From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 15:19:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56ab33ac-865b-b37e-75f2-a489424566c3@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMe9rOqf0OHL9397Vikgb=UWhRMf+FmGq-9VAJNmfmzNMMDkCw@mail.gmail.com>
On 3/9/20 2:12 PM, H.J. Lu wrote:
>> But what are the rules for clone()? Should there be rules for
>> mismatches for CET enabling between threads if a process (not child
>> processes)?
> What did you mean? A threaded application is either CET enabled or not
> CET enabled. A new thread from clone makes no difference.
Stacks are fundamentally thread-local resources. The registers that
point to them and MSRs that manage shadow stacks are all CPU-thread
local. Nothing is fundamentally tied to the address space shared across
the process.
A thread might also share *no* control flow with its child. It might
ask the thread to start in code that the parent can never even reach.
It sounds like you've picked a Linux implementation that has
restrictions on top of the fundamentals. That's not wrong per se, but
it does deserve explanation and deliberate, not experimental design.
Could you go back to the folks at Intel and try to figure out what this
was designed to *do*? Yes, I'm probably one of those folks. You know
where to find me. :)
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.ne>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 15:19:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56ab33ac-865b-b37e-75f2-a489424566c3@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMe9rOqf0OHL9397Vikgb=UWhRMf+FmGq-9VAJNmfmzNMMDkCw@mail.gmail.com>
On 3/9/20 2:12 PM, H.J. Lu wrote:
>> But what are the rules for clone()? Should there be rules for
>> mismatches for CET enabling between threads if a process (not child
>> processes)?
> What did you mean? A threaded application is either CET enabled or not
> CET enabled. A new thread from clone makes no difference.
Stacks are fundamentally thread-local resources. The registers that
point to them and MSRs that manage shadow stacks are all CPU-thread
local. Nothing is fundamentally tied to the address space shared across
the process.
A thread might also share *no* control flow with its child. It might
ask the thread to start in code that the parent can never even reach.
It sounds like you've picked a Linux implementation that has
restrictions on top of the fundamentals. That's not wrong per se, but
it does deserve explanation and deliberate, not experimental design.
Could you go back to the folks at Intel and try to figure out what this
was designed to *do*? Yes, I'm probably one of those folks. You know
where to find me. :)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-09 22:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 264+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 20:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-03-09 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57 ` Pavel Machek
2020-02-26 19:57 ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:16 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 1:16 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 21:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 22:47 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 22:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:34 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:34 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27 0:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 0:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook
2020-02-25 21:31 ` Kees Cook
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