From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> To: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, "Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>, "Daniel Palmer" <daniel@0x0f.com>, ndesaulniers@google.com, "Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, manojgupta@google.com, "Andreas Färber" <afaerber@suse.de>, llozano@google.com, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>, "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] ARM: Implement Clang's SLS mitigation Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 22:55:08 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210212055508.GA3822196@ubuntu-m3-large-x86> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210212051500.943179-1-jiancai@google.com> Hi Jian, On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:14:58PM -0800, Jian Cai wrote: > This patch adds a config CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn Drop "a config". > on -mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation > vulnerability, or more commonly known as Spectre, Meldown. ^ I would drop "or" here ^ drop comma, use "and", typo: "Meltdown" Although, is that a fair statement? SLS is not called Spectre or Meltdown by ARM, it is a speculative processor vulnerabilty. It might just be better to drop eerything after the first comma (although maybe that is just being pedantic). > > Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below, and this config turns > on the strongest option. > > all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented. > none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation. > retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions. > blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions. I cannot comment on whether or not this is worth doing, I will leave that up to Will, Catalin, et al. The following comments are more from a "regular kernel developer" perspective, rather than an "arm64 kernel developer" :) > Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221 > Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404 > Link: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation This is also a useful article it seems: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2 > Link: https://crbug.com/1171521 This crbug is private. If it is going into a commit message, please publicize it. > Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com> > --- > arch/arm/Makefile | 4 ++++ > arch/arm64/Makefile | 5 +++++ > security/Kconfig.hardening | 11 +++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile > index 4aaec9599e8a..11d89ef32da9 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm/Makefile > @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS += -D__ARMEL__ > KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -EL > endif > > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) > +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all > +endif > + > # > # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 and > # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and signed > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile > index 90309208bb28..8fd0ccd87eca 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile > @@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils) > endif > endif > > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) > +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all > +endif > + > + Extra space here > cc_has_k_constraint := $(call try-run,echo \ > 'int main(void) { \ > asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295)); \ > diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening > index 269967c4fc1b..d83c406c81a3 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening > +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening > @@ -121,6 +121,17 @@ choice > > endchoice > > + > +config CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) I do not think that CONFIG_CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL serves much purpose. Moving the cc-option into CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL is just as clean. config HARDEN_SLS_ALL bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening" depends on $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) help Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening at highest level. > + > + config HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening" The spacing here seems messed up, I corrected it above. > + depends on CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + help > + Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening > + at highest level. > + > config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE > bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" > depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK > -- > 2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog > > Cheers, Nathan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> To: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com> Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>, "Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, "Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>, "Daniel Palmer" <daniel@0x0f.com>, ndesaulniers@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, manojgupta@google.com, llozano@google.com, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>, "Andreas Färber" <afaerber@suse.de>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] ARM: Implement Clang's SLS mitigation Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 22:55:08 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210212055508.GA3822196@ubuntu-m3-large-x86> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210212051500.943179-1-jiancai@google.com> Hi Jian, On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:14:58PM -0800, Jian Cai wrote: > This patch adds a config CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn Drop "a config". > on -mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation > vulnerability, or more commonly known as Spectre, Meldown. ^ I would drop "or" here ^ drop comma, use "and", typo: "Meltdown" Although, is that a fair statement? SLS is not called Spectre or Meltdown by ARM, it is a speculative processor vulnerabilty. It might just be better to drop eerything after the first comma (although maybe that is just being pedantic). > > Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below, and this config turns > on the strongest option. > > all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented. > none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation. > retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions. > blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions. I cannot comment on whether or not this is worth doing, I will leave that up to Will, Catalin, et al. The following comments are more from a "regular kernel developer" perspective, rather than an "arm64 kernel developer" :) > Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221 > Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404 > Link: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation This is also a useful article it seems: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2 > Link: https://crbug.com/1171521 This crbug is private. If it is going into a commit message, please publicize it. > Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com> > --- > arch/arm/Makefile | 4 ++++ > arch/arm64/Makefile | 5 +++++ > security/Kconfig.hardening | 11 +++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile > index 4aaec9599e8a..11d89ef32da9 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm/Makefile > @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS += -D__ARMEL__ > KBUILD_LDFLAGS += -EL > endif > > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) > +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all > +endif > + > # > # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 and > # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and signed > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile > index 90309208bb28..8fd0ccd87eca 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile > +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile > @@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils) > endif > endif > > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) > +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all > +endif > + > + Extra space here > cc_has_k_constraint := $(call try-run,echo \ > 'int main(void) { \ > asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295)); \ > diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening > index 269967c4fc1b..d83c406c81a3 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening > +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening > @@ -121,6 +121,17 @@ choice > > endchoice > > + > +config CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) I do not think that CONFIG_CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL serves much purpose. Moving the cc-option into CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL is just as clean. config HARDEN_SLS_ALL bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening" depends on $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) help Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening at highest level. > + > + config HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening" The spacing here seems messed up, I corrected it above. > + depends on CC_HAS_HARDEN_SLS_ALL > + help > + Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening > + at highest level. > + > config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE > bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" > depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK > -- > 2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog > > Cheers, Nathan _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-12 5:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-02-12 5:14 [PATCH] ARM: Implement Clang's SLS mitigation Jian Cai 2021-02-12 5:14 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-12 5:55 ` Nathan Chancellor [this message] 2021-02-12 5:55 ` Nathan Chancellor 2021-02-12 10:41 ` David Laight 2021-02-12 10:41 ` David Laight 2021-02-12 19:52 ` [PATCH v2] " Jian Cai 2021-02-12 19:52 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-17 9:49 ` Will Deacon 2021-02-17 9:49 ` Will Deacon 2021-02-17 11:05 ` David Laight 2021-02-17 11:05 ` David Laight 2021-03-25 14:01 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-25 14:01 ` Linus Walleij 2021-02-17 18:20 ` Nick Desaulniers 2021-02-17 18:20 ` Nick Desaulniers 2021-02-19 20:18 ` [PATCH v3] ARM: Implement " Jian Cai 2021-02-19 20:18 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-19 20:30 ` Nathan Chancellor 2021-02-19 20:30 ` Nathan Chancellor 2021-02-19 23:08 ` [PATCH v4] " Jian Cai 2021-02-19 23:08 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-21 10:13 ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin 2021-02-21 10:13 ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin 2021-02-22 11:58 ` Will Deacon 2021-02-22 11:58 ` Will Deacon 2021-02-22 21:50 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-22 21:50 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-23 10:04 ` Will Deacon 2021-02-23 10:04 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-03 15:18 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-03 15:18 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-03 15:29 ` David Laight 2021-03-03 15:29 ` David Laight 2021-03-03 15:31 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-03 15:31 ` Linus Walleij 2021-02-23 2:31 ` [PATCH v5] " Jian Cai 2021-02-23 2:31 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-23 2:35 ` Jian Cai 2021-02-23 2:35 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-03 15:04 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-03 15:04 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-04 23:22 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-04 23:22 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-06 12:25 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-06 12:25 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-10 4:43 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-10 4:43 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-22 11:45 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-22 11:45 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-23 22:39 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-23 22:39 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-05 0:53 ` [PATCH v6] " Jian Cai 2021-03-05 0:53 ` Jian Cai 2021-03-05 9:52 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-05 9:52 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-06 12:27 ` Linus Walleij 2021-03-06 12:27 ` Linus Walleij
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