From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 22:28:35 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAG48ez3yYkMdxEEW6sJzBC5BZSbzEZKnpWzco32p-TJx7y_srg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org> On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 9:32 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add > kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the previous > discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack > determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea > but we have no examples of attacks". :) [...] > [1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html This one only starts using the stack's location after having parsed it out of dmesg (which in any environment that wants to provide a reasonable level of security really ought to be restricted to root), right? If you give people read access to dmesg, they can leak all sorts of pointers; not just the stack pointer, but also whatever else happens to be in the registers at that point - which is likely to give the attacker more ways to place controlled data at a known location. See e.g. <https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-cache-invalidation-bug-in-linux.html>, which leaks the pointer to a BPF map out of dmesg. Also, are you sure that it isn't possible to make the syscall that leaked its stack pointer never return to userspace (via ptrace or SIGSTOP or something like that), and therefore never realign its stack, while keeping some controlled data present on the syscall's stack? > [2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf That's a moderately large document; which specific part are you referencing?
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 22:28:35 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAG48ez3yYkMdxEEW6sJzBC5BZSbzEZKnpWzco32p-TJx7y_srg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org> On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 9:32 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add > kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the previous > discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack > determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea > but we have no examples of attacks". :) [...] > [1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html This one only starts using the stack's location after having parsed it out of dmesg (which in any environment that wants to provide a reasonable level of security really ought to be restricted to root), right? If you give people read access to dmesg, they can leak all sorts of pointers; not just the stack pointer, but also whatever else happens to be in the registers at that point - which is likely to give the attacker more ways to place controlled data at a known location. See e.g. <https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-cache-invalidation-bug-in-linux.html>, which leaks the pointer to a BPF map out of dmesg. Also, are you sure that it isn't possible to make the syscall that leaked its stack pointer never return to userspace (via ptrace or SIGSTOP or something like that), and therefore never realign its stack, while keeping some controlled data present on the syscall's stack? > [2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf That's a moderately large document; which specific part are you referencing? _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-24 21:29 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-03-24 20:32 [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 22:06 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-03-24 22:06 ` Peter Zijlstra 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-26 15:48 ` Alexander Potapenko 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 11:25 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 11:25 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-28 22:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-28 22:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook 2020-03-24 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 13:21 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-25 13:21 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-25 20:22 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 20:22 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-26 16:31 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 16:31 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-30 11:26 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-30 11:26 ` Mark Rutland 2020-04-20 20:54 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 20:54 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 22:34 ` Kees Cook 2020-04-20 22:34 ` Kees Cook 2020-04-21 7:02 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-21 7:02 ` Will Deacon 2020-03-24 21:28 ` Jann Horn [this message] 2020-03-24 21:28 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Jann Horn 2020-03-24 21:28 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-24 23:07 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-24 23:07 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 12:15 ` Reshetova, Elena 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 20:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-25 23:20 ` Jann Horn 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-03-26 17:18 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=CAG48ez3yYkMdxEEW6sJzBC5BZSbzEZKnpWzco32p-TJx7y_srg@mail.gmail.com \ --to=jannh@google.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \ --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \ --cc=enrico.perla@intel.com \ --cc=glider@google.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \ --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \ --cc=peterz@infradead.org \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=will@kernel.org \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.