From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Subject: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:42:46 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "guest-memory-protection" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, though. Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion. Changes since v1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (18): target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface guest memory protection: Perform KVM init via interface guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 40 +-- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 - accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 - backends/Makefile.objs | 2 + backends/guest-memory-protection.c | 29 ++ hw/core/machine.c | 61 ++++- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 +- include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h | 77 ++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 4 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 17 -- include/sysemu/sev.h | 6 +- target/i386/sev.c | 351 +++++++++++++------------ target/i386/sev_i386.h | 49 ---- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 81 ++++++ 15 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 299 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/guest-memory-protection.c create mode 100644 include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c -- 2.26.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, cohuck@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:42:46 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "guest-memory-protection" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, though. Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion. Changes since v1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (18): target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface guest memory protection: Perform KVM init via interface guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 40 +-- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 - accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 - backends/Makefile.objs | 2 + backends/guest-memory-protection.c | 29 ++ hw/core/machine.c | 61 ++++- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 +- include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h | 77 ++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 4 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 17 -- include/sysemu/sev.h | 6 +- target/i386/sev.c | 351 +++++++++++++------------ target/i386/sev_i386.h | 49 ---- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 81 ++++++ 15 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 299 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/guest-memory-protection.c create mode 100644 include/exec/guest-memory-protection.h create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c -- 2.26.2
next reply other threads:[~2020-05-21 3:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-21 3:42 David Gibson [this message] 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:01 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:04 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:05 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:05 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:06 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:07 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:08 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:11 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:09 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:16 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:18 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 1:44 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:21 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:39 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-02 3:45 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:41 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:54 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 4:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:16 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 4:15 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson 2020-05-29 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
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