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From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ #26831]
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 18:53:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201104185342.GC4812@sirena.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8c2d08a7-5595-6221-8da8-a7cbf6e1d493@arm.com>

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On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 12:47:09PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> On 11/4/20 4:50 AM, Mark Brown wrote:

> > The effect on pre-BTI hardware is an issue, another option would be for
> > systemd to disable this seccomp usage but only after checking for BTI
> > support in the system rather than just doing so purely based on the
> > architecture.

> That works, but your also losing seccomp in the case where the machine is
> BTI capable, but the service isn't. So it should really be checking the elf
> notes, but at that point you might just as well patch glibc.

True, I guess I was assuming that a BTI rebuild is done at the distro
level but of course even if that's the case a system could have third
party binaries so you can't just assume that the world is BTI.

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ #26831]
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 18:53:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201104185342.GC4812@sirena.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8c2d08a7-5595-6221-8da8-a7cbf6e1d493@arm.com>


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On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 12:47:09PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> On 11/4/20 4:50 AM, Mark Brown wrote:

> > The effect on pre-BTI hardware is an issue, another option would be for
> > systemd to disable this seccomp usage but only after checking for BTI
> > support in the system rather than just doing so purely based on the
> > architecture.

> That works, but your also losing seccomp in the case where the machine is
> BTI capable, but the service isn't. So it should really be checking the elf
> notes, but at that point you might just as well patch glibc.

True, I guess I was assuming that a BTI rebuild is done at the distro
level but of course even if that's the case a system could have third
party binaries so you can't just assume that the world is BTI.

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-04 18:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-03 10:25 [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ #26831] Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:25 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:25 ` [PATCH 1/4] elf: Pass the fd to note processing " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:25   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] elf: Move note processing after l_phdr is updated " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:38   ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:38     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:38     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 12:36     ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 12:36       ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 12:36       ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 15:04       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 15:04         ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 15:27         ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 15:27           ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 15:27           ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] aarch64: Use mmap to add PROT_BTI instead of mprotect " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:34   ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:34     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:34     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] aarch64: Remove the bti link_map field " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) " Mark Brown
2020-11-03 17:34   ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04  5:41   ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04  5:41     ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04  8:57     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04  8:57       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 14:41       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 14:41         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 14:45         ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 14:45           ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 14:45           ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 10:50     ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04 10:50       ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04 18:47       ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04 18:47         ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04 18:53         ` Mark Brown [this message]
2020-11-04 18:53           ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04  9:02   ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04  9:02     ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04  9:20   ` Will Deacon
2020-11-04  9:20     ` Will Deacon
2020-11-04  9:29     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04  9:29       ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04  9:29       ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04  9:55       ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04  9:55         ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 14:35         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 14:35           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 15:19           ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 15:19             ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 16:08             ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 16:08               ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 15:20         ` Mark Rutland
2020-11-04 15:20           ` Mark Rutland
2020-11-04 18:59           ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04 18:59             ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-05 11:31     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-05 11:31       ` Szabolcs Nagy

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