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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho  Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 13:20:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210211112008.GH242749@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCTtSrCEvuBug2ap@dhcp22.suse.cz>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:39:38AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 11-02-21 09:13:19, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 02:17:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > On Tue 09-02-21 11:09:38, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> [...]
> > > > Citing my older email:
> > > > 
> > > >     I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
> > > >     add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
> > > >     started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
> > > >     independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
> > > 
> > > Could you elaborate? Unmapping from the kernel address space can work
> > > both for sealed or hugetlb memfds, no? Those features are completely
> > > orthogonal AFAICS. With a dedicated syscall you will need to introduce
> > > this functionality on top if that is required. Have you considered that?
> > > I mean hugetlb pages are used to back guest memory very often. Is this
> > > something that will be a secret memory usecase?
> > > 
> > > Please be really specific when giving arguments to back a new syscall
> > > decision.
> > 
> > Isn't "syscalls have completely independent description" specific enough?
> 
> No, it's not as you can see from questions I've had above. More on that
> below.
> 
> > We are talking about API here, not the implementation details whether
> > secretmem supports large pages or not.
> > 
> > The purpose of memfd_create() is to create a file-like access to memory.
> > The purpose of memfd_secret() is to create a way to access memory hidden
> > from the kernel.
> > 
> > I don't think overloading memfd_create() with the secretmem flags because
> > they happen to return a file descriptor will be better for users, but
> > rather will be more confusing.
> 
> This is quite a subjective conclusion. I could very well argue that it
> would be much better to have a single syscall to get a fd backed memory
> with spedific requirements (sealing, unmapping from the kernel address
> space). 

> Neither of us would be clearly right or wrong.

100% agree :)

> A more important point is a future extensibility and usability, though.
> So let's just think of few usecases I have outlined above. Is it
> unrealistic to expect that secret memory should be sealable? What about
> hugetlb? Because if the answer is no then a new API is a clear win as the
> combination of flags would never work and then we would just suffer from
> the syscall multiplexing without much gain. On the other hand if
> combination of the functionality is to be expected then you will have to
> jam it into memfd_create and copy the interface likely causing more
> confusion. See what I mean?

I see your point, but I think that overloading memfd_create definitely gets
us into syscall multiplexing from day one and support for seals and huge
pages in the secretmem will not make it less of a multiplexer.

Sealing is anyway controlled via fcntl() and I don't think
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING makes much sense for the secretmem because it is there to
prevent rogue file sealing in tmpfs/hugetlbfs.

As for the huge pages, I'm not sure at all that supporting huge pages in
secretmem will involve hugetlbfs. And even if yes, adding SECRETMEM_HUGE
flag seems to me less confusing than saying "from kernel x.y you can use
MFD_CREATE | MFD_SECRET | MFD_HUGE" etc for all possible combinations.
 
> I by no means do not insist one way or the other but from what I have
> seen so far I have a feeling that the interface hasn't been thought
> through enough.

It has been, but we have different thoughts about it ;-)

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 13:20:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210211112008.GH242749@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCTtSrCEvuBug2ap@dhcp22.suse.cz>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:39:38AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 11-02-21 09:13:19, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 02:17:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > On Tue 09-02-21 11:09:38, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> [...]
> > > > Citing my older email:
> > > > 
> > > >     I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
> > > >     add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
> > > >     started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
> > > >     independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
> > > 
> > > Could you elaborate? Unmapping from the kernel address space can work
> > > both for sealed or hugetlb memfds, no? Those features are completely
> > > orthogonal AFAICS. With a dedicated syscall you will need to introduce
> > > this functionality on top if that is required. Have you considered that?
> > > I mean hugetlb pages are used to back guest memory very often. Is this
> > > something that will be a secret memory usecase?
> > > 
> > > Please be really specific when giving arguments to back a new syscall
> > > decision.
> > 
> > Isn't "syscalls have completely independent description" specific enough?
> 
> No, it's not as you can see from questions I've had above. More on that
> below.
> 
> > We are talking about API here, not the implementation details whether
> > secretmem supports large pages or not.
> > 
> > The purpose of memfd_create() is to create a file-like access to memory.
> > The purpose of memfd_secret() is to create a way to access memory hidden
> > from the kernel.
> > 
> > I don't think overloading memfd_create() with the secretmem flags because
> > they happen to return a file descriptor will be better for users, but
> > rather will be more confusing.
> 
> This is quite a subjective conclusion. I could very well argue that it
> would be much better to have a single syscall to get a fd backed memory
> with spedific requirements (sealing, unmapping from the kernel address
> space). 

