[PATCH v2] perf stat: force error in fallback on :k events

* [PATCH v2] perf stat: force error in fallback on :k events
@ 2020-04-14 16:15 Ian Rogers
  2020-04-15  9:18 ` Jiri Olsa
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Ian Rogers @ 2020-04-14 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
	Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Kim,
	linux-kernel
  Cc: Stephane Eranian, Ian Rogers

From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>

When it is not possible for a non-privilege perf command
to monitor at the kernel level (:k), the fallback code forces
a :u. That works if the event was previously monitoring both levels.
But if the event was already constrained to kernel only, then it does
not make sense to restrict it to user only.
Given the code works by exclusion, a kernel only event would have:
attr->exclude_user = 1
The fallback code would add:
attr->exclude_kernel = 1;

In the end the end would not monitor in either the user level or kernel
level. In other words, it would count nothing.

An event programmed to monitor kernel only cannot be switched to user only
without seriously warning the user.

This patch forces an error in this case to make it clear the request
cannot really be satisfied.

Behavior with paranoid 1:
$ sudo bash -c "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
$ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1

 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

         1,520,413      cycles:k

       1.002361664 seconds time elapsed

       0.002480000 seconds user
       0.000000000 seconds sys

Old behavior with paranoid 2:
$ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
$ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
 Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

                 0      cycles:ku

       1.002358127 seconds time elapsed

       0.002384000 seconds user
       0.000000000 seconds sys

New behavior with paranoid 2:
$ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
$ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
Error:
You may not have permission to collect stats.

Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,
which controls use of the performance events system by
unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The current value is 2:

  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
>= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:

        kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1

v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from jolsa@redhat.com.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index d23db6755f51..b4e8bcb5ab05 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2446,6 +2446,10 @@ bool perf_evsel__fallback(struct evsel *evsel, int err,
 		char *new_name;
 		const char *sep = ":";
 
+		/* If event has exclude user then don't exclude kernel. */
+		if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)
+			return false;
+
 		/* Is there already the separator in the name. */
 		if (strchr(name, '/') ||
 		    strchr(name, ':'))
-- 
2.26.0.110.g2183baf09c-goog


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