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From: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
To: Maxim Fomin <maxim@fomin.one>
Cc: "grub-devel@gnu.org" <grub-devel@gnu.org>,
	"dkiper@net-space.pl" <dkiper@net-space.pl>,
	"ps@pks.im" <ps@pks.im>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode
Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 19:54:47 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221223195447.2c340af9@crass-HP-ZBook-15-G2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3fIZJQVSGi0Q_eyZ7CvJppLpelCcx9lgm1OeHzGjU2Va9mdeCH-J9TXdebbdgE7PN4s_qDesWKgbXHItgrnT6_HlhUvRt_wYtYEDgnmvjsY=@fomin.one>

On Fri, 02 Dec 2022 17:11:23 +0000
Maxim Fomin <maxim@fomin.one> wrote:

> ------- Original Message -------
> On Friday, December 2nd, 2022 at 0:00, Glenn Washburn
> <development@efficientek.com> wrote:
> > I'm now compiling this patch and found a few compile issues below.
> > You're compile testing this right?
> 
> First versions of the patch were tested in pure grub src directory.
> Later I switched to directly making and installing GRUB package for
> my distro using its source script syntax. It seems this process was
> affected by environment options which hided these errors/warnings.
> 
> I test the patch on my two old laptops - one with UEFI BIOS
> (x86_64-efi) and one is pre-UEFI (i386-pc). I was compiling i386-pc
> target too, because otherwise the second laptop was unbootable.
> During i386-pc compilation I noticed some warnings related to
> 'PRIuGRUB_XXX' macros which were absent during efi target
> compilation. I noticed that there are similar warnings in other
> modules and decided that there are issues with 'PRIuGRUB_XXX' macros
> at i386-pc platform at global level. In any case, these issues didn't
> cause compilation fail in my working environment because I would not
> be able to compile and boot pre-UEFI lap. Do you use -Werror? 

I didn't see this until just now. In case you're still interested, no I
don't use -Werror or any special compiler flags. And I'm using gcc
version 10.2.1 from a Debian 11 container.

Glenn

> 
> P.S. Also thanks for suggested fixes.
> 
> Best regards,
> Maxim Fomin
> 
> > > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> > > index 377969984..34ca6b4f1 100644
> > > --- a/docs/grub.texi
> > > +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> > > @@ -5138,13 +5138,13 @@ to generate password hashes.
> > > @xref{Security}.
> > > 
> > > Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the
> > > encrypted -data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte
> > > sectors with the blocklist +data at the device is specified in
> > > terms of 512 byte sectors using the blocklist syntax and loopback
> > > device. The following example shows how to specify 1MiB offset:
> > > 
> > > @example
> > > loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > > -plainmount node
> > > +plainmount node @var{...}
> > > @end example
> > > 
> > > The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS
> > > encrypted volume @@ -5155,13 +5155,14 @@ The keyfile path
> > > parameter has higher priority than the secret passphrase
> > > parameter and is specified with the option @option{-d}. Password
> > > data obtained from keyfiles is not hashed and is used directly as
> > > a cipher key. An optional offset of password data in the keyfile
> > > can be specified with the option -@option{-O} or directly with
> > > the option @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax. +@option{-O} or
> > > directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax,
> > > +if the keyfile data can be accessed from a device and is 512
> > > byte aligned. The following example shows both methods to specify
> > > password data in the keyfile at offset 1MiB:
> > > 
> > > @example
> > > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576
> > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...}
> > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...}
> > > @end example
> > > 
> > > If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string
> > > specified diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c index 656c5d09f..85ada25bc 100644
> > > --- a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > @@ -146,8 +146,12 @@ plainmount_configure_password
> > > (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash, dev->hash =
> > > grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name (hash); len = dev->hash->mdlen;
> > > 
> > > - alloc_size = password_size >= key_size ? password_size :
> > > key_size;
> > > - p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len));
> > > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size);
> > > + /*
> > > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix
> > > character
> > > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of
> > > 'len').
