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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <wil l@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 18:16:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a8567a9-6940-c23f-0927-e4b5c5db0d5e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000cfaa0a9a09f07c5e50e573393cda301d650c9.camel@linux.ibm.com>

>>   For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>>
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure"  all doesn't really make sense to me.
> 
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to.  In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.

I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally. 
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as 
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.

I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location 
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this 
needs more thought, of course.

> 
>>   The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> 
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more 
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be 
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be 
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough 
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we 
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret() 
right now.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 18:16:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a8567a9-6940-c23f-0927-e4b5c5db0d5e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000cfaa0a9a09f07c5e50e573393cda301d650c9.camel@linux.ibm.com>

>>   For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>>
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure"  all doesn't really make sense to me.
> 
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to.  In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.

I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally. 
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as 
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.

I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location 
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this 
needs more thought, of course.

> 
>>   The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> 
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more 
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be 
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be 
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough 
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we 
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret() 
right now.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 18:16:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a8567a9-6940-c23f-0927-e4b5c5db0d5e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000cfaa0a9a09f07c5e50e573393cda301d650c9.camel@linux.ibm.com>

>>   For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>>
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure"  all doesn't really make sense to me.
> 
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to.  In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.

I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally. 
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as 
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.

I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location 
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this 
needs more thought, of course.

> 
>>   The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> 
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more 
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be 
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be 
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough 
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we 
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret() 
right now.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 18:16:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a8567a9-6940-c23f-0927-e4b5c5db0d5e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000cfaa0a9a09f07c5e50e573393cda301d650c9.camel@linux.ibm.com>

>>   For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>>
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure"  all doesn't really make sense to me.
> 
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to.  In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.

I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally. 
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as 
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.

I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location 
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this 
needs more thought, of course.

> 
>>   The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> 
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more 
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be 
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be 
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough 
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we 
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret() 
right now.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-16 17:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 293+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-08  8:49 [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 03/10] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 04/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 05/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 06/10] arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:49   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:49     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 21:26     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:26       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  8:47       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:47         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:09         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09  9:09           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-09 13:17           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:17             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  7:13             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  7:13               ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11  8:39               ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  8:39                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:01                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:01                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:38                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:38                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11  9:48                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11  9:48                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 10:02                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 11:29                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:29                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:27                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:07                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 12:07                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-11 23:09                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 23:09                         ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12  9:18                         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-12  9:18                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:19                           ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:19                             ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-14  9:58                             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14  9:58                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-14 19:21                               ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-14 19:21                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15  9:13                                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15  9:13                                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 18:14                                   ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 18:14                                     ` James Bottomley
2021-02-15 19:20                                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-15 19:20                                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:25                                       ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:25                                         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:34                                         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:34                                           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:44                                           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 16:44                                             ` James Bottomley
2021-02-16 17:16                                             ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 17:16                                               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-17 16:19                                               ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-17 16:19                                                 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22  9:38                                                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22  9:38                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-22 10:50                                                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-16 16:51                                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-16 16:51                                           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 11:20                 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 11:20                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 12:30                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 12:30                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-11 22:59                     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-11 22:59                       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-12  9:02                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-12  9:02                         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 10:18   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:18     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:32     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:32       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:51       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:51         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:53         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:53           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 10:57           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 10:57             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 11:13             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:13               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:14                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 11:26                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 12:17                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 12:17                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:34                       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-08 13:40                     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 13:40                       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:28     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:28       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22  7:34   ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22  7:34     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 10:23     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 10:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-22 18:27       ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 18:27         ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-22 19:17       ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:17         ` Dan Williams
2021-02-22 19:21         ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-22 19:21           ` James Bottomley
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49 ` [PATCH v17 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  8:49   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08  9:27 ` [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:13   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-02-08 21:38     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-08 21:38       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  8:59       ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  8:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:15         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:15           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09  9:53           ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09  9:53             ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 10:23             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:23               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 10:30                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 13:25               ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 13:25                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 16:17                 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 16:17                   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-02-09 20:08                   ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko
2021-02-09 20:08                     ` Michal Hocko

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