From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>,
Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>,
Joseph Nuzman <joseph.nuzman@intel.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Subject: [patch 28/38] x86/retbleed: Add SKL return thunk
Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2022 01:17:55 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220716230954.334016834@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20220716230344.239749011@linutronix.de
To address the Intel SKL RSB underflow issue in software it's required to
do call depth tracking.
Provide a return thunk for call depth tracking on Intel SKL CPUs.
The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift
right on call entry and logical shift left on return.
The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call
depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and
saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 so the tracking covers
12 nested calls. On return the variable is shifted left logically so it
becomes zero again.
CALL RET
0: 0x8000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
1: 0xfc00000000000000 0xf000000000000000
...
11: 0xfffffffffffffff8 0xfffffffffffffc00
12: 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffe0
After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the next
stuffing has to take place.
There is a inaccuracy for situations like this:
10 calls
5 returns
3 calls
4 returns
3 calls
....
The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction, but
there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not claim to
be perfect, but it should obfuscate the problem enough to make exploitation
extremly difficult.
The theory behind this is:
RSB is a stack with depth 16 which is filled on every call. On the return
path speculation "pops" entries to speculate down the call chain. Once the
speculative RSB is empty it switches to other predictors, e.g. the Branch
History Buffer, which can be mistrained by user space and misguide the
speculation path to a gadget.
Call depth tracking is designed to break this speculation path by stuffing
speculation trap calls into the RSB which are never getting a corresponding
return executed. This stalls the prediction path until it gets resteered,
The assumption is that stuffing at the 12th return is sufficient to break
the speculation before it hits the underflow and the fallback to the other
predictors. Testing confirms that it works. Johannes, one of the retbleed
researchers. tried to attack this approach but failed.
There is obviously no scientific proof that this will withstand future
research progress, but all we can do right now is to speculate about it.
The SAR/SHL usage was suggested by Andi Kleen.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 10 +--
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 5 +
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 30 +++++++++
4 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__switch_to_asm)
SYM_CODE_START(ret_from_fork)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // copy_thread
+ CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
movq %rax, %rdi
call schedule_tail /* rdi: 'prev' task parameter */
@@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
- UNTRAIN_RET
+ UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
RET
SYM_CODE_END(xen_error_entry)
@@ -975,7 +976,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(paranoid_entry)
* CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
*/
IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
- UNTRAIN_RET
+ UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
RET
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -1060,7 +1061,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
IBRS_ENTER
- UNTRAIN_RET
+ UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1095,6 +1096,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
*/
.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+ CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */
ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
RET
@@ -1113,7 +1115,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
IBRS_ENTER
- UNTRAIN_RET
+ UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -11,8 +11,53 @@
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
#define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE 32
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+
+/*
+ * Call depth tracking for Intel SKL CPUs to address the RSB underflow
+ * issue in software.
+ *
+ * The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift
+ * right on call entry and logical shift left on return.
+ *
+ * The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call
+ * depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and
+ * saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 for both directions
+ * so the tracking covers 12 nested calls.
+ *
+ * Call
+ * 0: 0x8000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
+ * 1: 0xfc00000000000000 0xf000000000000000
+ * ...
+ * 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8 0xfffffffffffffc00
+ * 12: 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffe0
+ *
+ * After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the
+ * next stuffing has to take place.
+ *
+ * There is a inaccuracy for situations like this:
+ *
+ * 10 calls
+ * 5 returns
+ * 3 calls
+ * 4 returns
+ * 3 calls
+ * ....
+ *
+ * The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction,
+ * but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not
+ * claim to be perfect and it can be speculated around by the CPU, but it
+ * is considered that it obfuscates the problem enough to make exploitation
+ * extremly difficult.