> > > + */
> > > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1);
> > > derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2);
> > > if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL)
> > > {
> > > @@ -170,9 +174,10 @@ plainmount_configure_password
> > > (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash, if (len > size)
> > > len = size;
> > > 
> > > - grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size);
> > > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round);
> > > }
> > > - grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN
> > > * 2);
> > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size);
> > > +
> > > exit:
> > > grub_free (p);
> > > grub_free (derived_hash);
> > > ---
> > > docs/grub.texi | 81 +++++++
> > > grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 5 +
> > > grub-core/disk/plainmount.c | 462
> > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 548
> > > insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
> > > index 2d6cd8358..34ca6b4f1 100644
> > > --- a/docs/grub.texi
> > > +++ b/docs/grub.texi
> > > @@ -4271,6 +4271,7 @@ you forget a command, you can run the
> > > command @command{help}
> > > * parttool:: Modify partition table entries
> > > * password:: Set a clear-text password
> > > * password_pbkdf2:: Set a hashed password
> > > +* plainmount:: Open device encrypted in plain mode
> > > * play:: Play a tune
> > > * probe:: Retrieve device info
> > > * rdmsr:: Read values from model-specific
> > > registers @@ -4558,6 +4559,14 @@ function is supported, as Argon2
> > > is not yet supported.
> > > Also, note that, unlike filesystem UUIDs, UUIDs for encrypted
> > > devices must be specified without dash separators.
> > > +
> > > +Successfully decrypted disks are named as (cryptoX) and have
> > > increasing numeration +suffix for each new decrypted disk. If the
> > > encrypted disk hosts some higher level +of abstraction (like LVM2
> > > or MDRAID) it will be created under a separate device +namespace
> > > in addition to the cryptodisk namespace. +
> > > +Support for plain encryption mode (plain dm-crypt) is provided
> > > via separate +@command{@pxref{plainmount}} command.
> > > @end deffn
> > > 
> > > @node cutmem
> > > @@ -5120,6 +5129,78 @@ to generate password hashes.
> > > @xref{Security}. @end deffn
> > > 
> > > +@node plainmount
> > > +@subsection plainmount
> > > +
> > > +@deffn Command plainmount device @option{-c} cipher @option{-s}
> > > key size [@option{-h} hash] +[@option{-S} sector size]
> > > [@option{-p} password] [@option{-u} uuid] +[[@option{-d} keyfile]
> > > [@option{-O} keyfile offset]] +
> > > +
> > > +Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the
> > > encrypted +data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte
> > > sectors using the blocklist +syntax and loopback device. The
> > > following example shows how to specify 1MiB +offset:
> > > +
> > > +@example
> > > +loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+
> > > +plainmount node @var{...}
> > > +@end example
> > > +
> > > +The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS
> > > encrypted volume +if its master key and parameters (key size,
> > > cipher, offset, etc) are known. +
> > > +There are two ways to specify a password: a keyfile and a secret
> > > passphrase. +The keyfile path parameter has higher priority than
> > > the secret passphrase +parameter and is specified with the option
> > > @option{-d}. Password data obtained +from keyfiles is not hashed
> > > and is used directly as a cipher key. An optional +offset of
> > > password data in the keyfile can be specified with the option
> > > +@option{-O} or directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB
> > > blocklist syntax, +if the keyfile data can be accessed from a
> > > device and is 512 byte aligned. +The following example shows both
> > > methods to specify password data in the +keyfile at offset 1MiB: +
> > > +@example
> > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...}
> > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...}
> > > +@end example
> > > +
> > > +If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string
> > > specified +by option @option{-p} or is requested interactively
> > > from the console. In both +cases the provided password is hashed
> > > with the algorithm specified by the +option @option{-h}. This
> > > option is mandatory if no keyfile is specified, but +it can be
> > > set to @samp{plain} which means that no hashing is done and such
> > > +password is used directly as a key. +
> > > +Cipher @option{-c} and keysize @option{-s} options specify the
> > > cipher algorithm +and the key size respectively and are mandatory
> > > options. Cipher must be specified +with the mode separated by a
> > > dash (for example, @samp{aes-xts-plain64}). Key size +option
> > > @option{-s} is the key size of the cipher in bits, not to be
> > > confused with +the offset of the key data in a keyfile specified
> > > with the @option{-O} option. It +must not exceed 1024 bits, so a
> > > 32 byte key would be specified as 256 bits + +The optional
> > > parameter @option{-S} specifies encrypted device sector size. It
> > > +must be at least 512 bytes long (default value) and a power of
> > > 2. @footnote{Current +implementation of cryptsetup supports only
> > > 512/1024/2048/4096 byte sectors}. +Disk sector size is configured
> > > when creating the encrypted volume. Attempting +to decrypt
> > > volumes with a different sector size than it was created with
> > > will +not result in an error, but will decrypt to random bytes