> Neither of us would be clearly right or wrong.

100% agree :)

> A more important point is a future extensibility and usability, though.
> So let's just think of few usecases I have outlined above. Is it
> unrealistic to expect that secret memory should be sealable? What about
> hugetlb? Because if the answer is no then a new API is a clear win as the
> combination of flags would never work and then we would just suffer from
> the syscall multiplexing without much gain. On the other hand if
> combination of the functionality is to be expected then you will have to
> jam it into memfd_create and copy the interface likely causing more
> confusion. See what I mean?

I see your point, but I think that overloading memfd_create definitely gets
us into syscall multiplexing from day one and support for seals and huge
pages in the secretmem will not make it less of a multiplexer.

Sealing is anyway controlled via fcntl() and I don't think
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING makes much sense for the secretmem because it is there to
prevent rogue file sealing in tmpfs/hugetlbfs.

As for the huge pages, I'm not sure at all that supporting huge pages in
secretmem will involve hugetlbfs. And even if yes, adding SECRETMEM_HUGE
flag seems to me less confusing than saying "from kernel x.y you can use
MFD_CREATE | MFD_SECRET | MFD_HUGE" etc for all possible combinations.
 
> I by no means do not insist one way or the other but from what I have
> seen so far I have a feeling that the interface hasn't been thought
> through enough.

It has been, but we have different thoughts about it ;-)

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 13:20:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210211112008.GH242749@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCTtSrCEvuBug2ap@dhcp22.suse.cz>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:39:38AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 11-02-21 09:13:19, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 02:17:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > On Tue 09-02-21 11:09:38, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> [...]
> > > > Citing my older email:
> > > > 
> > > >     I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
> > > >     add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
> > > >     started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
> > > >     independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
> > > 
> > > Could you elaborate? Unmapping from the kernel address space can work
> > > both for sealed or hugetlb memfds, no? Those features are completely
> > > orthogonal AFAICS. With a dedicated syscall you will need to introduce
> > > this functionality on top if that is required. Have you considered that?
> > > I mean hugetlb pages are used to back guest memory very often. Is this
> > > something that will be a secret memory usecase?
> > > 
> > > Please be really specific when giving arguments to back a new syscall
> > > decision.
> > 
> > Isn't "syscalls have completely independent description" specific enough?
> 
> No, it's not as you can see from questions I've had above. More on that
> below.
> 
> > We are talking about API here, not the implementation details whether
> > secretmem supports large pages or not.
> > 
> > The purpose of memfd_create() is to create a file-like access to memory.
> > The purpose of memfd_secret() is to create a way to access memory hidden
> > from the kernel.
> > 
> > I don't think overloading memfd_create() with the secretmem flags because
> > they happen to return a file descriptor will be better for users, but
> > rather will be more confusing.
> 
> This is quite a subjective conclusion. I could very well argue that it
> would be much better to have a single syscall to get a fd backed memory
> with spedific requirements (sealing, unmapping from the kernel address
> space). 

> Neither of us would be clearly right or wrong.

100% agree :)

> A more important point is a future extensibility and usability, though.
> So let's just think of few usecases I have outlined above. Is it
> unrealistic to expect that secret memory should be sealable? What about
> hugetlb? Because if the answer is no then a new API is a clear win as the
> combination of flags would never work and then we would just suffer from
> the syscall multiplexing without much gain. On the other hand if
> combination of the functionality is to be expected then you will have to
> jam it into memfd_create and copy the interface likely causing more
> confusion. See what I mean?

I see your point, but I think that overloading memfd_create definitely gets
us into syscall multiplexing from day one and support for seals and huge
pages in the secretmem will not make it less of a multiplexer.

Sealing is anyway controlled via fcntl() and I don't think
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING makes much sense for the secretmem because it is there to
prevent rogue file sealing in tmpfs/hugetlbfs.

