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From: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:44:16 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210129174416.GC231819@dt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22db2bfb4d6551aed661a9ae95b4fdbef613ca21.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On 2021-01-26 11:36:46 -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
> state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
> 
> Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
> hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
> state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
> value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
> encrypted and measured. Search the guest firmware for the guest for a
> specific GUID that tells Qemu the value of the reset vector to use.
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c    | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c |  5 +++
>  hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c     | 10 +++++-
>  include/sysemu/kvm.h   | 16 +++++++++
>  include/sysemu/sev.h   |  3 ++
>  target/i386/kvm/kvm.c  |  2 ++
>  target/i386/sev.c      | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 3feb17d965..410879cf94 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
>  #include "qemu/main-loop.h"
>  #include "trace.h"
>  #include "hw/irq.h"
> +#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
>  #include "sysemu/sev.h"
>  #include "qapi/visitor.h"
>  #include "qapi/qapi-types-common.h"
> @@ -126,6 +127,12 @@ struct KVMState
>      /* memory encryption */
>      void *memcrypt_handle;
>      int (*memcrypt_encrypt_data)(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
> +    int (*memcrypt_save_reset_vector)(void *handle, void *flash_ptr,
> +                                      uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
> +
> +    uint32_t reset_cs;
> +    uint32_t reset_ip;
> +    bool reset_data_valid;
>  
>      /* For "info mtree -f" to tell if an MR is registered in KVM */
>      int nr_as;
> @@ -245,6 +252,62 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
>      return 1;
>  }
>  
> +void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
> +{
> +    X86CPU *x86;
> +    CPUX86State *env;
> +
> +    /* Only update if we have valid reset information */
> +    if (!kvm_state->reset_data_valid) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
> +    if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
> +    x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> +    env = &x86->env;
> +
> +    cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, kvm_state->reset_cs, 0xffff,
> +                           DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
> +                           DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
> +
> +    env->eip = kvm_state->reset_ip;
> +}
> +
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> +{
> +    CPUState *cpu;
> +    uint32_t addr;
> +    int ret;
> +
> +    if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled() &&
> +        kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector) {
> +
> +        addr = 0;
> +        ret = kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle,
> +                                                    flash_ptr, flash_size,
> +                                                    &addr);
> +        if (ret) {
> +            return ret;
> +        }
> +
> +        if (addr) {
> +            kvm_state->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
> +            kvm_state->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
> +            kvm_state->reset_data_valid = true;
> +
> +            CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
> +                kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(cpu);
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /* Called with KVMMemoryListener.slots_lock held */
>  static KVMSlot *kvm_get_free_slot(KVMMemoryListener *kml)
>  {
> @@ -2216,6 +2279,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
>          }
>  
>          kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
> +        kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector = sev_es_save_reset_vector;
>      }
>  
>      ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
> diff --git a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> index 680e099463..162c28429e 100644
> --- a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> +++ b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
>    return 1;
>  }
>  
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> +{
> +    return -ENOSYS;
> +}
> +
>  #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
>  int kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(KVMState *s, int vector, PCIDevice *dev)
>  {
> diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> index 436b78c587..edec28842d 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> @@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
>      PFlashCFI01 *system_flash;
>      MemoryRegion *flash_mem;
>      void *flash_ptr;
> -    int ret, flash_size;
> +    uint64_t flash_size;
> +    int ret;
>  
>      assert(PC_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(pcms)->pci_enabled);
>  
> @@ -301,6 +302,13 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
>                   * search for them
>                   */
>                  pc_system_parse_ovmf_flash(flash_ptr, flash_size);
> +
> +                ret = kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(flash_ptr, flash_size);
> +                if (ret) {
> +                    error_report("failed to locate and/or save reset vector");
> +                    exit(1);
> +                }
> +
>                  ret = kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(flash_ptr, flash_size);
>                  if (ret) {
>                      error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/kvm.h b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> index bb5d5cf497..875ca101e3 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> @@ -249,6 +249,22 @@ bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void);
>   */
>  int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
>  
> +/**
> + * kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector - sets the CS/IP value for the AP if SEV-ES
> + *                                 is active.