> > > and thus prevent +accessing the volume (in some cases the
> > > filesystem driver can detect the presence +of a filesystem, but
> > > nevertheless will refuse to mount it). + +By default new
> > > plainmount devices will be given a UUID starting with
> > > +'109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a401' where the last digits are
> > > incremented +by one for each plainmounted device beyond the first
> > > up to 2^10 devices. + +All encryption arguments (cipher, hash,
> > > key size, disk offset and disk sector +size) must match the
> > > parameters used to create the volume. If any of them does +not
> > > match the actual arguments used during the initial encryption,
> > > plainmount +will create virtual device with the garbage data and
> > > GRUB will report unknown +filesystem for such device. Writing
> > > data to such virtual device will result in +the data loss if the
> > > underlying partition contained desired data. +@end deffn + +
> > > @node play
> > > @subsection play
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > > b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def index 98714c68d..f4153608c 100644
> > > --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > > +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
> > > @@ -1184,6 +1184,11 @@ module = {
> > > common = disk/cryptodisk.c;
> > > };
> > > 
> > > +module = {
> > > + name = plainmount;
> > > + common = disk/plainmount.c;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > module = {
> > > name = json;
> > > common = lib/json/json.c;
> > > diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c new file mode 100644
> > > index 000000000..85ada25bc
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
> > > +/*
> > > + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
> > > + * Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
> > > + *
> > > + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
> > > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> > > published by
> > > + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
> > > License, or
> > > + * (at your option) any later version.
> > > + *
> > > + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> > > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> > > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> > > + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> > > + *
> > > + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
> > > License
> > > + * along with GRUB. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
> > > + /
> > > +
> > > +/ plaimount.c - Open device encrypted in plain mode. /
> > > +
> > > +#include <grub/cryptodisk.h>
> > > +#include <grub/dl.h>
> > > +#include <grub/err.h>
> > > +#include <grub/extcmd.h>
> > > +#include <grub/partition.h>
> > > +#include <grub/file.h>
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
> > > +
> > > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
> > > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID
> > > "109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a400" +
> > > +
> > > +enum PLAINMOUNT_OPTION
> > > + {
> > > + OPTION_HASH,
> > > + OPTION_CIPHER,
> > > + OPTION_KEY_SIZE,
> > > + OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE,
> > > + OPTION_PASSWORD,
> > > + OPTION_KEYFILE,
> > > + OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET,
> > > + OPTION_UUID
> > > + };
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
> > > + {
> > > + / TRANSLATORS: It's still restricted to this module only. /
> > > + {"hash", 'h', 0, N_("Password hash"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > > + {"cipher", 'c', 0, N_("Password cipher"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > > + {"key-size", 's', 0, N_("Key size (in bits)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > > + {"sector-size", 'S', 0, N_("Device sector size"), 0,
> > > ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > > + {"password", 'p', 0, N_("Password (key)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > > + {"keyfile", 'd', 0, N_("Keyfile path"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > > + {"keyfile-offset", 'O', 0, N_("Keyfile offset"), 0,
> > > ARG_TYPE_INT},
> > > + {"uuid", 'u', 0, N_("Set device UUID"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING},
> > > + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
> > > + };
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/ Cryptodisk setkey() function wrapper */
> > > +static grub_err_t
> > > +plainmount_setkey (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_uint8_t key,
> > > + grub_size_t size)
> > > +{
> > > + gcry_err_code_t code = grub_cryptodisk_setkey (dev, key, size);
> > > + if (code != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
> > > + {
> > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "failed to set cipher key with
> > > code: %d\n", code);
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot set
> > > specified key"));
> > > + }
> > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/ Configure cryptodisk uuid */
> > > +static void plainmount_set_uuid (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const
> > > char user_uuid) +{
> > > + grub_size_t pos = 0;
> > > +
> > > + / Size of user_uuid is checked in main func /
> > > + if (user_uuid != NULL)
> > > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, user_uuid, grub_strlen (user_uuid));
> > > + else
> > > + {
> > > + /
> > > + * Set default UUID. Last digits start from 1 and are
> > > incremented for
> > > + * each new plainmount device by snprintf().