As for the huge pages, I'm not sure at all that supporting huge pages in
secretmem will involve hugetlbfs. And even if yes, adding SECRETMEM_HUGE
flag seems to me less confusing than saying "from kernel x.y you can use
MFD_CREATE | MFD_SECRET | MFD_HUGE" etc for all possible combinations.
 
> I by no means do not insist one way or the other but from what I have
> seen so far I have a feeling that the interface hasn't been thought
> through enough.

It has been, but we have different thoughts about it ;-)

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 13:20:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210211112008.GH242749@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCTtSrCEvuBug2ap@dhcp22.suse.cz>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:39:38AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 11-02-21 09:13:19, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 02:17:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > On Tue 09-02-21 11:09:38, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> [...]
> > > > Citing my older email:
> > > > 
> > > >     I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
> > > >     add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
> > > >     started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
> > > >     independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.
> > > 
> > > Could you elaborate? Unmapping from the kernel address space can work
> > > both for sealed or hugetlb memfds, no? Those features are completely
> > > orthogonal AFAICS. With a dedicated syscall you will need to introduce
> > > this functionality on top if that is required. Have you considered that?
> > > I mean hugetlb pages are used to back guest memory very often. Is this
> > > something that will be a secret memory usecase?
> > > 
> > > Please be really specific when giving arguments to back a new syscall
> > > decision.
> > 
> > Isn't "syscalls have completely independent description" specific enough?
> 
> No, it's not as you can see from questions I've had above. More on that
> below.
> 
> > We are talking about API here, not the implementation details whether
> > secretmem supports large pages or not.
> > 
> > The purpose of memfd_create() is to create a file-like access to memory.
> > The purpose of memfd_secret() is to create a way to access memory hidden
> > from the kernel.
> > 
> > I don't think overloading memfd_create() with the secretmem flags because
> > they happen to return a file descriptor will be better for users, but
> > rather will be more confusing.
> 
> This is quite a subjective conclusion. I could very well argue that it
> would be much better to have a single syscall to get a fd backed memory
> with spedific requirements (sealing, unmapping from the kernel address
> space). 

> Neither of us would be clearly right or wrong.

100% agree :)

> A more important point is a future extensibility and usability, though.
> So let's just think of few usecases I have outlined above. Is it
> unrealistic to expect that secret memory should be sealable? What about
> hugetlb? Because if the answer is no then a new API is a clear win as the
> combination of flags would never work and then we would just suffer from
> the syscall multiplexing without much gain. On the other hand if
> combination of the functionality is to be expected then you will have to
> jam it into memfd_create and copy the interface likely causing more
> confusion. See what I mean?

I see your point, but I think that overloading memfd_create definitely gets
us into syscall multiplexing from day one and support for seals and huge
pages in the secretmem will not make it less of a multiplexer.

Sealing is anyway controlled via fcntl() and I don't think
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING makes much sense for the secretmem because it is there to
prevent rogue file sealing in tmpfs/hugetlbfs.

As for the huge pages, I'm not sure at all that supporting huge pages in
secretmem will involve hugetlbfs. And even if yes, adding SECRETMEM_HUGE
flag seems to me less confusing than saying "from kernel x.y you can use
MFD_CREATE | MFD_SECRET | MFD_HUGE" etc for all possible combinations.
 
> I by no means do not insist one way or the other but from what I have
> seen so far I have a feeling that the interface hasn't been thought
> through enough.

It has been, but we have different thoughts about it ;-)

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-11 11:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 293+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-08  8:49 [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 03/10] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 04/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 05/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 06/10] arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:49   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 21:26     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  8:47       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:09         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 13:17           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  7:13             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  8:39               ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:01                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:38                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:48                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 11:29                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:07                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 23:09                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12  9:18                         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:19                           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:58                             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 19:21                               ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15  9:13                                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 18:14                                   ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 19:20                                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:25                                       ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:34                                         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:44                                           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 17:16                                             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-17 16:19                                               ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22  9:38                                                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:51                                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 11:20                 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:30                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 22:59                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12  9:02                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:18   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:32     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:51       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:53         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:57           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 11:13             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 12:17                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:40                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:28     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22  7:34   ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 10:23     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 18:27       ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 19:17       ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:21         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  9:27 ` [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:13   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:38     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  8:59       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:15         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:53           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 10:23             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 13:25               ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 16:17                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 20:08                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko

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