> + */
> +void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu);
> +
> +/**
> + * kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector - locates and saves the reset vector to be
> + *                                  used as the initial CS/IP value for APs
> + *                                  if SEV-ES is active.
> + *
> + * Return: 1 SEV-ES is active and failed to locate a valid reset vector
> + *         0 SEV-ES is not active or successfully located and saved the
> + *           reset vector address
> + */
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_prt, uint64_t flash_size);
>  
>  #ifdef NEED_CPU_H
>  #include "cpu.h"
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> index 7ab6e3e31d..6f5ad3fd03 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> @@ -20,4 +20,7 @@ void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
>  int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
>  int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
>                               uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
> +int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr,
> +                             uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
> +
>  #endif
> diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> index 6dc1ee052d..aaae79557d 100644
> --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> @@ -1920,6 +1920,8 @@ void kvm_arch_reset_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
>      }
>      /* enabled by default */
>      env->poll_control_msr = 1;
> +
> +    kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPU(cpu));
>  }
>  
>  void kvm_arch_do_init_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index ddec7ebaa7..badc141554 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
>  #include "qemu/base64.h"
>  #include "qemu/module.h"
> +#include "qemu/uuid.h"
>  #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
>  #include "sev_i386.h"
>  #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
> @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
>  #include "qom/object.h"
>  #include "exec/address-spaces.h"
>  #include "monitor/monitor.h"
> +#include "hw/i386/pc.h"
>  
>  #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
>  OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
> @@ -71,6 +73,12 @@ struct SevGuestState {
>  #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY    0x1 /* disable debug */
>  #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE      "/dev/sev"
>  
> +#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID     "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
> +typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {
> +    /* SEV-ES Reset Vector Address */
> +    uint32_t reset_addr;
> +} SevInfoBlock;
> +
>  static SevGuestState *sev_guest;
>  static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
>  
> @@ -896,6 +904,72 @@ int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr, const char *secret,
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int
> +sev_es_parse_reset_block(SevInfoBlock *info, uint32_t *addr)
> +{
> +    if (!info->reset_addr) {
> +        error_report("SEV-ES reset address is zero");
> +        return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    *addr = info->reset_addr;
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int
> +sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size,
> +                         uint32_t *addr)
> +{
> +    QemuUUID info_guid, *guid;
> +    SevInfoBlock *info;
> +    uint8_t *data;
> +    uint16_t *len;
> +
> +    assert(handle);
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Initialize the address to zero. An address of zero with a successful
> +     * return code indicates that SEV-ES is not active.
> +     */
> +    *addr = 0;
> +    if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Extract the AP reset vector for SEV-ES guests by locating the SEV GUID.
> +     * The SEV GUID is located on its own (original implementation) or within
> +     * the Firmware GUID Table (new implementation), either of which are
> +     * located 32 bytes from the end of the flash.
> +     *
> +     * Check the Firmware GUID Table first.
> +     */
> +    if (pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
> +        return sev_es_parse_reset_block((SevInfoBlock *)data, addr);
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * SEV info block not found in the Firmware GUID Table (or there isn't
> +     * a Firmware GUID Table), fall back to the original implementation.
> +     */
> +    data = flash_ptr + flash_size - 0x20;

Even if the SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID is always located at 32 bytes from the end
of the flash, isn't it better to define a constant with a value of 0x20?

> +
> +    qemu_uuid_parse(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &info_guid);
> +    info_guid = qemu_uuid_bswap(info_guid); /* GUIDs are LE */
> +
> +    guid = (QemuUUID *)(data - sizeof(info_guid));
> +    if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(guid, &info_guid)) {
> +        error_report("SEV information block/Firmware GUID Table block not found in pflash rom");
> +        return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    len = (uint16_t *)((uint8_t *)guid - sizeof(*len));
> +    info = (SevInfoBlock *)(data - le16_to_cpu(*len));
> +
> +    return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr);
> +}
> +
>  static void
>  sev_register_types(void)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.30.0
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:44:16 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210129174416.GC231819@dt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22db2bfb4d6551aed661a9ae95b4fdbef613ca21.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On 2021-01-26 11:36:46 -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
> state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
> 
> Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
> hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
> state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
> value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
> encrypted and measured. Search the guest firmware for the guest for a
> specific GUID that tells Qemu the value of the reset vector to use.
