From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Subject: [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:43:03 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-18-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected Execution Framework) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are quite different. Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs. Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference which depends on havint the right hardware and firmware, we don't enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to create a "pef-guest" object and set the guest-memory-protection machine property to point to it. Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter secure mode, so we can't know if the guest actually is secure until well after machine creation time. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c diff --git a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs index e8fa18ce13..ac93b9700e 100644 --- a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs +++ b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-y += machine.o mmu_helper.o mmu-hash32.o monitor.o arch_dump.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-hash64.o mmu-book3s-v3.o compat.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-radix64.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o pef.o obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o obj-y += dfp_helper.o obj-y += excp_helper.o diff --git a/target/ppc/pef.c b/target/ppc/pef.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..823daf3e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/ppc/pef.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * PEF (Protected Execution Framework) for POWER support + * + * Copyright David Gibson, Redhat Inc. 2020 + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later. + * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#define TYPE_PEF_GUEST "pef-guest" +#define PEF_GUEST(obj) \ + OBJECT_CHECK(PefGuestState, (obj), TYPE_SEV_GUEST) + +typedef struct PefGuestState PefGuestState; + +/** + * PefGuestState: + * + * The PefGuestState object is used for creating and managing a PEF + * guest. + * + * # $QEMU \ + * -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \ + * -machine ...,guest-memory-protection=pef0 + */ +struct PefGuestState { + Object parent_obj; +}; + +static Error *pef_mig_blocker; + +static int pef_kvm_init(GuestMemoryProtection *gmpo, Error **errp) +{ + PefGuestState *pef = PEF_GUEST(gmpo); + + if (!kvm_check_extension(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST)) { + error_setg(errp, + "KVM implementation does not support Secure VMs (is an ultravisor running?)"); + return -1; + } else { + int ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST, 0, 1); + + if (ret < 0) { + error_setg(errp, + "Error enabling PEF with KVM"); + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void pef_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) +{ + GuestMemoryProtectionClass *gmpc = GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION_CLASS(oc); + + gmpc->kvm_init = pef_kvm_init; +} + +static const TypeInfo pef_guest_info = { + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .name = TYPE_PEF_GUEST, + .instance_size = sizeof(PefGuestState), + .class_init = pef_guest_class_init, + .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) { + { TYPE_GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION }, + { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE }, + { } + } +}; + +static void +pef_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&pef_guest_info); +} + +type_init(pef_register_types); -- 2.26.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, cohuck@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:43:03 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200521034304.340040-18-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected Execution Framework) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are quite different. Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs. Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference which depends on havint the right hardware and firmware, we don't enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to create a "pef-guest" object and set the guest-memory-protection machine property to point to it. Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter secure mode, so we can't know if the guest actually is secure until well after machine creation time. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c diff --git a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs index e8fa18ce13..ac93b9700e 100644 --- a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs +++ b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-y += machine.o mmu_helper.o mmu-hash32.o monitor.o arch_dump.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-hash64.o mmu-book3s-v3.o compat.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-radix64.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o pef.o obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o obj-y += dfp_helper.o obj-y += excp_helper.o diff --git a/target/ppc/pef.c b/target/ppc/pef.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..823daf3e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/target/ppc/pef.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * PEF (Protected Execution Framework) for POWER support + * + * Copyright David Gibson, Redhat Inc. 2020 + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later. + * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#define TYPE_PEF_GUEST "pef-guest" +#define PEF_GUEST(obj) \ + OBJECT_CHECK(PefGuestState, (obj), TYPE_SEV_GUEST) + +typedef struct PefGuestState PefGuestState; + +/** + * PefGuestState: + * + * The PefGuestState object is used for creating and managing a PEF + * guest. + * + * # $QEMU \ + * -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \ + * -machine ...,guest-memory-protection=pef0 + */ +struct PefGuestState { + Object parent_obj; +}; + +static Error *pef_mig_blocker; + +static int pef_kvm_init(GuestMemoryProtection *gmpo, Error **errp) +{ + PefGuestState *pef = PEF_GUEST(gmpo); + + if (!kvm_check_extension(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST)) { + error_setg(errp, + "KVM implementation does not support Secure VMs (is an ultravisor running?)"); + return -1; + } else { + int ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST, 0, 1); + + if (ret < 0) { + error_setg(errp, + "Error enabling PEF with KVM"); + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void pef_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) +{ + GuestMemoryProtectionClass *gmpc = GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION_CLASS(oc); + + gmpc->kvm_init = pef_kvm_init; +} + +static const TypeInfo pef_guest_info = { + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .name = TYPE_PEF_GUEST, + .instance_size = sizeof(PefGuestState), + .class_init = pef_guest_class_init, + .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) { + { TYPE_GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION }, + { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE }, + { } + } +}; + +static void +pef_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&pef_guest_info); +} + +type_init(pef_register_types); -- 2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-21 3:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-21 3:42 [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:01 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:04 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:05 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:05 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:06 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:07 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:08 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:11 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:09 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:16 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 3:18 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 1:44 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:21 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:39 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-02 3:45 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:41 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 3:54 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-02 4:13 ` Richard Henderson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-05-29 9:16 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2020-06-02 4:15 ` Richard Henderson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson [this message] 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic 2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson 2020-05-29 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson 2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
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