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From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: "Michal Suchánek" <msuchanek@suse.de>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:44:46 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014446.tqopgaz2n3srwc6p@Rk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220411085938.GA163591@kunlun.suse.cz>

On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 10:59:38AM +0200, Michal Suchánek wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 09:31:18AM +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>> Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
>> MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
>> rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
>> restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
>
>This is because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
>contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.
>
>> This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
>> .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_key
>> keyring.
>>
>> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +---
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> index 9ec34690e255..51af1c22d6da 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
>>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>>  #include <linux/pe.h>
>>  #include <linux/string.h>
>> -#include <linux/verification.h>
>>  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
>>  #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>>  #include <asm/image.h>
>> @@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
>>  static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>  {
>> -	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
>> -				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
>> +	return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
>>  }
>>  #endif
>
>You can eliminate image_verify_sig here aswell and directly assign
>kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig to fops.

Good suggestions, thanks!

>
>Thanks
>
>Michal
>

-- 
Best regards,
Coiby


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: "Michal Suchánek" <msuchanek@suse.de>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:44:46 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014446.tqopgaz2n3srwc6p@Rk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220411085938.GA163591@kunlun.suse.cz>

On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 10:59:38AM +0200, Michal Suchánek wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 09:31:18AM +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>> Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
>> MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
>> rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
>> restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
>
>This is because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
>contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.
>
>> This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
>> .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_key
>> keyring.
>>
>> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +---
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> index 9ec34690e255..51af1c22d6da 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
>>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>>  #include <linux/pe.h>
>>  #include <linux/string.h>
>> -#include <linux/verification.h>
>>  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
>>  #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>>  #include <asm/image.h>
>> @@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
>>  static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>  {
>> -	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
>> -				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
>> +	return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
>>  }
>>  #endif
>
>You can eliminate image_verify_sig here aswell and directly assign
>kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig to fops.

Good suggestions, thanks!

>
>Thanks
>
>Michal
>

-- 
Best regards,
Coiby


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:44:46 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014446.tqopgaz2n3srwc6p@Rk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220411085938.GA163591@kunlun.suse.cz>

On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 10:59:38AM +0200, Michal Such?nek wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 01, 2022 at 09:31:18AM +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
>> Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
>> MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
>> rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
>> restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
>
>This is because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
>contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.
>
>> This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
>> .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_key
>> keyring.
>>
>> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +---
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> index 9ec34690e255..51af1c22d6da 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
>> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
>>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>>  #include <linux/pe.h>
>>  #include <linux/string.h>
>> -#include <linux/verification.h>
>>  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
>>  #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>>  #include <asm/image.h>
>> @@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
>>  static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>  {
>> -	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
>> -				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
>> +	return kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(kernel, kernel_len);
>>  }
>>  #endif
>
>You can eliminate image_verify_sig here aswell and directly assign
>kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig to fops.

Good suggestions, thanks!

>
>Thanks
>
>Michal
>

-- 
Best regards,
Coiby



  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-14  1:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-01  1:31 [PATCH v5 0/3] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31 ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-11  9:01   ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11  9:01     ` Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=
2022-04-11  9:01     ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-01  1:31 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-11  8:54   ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11  8:54     ` Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=
2022-04-11  8:54     ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-14  1:46     ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:46       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:46       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-01  1:31   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-11  8:59   ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11  8:59     ` Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=
2022-04-11  8:59     ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-14  1:44     ` Coiby Xu [this message]
2022-04-14  1:44       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:44       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-08  7:17 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 kdump " Baoquan He
2022-04-08  7:17   ` Baoquan He
2022-04-08  8:59   ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-08  8:59     ` Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=
2022-04-11  1:13     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-11  1:13       ` Baoquan He
2022-04-11  1:52       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-11  1:52         ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-11  8:43         ` Michal Suchánek
2022-04-11  8:43           ` Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=
2022-04-13  9:32           ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-13  9:32             ` Coiby Xu

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