Re: [Virtio-fs] Securing file handles

[Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>]

On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 06:28:24PM +0100, Max Reitz wrote:
> On 08.03.21 15:50, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 2:39 PM Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > Admittedly I’m not yet at the point where I feel comfortable doing
> > > changes to the kernel at all, so if you have the time, I’d appreciate
> > > it.  (If you don’t really have the time, I could try my hand first and
> > > then we’d see.)
> > 
> > I'd hate to context switch away from the fuse leases to the kernel
> > crypto, so it would have to wait some time...
> > 
> > But I've attached an incomplete patch that just missing the crypto
> > bits and testing.
> > 
> > Would you mind having a go at it?
> 
> Thanks, I’ll look into the crypto stuff and have a go.  (Sorry for the
> delay...)
> 
> I’d still prefer a service process instead of putting this in the kernel,
> but let’s see how complicated it would be.  I suppose one problem with
> putting it into a service process is that doing so wouldn’t help with
> containers: If containers don’t allow CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, we I suppose
> it’ll be difficult to give it even to such a service process.
> 
> One thing that also needs to be solved is how to specify a persistent key.
> I suppose the idea in your patch is to generate a random key for every new
> process, but we would need a persistent key.  With a service process, it
> could be configured by the user to use a specific key, or perhaps it has
> kind of small database and virtiofsd selects its persistent key by a hash of
> it or some other ID that it has received from the service process.
> 
> I don’t know how you’d go making the kernel store persistent keys, though.

Is it possible to load persistent key from user space into a keyring
using keyctl. 

Vivek

> 
> Max
> 
> > > So AFAIU you want to put this in the kernel so we can get rid of needing
> > > the capability, because when you can only open handles that were
> > > previously generated for you, there wouldn’t be a security problem, right?
> > 
> > Something like that.
> > 
> > > But what about cases where a file is made inaccessible to some process
> > > between generating the handle and later opening it?  E.g. in
> > > /path/to/file, the “to” directory is changed to go-x (and the current
> > > user is not the owner), so opening /path/to/file wouldn’t be possible by
> > > path anymore.  Sure, if the FD remained open, you could still open the
> > > file anyway; but I consider it different in semantics.  (E.g. you could
> > > check that there are no processes that have “file” open anymore, and so
> > > you could assume that it’s now inaccessible.)
> > 
> > That could be a concern, yes.   Requiring CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH in the
> > current user namespace, as my template patch does, might mitigate
> > those worries somewhat.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Miklos
> > 
> 
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