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
> Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c    | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c |  5 +++
>  hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c     | 10 +++++-
>  include/sysemu/kvm.h   | 16 +++++++++
>  include/sysemu/sev.h   |  3 ++
>  target/i386/kvm/kvm.c  |  2 ++
>  target/i386/sev.c      | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 3feb17d965..410879cf94 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
>  #include "qemu/main-loop.h"
>  #include "trace.h"
>  #include "hw/irq.h"
> +#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
>  #include "sysemu/sev.h"
>  #include "qapi/visitor.h"
>  #include "qapi/qapi-types-common.h"
> @@ -126,6 +127,12 @@ struct KVMState
>      /* memory encryption */
>      void *memcrypt_handle;
>      int (*memcrypt_encrypt_data)(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
> +    int (*memcrypt_save_reset_vector)(void *handle, void *flash_ptr,
> +                                      uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
> +
> +    uint32_t reset_cs;
> +    uint32_t reset_ip;
> +    bool reset_data_valid;
>  
>      /* For "info mtree -f" to tell if an MR is registered in KVM */
>      int nr_as;
> @@ -245,6 +252,62 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
>      return 1;
>  }
>  
> +void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
> +{
> +    X86CPU *x86;
> +    CPUX86State *env;
> +
> +    /* Only update if we have valid reset information */
> +    if (!kvm_state->reset_data_valid) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
> +    if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +
> +    x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
> +    env = &x86->env;
> +
> +    cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, kvm_state->reset_cs, 0xffff,
> +                           DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
> +                           DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
> +
> +    env->eip = kvm_state->reset_ip;
> +}
> +
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> +{
> +    CPUState *cpu;
> +    uint32_t addr;
> +    int ret;
> +
> +    if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled() &&
> +        kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector) {
> +
> +        addr = 0;
> +        ret = kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle,
> +                                                    flash_ptr, flash_size,
> +                                                    &addr);
> +        if (ret) {
> +            return ret;
> +        }
> +
> +        if (addr) {
> +            kvm_state->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
> +            kvm_state->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
> +            kvm_state->reset_data_valid = true;
> +
> +            CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
> +                kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(cpu);
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /* Called with KVMMemoryListener.slots_lock held */
>  static KVMSlot *kvm_get_free_slot(KVMMemoryListener *kml)
>  {
> @@ -2216,6 +2279,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
>          }
>  
>          kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
> +        kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector = sev_es_save_reset_vector;
>      }
>  
>      ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
> diff --git a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> index 680e099463..162c28429e 100644
> --- a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> +++ b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
>    return 1;
>  }
>  
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
> +{
> +    return -ENOSYS;
> +}
> +
>  #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
>  int kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(KVMState *s, int vector, PCIDevice *dev)
>  {
> diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> index 436b78c587..edec28842d 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
> @@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
>      PFlashCFI01 *system_flash;
>      MemoryRegion *flash_mem;
>      void *flash_ptr;
> -    int ret, flash_size;
> +    uint64_t flash_size;
> +    int ret;
>  
>      assert(PC_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(pcms)->pci_enabled);
>  
> @@ -301,6 +302,13 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
>                   * search for them
>                   */
>                  pc_system_parse_ovmf_flash(flash_ptr, flash_size);
> +
> +                ret = kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(flash_ptr, flash_size);
> +                if (ret) {
> +                    error_report("failed to locate and/or save reset vector");
> +                    exit(1);
> +                }
> +
>                  ret = kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(flash_ptr, flash_size);
>                  if (ret) {
>                      error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/kvm.h b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> index bb5d5cf497..875ca101e3 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> @@ -249,6 +249,22 @@ bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void);
>   */
>  int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
>  
> +/**
> + * kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector - sets the CS/IP value for the AP if SEV-ES
> + *                                 is active.
> + */
> +void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu);
> +
> +/**
> + * kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector - locates and saves the reset vector to be
> + *                                  used as the initial CS/IP value for APs
> + *                                  if SEV-ES is active.