+ */
+#define RET_DEPTH_SHIFT 5
+#define RSB_RET_STUFF_LOOPS 16
+#define RET_DEPTH_INIT 0x8000000000000000ULL
+#define RET_DEPTH_INIT_FROM_CALL 0xfc00000000000000ULL
+#define RET_DEPTH_CREDIT 0xffffffffffffffffULL
/*
* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
@@ -31,7 +76,28 @@
* from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
*/
-#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH \
+ movq $-1, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);
+
+#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH \
+ mov $0x80, %rax; \
+ shl $56, %rax; \
+ movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);
+
+#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL \
+ mov $0xfc, %rax; \
+ shl $56, %rax; \
+ movq %rax, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth);
+
+#define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH \
+ sarq $5, %gs:__x86_call_depth
+#else
+#define CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
+#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH
+#define INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH
+#define RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL
+#endif
/*
* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
@@ -59,7 +125,9 @@
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
- jnz 771b;
+ jnz 771b; \
+ \
+ CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -145,11 +213,32 @@
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro UNTRAIN_RET
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH)
ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
- ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
- CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
- "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
+ ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \
+ CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
+ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, \
+ __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH)
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
+ ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \
+ CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
+ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, \
+ __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
+#endif
+.endm
+
+
+.macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+ ALTERNATIVE "", \
+ __stringify(INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
#endif
.endm
@@ -174,6 +263,19 @@ extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
#define x86_return_thunk (&__x86_return_thunk)
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+extern void __x86_return_skl(void);
+
+static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void)
+{
+ x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_skl;
+}
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_depth);
+#else
+static inline void x86_set_skl_return_thunk(void) {}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
#define GEN(reg) \
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -2002,6 +2002,11 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_call_depth);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(__x86_call_depth);
+#endif
+
static void wrmsrl_cstar(unsigned long val)
{
/*
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
@@ -140,3 +141,32 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+
+ .align 64
+SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_skl)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ /* Keep the hotpath in a 16byte I-fetch */
+ shlq $5, PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth)
+ jz 1f
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+1:
+ .rept 16
+ ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
+ call 2f
+ int3
+2:
+ .endr
+ add $(8*16), %rsp
+
+ CREDIT_CALL_DEPTH
+
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_return_skl)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-16 23:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 142+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-16 23:17 [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call depth tracking mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 01/38] x86/paravirt: Ensure proper alignment Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 02/38] x86/cpu: Use native_wrmsrl() in load_percpu_segment() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 0:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-07-17 15:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-17 19:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 20:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 20:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 21:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 5:11 ` Juergen Gross
2022-07-18 6:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 8:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 9:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 10:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 11:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 0/3] x86/cpu: Sanitize switch_to_new_gdt() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 1/3] x86/cpu: Remove segment load from switch_to_new_gdt() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 18:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 2/3] x86/cpu: Get rid of redundant switch_to_new_gdt() invocations Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 3/3] x86/cpu: Re-enable stackprotector Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 03/38] x86/modules: Set VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS in module_alloc() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 04/38] x86/vdso: Ensure all kernel code is seen by objtool Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 05/38] btree: Initialize early when builtin Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 06/38] objtool: Allow GS relative relocs Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 07/38] objtool: Track init section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 08/38] objtool: Add .call_sites section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 09/38] objtool: Add .sym_sites section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 10/38] objtool: Add --hacks=skylake Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 11/38] objtool: Allow STT_NOTYPE -> STT_FUNC+0 tail-calls Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 12/38] x86/entry: Make sync_regs() invocation a tail call Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 13/38] x86/modules: Make module_alloc() generally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 14/38] x86/Kconfig: Add CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 15/38] x86/retbleed: Add X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 16/38] modules: Make struct module_layout unconditionally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 17/38] module: Add arch_data to module_layout Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 18/38] mm/vmalloc: Provide huge page mappings Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 19/38] x86/module: Provide __module_alloc() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 20/38] x86/alternatives: Provide text_poke_[copy|set]_locked() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 21/38] x86/entry: Make some entry symbols global Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 22/38] x86/paravirt: Make struct paravirt_call_site unconditionally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 23/38] x86/callthunks: Add call patching for call depth tracking Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 24/38] module: Add layout for callthunks tracking Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 25/38] x86/modules: Add call thunk patching Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 26/38] x86/returnthunk: Allow different return thunks Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 27/38] x86/asm: Provide ALTERNATIVE_3 Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 29/38] x86/retpoline: Add SKL retthunk retpolines Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 30/38] x86/retbleed: Add SKL call thunk Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 31/38] x86/calldepth: Add ret/call counting for debug Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 32/38] static_call: Add call depth tracking support Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 33/38] kallsyms: Take callthunks into account Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 34/38] x86/orc: Make it callthunk aware Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 35/38] kprobes: Add callthunk blacklisting Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 36/38] x86/ftrace: Make it call depth tracking aware Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 21:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-19 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 13:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 37/38] x86/bpf: Emit call depth accounting if required Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 5:30 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-07-19 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 38/38] x86/retbleed: Add call depth tracking mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 9:45 ` [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call " David Laight
2022-07-17 15:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 17:56 ` David Laight
2022-07-17 19:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 20:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 21:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 21:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 22:47 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-18 22:55 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 23:08 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-18 23:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 23:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 0:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 1:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 17:19 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-20 21:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 8:21 ` David Laight
2022-07-21 10:56 ` David Laight
2022-07-21 15:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 17:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 18:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-21 18:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 18:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-21 20:22 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-22 0:16 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-22 10:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-22 15:38 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-21 22:01 ` David Laight
2022-07-22 11:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-22 13:27 ` David Laight
2022-07-23 9:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 0:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:19 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-19 17:21 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 17:58 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-19 8:26 ` David Laight
2022-07-19 16:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 17:23 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 17:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 18:06 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 20:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:48 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 22:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 23:10 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 9:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-20 16:55 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-20 19:42 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-22 20:11 ` Tim Chen
2022-07-22 22:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 19:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 10:24 ` Virt " Andrew Cooper
2022-07-19 14:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 16:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-07-19 21:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 14:45 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-07-19 20:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 16:57 ` [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: " Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 17:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 17:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 17:50 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 18:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 19:11 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2022-07-20 19:43 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 21:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
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