From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 13:22:07 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202003251319.AECA788D63@keescook> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200325132127.GB12236@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:21:27PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote: > On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:31PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly > > 5 bits of entropy. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > Just to check, do you have an idea of the impact on arm64? Patch 3 had > figures for x86 where it reads the TSC, and it's unclear to me how > get_random_int() compares to that. I didn't do a measurement on arm64 since I don't have a good bare-metal test environment. I know Andy Lutomirki has plans for making get_random_get() as fast as possible, so that's why I used it here. I couldn't figure out if there was a comparable instruction like rdtsc in aarch64 (it seems there's a cycle counter, but I found nothing in the kernel that seemed to actually use it)? > Otherwise, this looks sound to me; I'd jsut like to know whether the > overhead is in the same ballpark. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 13:22:07 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202003251319.AECA788D63@keescook> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200325132127.GB12236@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:21:27PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote: > On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:31PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly > > 5 bits of entropy. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > Just to check, do you have an idea of the impact on arm64? Patch 3 had > figures for x86 where it reads the TSC, and it's unclear to me how > get_random_int() compares to that. I didn't do a measurement on arm64 since I don't have a good bare-metal test environment. I know Andy Lutomirki has plans for making get_random_get() as fast as possible, so that's why I used it here. I couldn't figure out if there was a comparable instruction like rdtsc in aarch64 (it seems there's a cycle counter, but I found nothing in the kernel that seemed to actually use it)? > Otherwise, this looks sound to me; I'd jsut like to know whether the > overhead is in the same ballpark. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-25 20:22 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-03-24 20:32 [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 22:06 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-03-24 22:06 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 11:25 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 11:25 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-28 22:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-28 22:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 13:21 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-25 13:21 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-25 20:22 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2020-03-25 20:22 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-26 16:31 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 16:31 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 11:26 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 11:26 ` Mark Rutland 2020-04-20 20:54 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 20:54 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 22:34 ` Kees Cook 2020-04-20 22:34 ` Kees Cook 2020-04-21 7:02 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-21 7:02 ` Will Deacon 2020-03-24 21:28 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Jann Horn 2020-03-24 21:28 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-24 21:28 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-24 23:07 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 23:07 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook
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