> + *
> + * Return: 1 SEV-ES is active and failed to locate a valid reset vector
> + *         0 SEV-ES is not active or successfully located and saved the
> + *           reset vector address
> + */
> +int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_prt, uint64_t flash_size);
>  
>  #ifdef NEED_CPU_H
>  #include "cpu.h"
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> index 7ab6e3e31d..6f5ad3fd03 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> @@ -20,4 +20,7 @@ void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
>  int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
>  int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
>                               uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
> +int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr,
> +                             uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
> +
>  #endif
> diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> index 6dc1ee052d..aaae79557d 100644
> --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
> @@ -1920,6 +1920,8 @@ void kvm_arch_reset_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
>      }
>      /* enabled by default */
>      env->poll_control_msr = 1;
> +
> +    kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPU(cpu));
>  }
>  
>  void kvm_arch_do_init_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index ddec7ebaa7..badc141554 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
>  #include "qemu/base64.h"
>  #include "qemu/module.h"
> +#include "qemu/uuid.h"
>  #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
>  #include "sev_i386.h"
>  #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
> @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
>  #include "qom/object.h"
>  #include "exec/address-spaces.h"
>  #include "monitor/monitor.h"
> +#include "hw/i386/pc.h"
>  
>  #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
>  OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
> @@ -71,6 +73,12 @@ struct SevGuestState {
>  #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY    0x1 /* disable debug */
>  #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE      "/dev/sev"
>  
> +#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID     "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
> +typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {
> +    /* SEV-ES Reset Vector Address */
> +    uint32_t reset_addr;
> +} SevInfoBlock;
> +
>  static SevGuestState *sev_guest;
>  static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
>  
> @@ -896,6 +904,72 @@ int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr, const char *secret,
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int
> +sev_es_parse_reset_block(SevInfoBlock *info, uint32_t *addr)
> +{
> +    if (!info->reset_addr) {
> +        error_report("SEV-ES reset address is zero");
> +        return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    *addr = info->reset_addr;
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int
> +sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size,
> +                         uint32_t *addr)
> +{
> +    QemuUUID info_guid, *guid;
> +    SevInfoBlock *info;
> +    uint8_t *data;
> +    uint16_t *len;
> +
> +    assert(handle);
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Initialize the address to zero. An address of zero with a successful
> +     * return code indicates that SEV-ES is not active.
> +     */
> +    *addr = 0;
> +    if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
> +        return 0;
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Extract the AP reset vector for SEV-ES guests by locating the SEV GUID.
> +     * The SEV GUID is located on its own (original implementation) or within
> +     * the Firmware GUID Table (new implementation), either of which are
> +     * located 32 bytes from the end of the flash.
> +     *
> +     * Check the Firmware GUID Table first.
> +     */
> +    if (pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
> +        return sev_es_parse_reset_block((SevInfoBlock *)data, addr);
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * SEV info block not found in the Firmware GUID Table (or there isn't
> +     * a Firmware GUID Table), fall back to the original implementation.
> +     */
> +    data = flash_ptr + flash_size - 0x20;

Even if the SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID is always located at 32 bytes from the end
of the flash, isn't it better to define a constant with a value of 0x20?

> +
> +    qemu_uuid_parse(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &info_guid);
> +    info_guid = qemu_uuid_bswap(info_guid); /* GUIDs are LE */
> +
> +    guid = (QemuUUID *)(data - sizeof(info_guid));
> +    if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(guid, &info_guid)) {
> +        error_report("SEV information block/Firmware GUID Table block not found in pflash rom");
> +        return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    len = (uint16_t *)((uint8_t *)guid - sizeof(*len));
> +    info = (SevInfoBlock *)(data - le16_to_cpu(*len));
> +
> +    return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr);
> +}
> +
>  static void
>  sev_register_types(void)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.30.0
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-29 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-26 17:36 [PATCH v6 0/6] Qemu SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:39   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-29 17:39     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:41   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-29 17:41     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:44   ` Venu Busireddy [this message]
2021-01-29 17:44     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-02-01 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-01 18:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:44   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-29 17:44     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-29 17:46     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-26 17:36 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy Tom Lendacky
2021-01-26 17:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-29 17:46   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-01-29 17:46     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-02-05 10:59 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] Qemu SEV-ES guest support Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-05 10:59   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-08 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-08 15:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-08 16:31     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-08 16:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-08 17:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-08 17:35         ` Tom Lendacky

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