> > > + /
> > > + grub_snprintf (dev->uuid, sizeof (dev->uuid)-1, "%36lx",
> > > dev->id+1);
> > > + while (dev->uuid[++pos] == ' ');
> > > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID, pos);
> > > + }
> > > + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (dev->uuid) >= sizeof
> > > (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID)); +}
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/ Configure cryptodevice sector size (-S option) /
> > > +static grub_err_t
> > > +plainmount_configure_sectors (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_disk_t
> > > disk,
> > > + grub_size_t sector_size)
> > > +{
> > > + dev->total_sectors = grub_disk_native_sectors (disk);
> > > + if (dev->total_sectors == GRUB_DISK_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, N_("cannot determine
> > > disk %s size"),
> > > + disk->name);
> > > +
> > > + / Convert size to sectors */
> > > + dev->log_sector_size = grub_log2ull (sector_size);
> > > + dev->total_sectors = grub_convert_sector (dev->total_sectors,
> > > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS,
> > > + dev->log_sector_size);
> > > + if (dev->total_sectors == 0)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
> > > + N_("cannot set specified sector size on disk
> > > %s"),
> > > + disk->name);
> > > +
> > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "log_sector_size=%d,
> > > total_sectors=%"
> > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n", dev->log_sector_size,
> > > dev->total_sectors);
> > 
> > 
> > s/PRIuGRUB_SIZE/PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T/
> > 
> > This compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on i386.
> > 
> > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/* Hashes a password into a key and stores it with the cipher. */
> > > +static grub_err_t
> > > +plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char
> > > *hash,
> > > + grub_uint8_t *key_data, grub_size_t
> > > key_size,
> > > + grub_size_t password_size)
> > > +{
> > > + grub_uint8_t *derived_hash, dh;
> > > + char p;
> > > + unsigned int round, i, len, size;
> > > + grub_size_t alloc_size;
> > > + grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > > +
> > > + / Support none (plain) hash /
> > > + if (grub_strcmp (hash, "plain") == 0)
> > > + {
> > > + dev->hash = NULL;
> > > + return err;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Hash argument was checked at main func /
> > > + dev->hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name (hash);
> > > + len = dev->hash->mdlen;
> > > +
> > > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size);
> > > + /
> > > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix
> > > character
> > > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of
> > > 'len').
> > > + /
> > > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1);
> > > + derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2);
> > > + if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL)
> > > + {
> > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> > > + goto exit;
> > > + }
> > > + dh = derived_hash;
> > > +
> > > + /
> > > + * Hash password. Adapted from cryptsetup.
> > > + *
> > > https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/lib/crypt_plain.c
> > > + /
> > > + for (round = 0, size = alloc_size; size; round++, dh += len,
> > > size -= len)
> > > + {
> > > + for (i = 0; i < round; i++)
> > > + p[i] = 'A';
> > > +
> > > + grub_memcpy (p + i, (char) key_data, password_size);
> > > +
> > > + if (len > size)
> > > + len = size;
> > > +
> > > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round);
> > > + }
> > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size);
> > > +
> > > +exit:
> > > + grub_free (p);
> > > + grub_free (derived_hash);
> > > + return err;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/ Read key material from keyfile */
> > > +static grub_err_t
> > > +plainmount_configure_keyfile (char *keyfile, grub_uint8_t
> > > *key_data,
> > > + grub_size_t key_size, grub_size_t
> > > keyfile_offset) +{
> > > + grub_file_t g_keyfile = grub_file_open (keyfile,
> > > GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE);
> > > + if (g_keyfile == NULL)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("cannot open
> > > keyfile %s"),
> > > + keyfile);
> > > +
> > > + if (grub_file_seek (g_keyfile, keyfile_offset) ==
> > > (grub_off_t)-1)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR,
> > > + N_("cannot seek keyfile at offset
> > > %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE),
> > > + keyfile_offset);
> > > +
> > > + if (key_size > (g_keyfile->size - keyfile_offset))
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Specified key size
> > > (%"
> > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") is too small for keyfile size
> > > (%"
> > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and offset
> > > (%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE")"),
> > 
> > 
> > Also, this compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on
> > i386.
> > 
> > The format code for g_keyfile->size should be PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T.
> > 
> > > + key_size, g_keyfile->size, keyfile_offset);
> > > +
> > > + if (grub_file_read (g_keyfile, key_data, key_size) !=
> > > (grub_ssize_t) key_size)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR, N_("error reading
> > > key file"));
> > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +
> > > +/* Plainmount command entry point */
> > > +static grub_err_t
> > > +grub_cmd_plainmount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char
> > > **args) +{
> > > + struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state;
> > > + grub_cryptodisk_t dev = NULL;
> > > + grub_disk_t disk = NULL;
> > > + const gcry_md_spec_t *gcry_hash;
> > > + char *diskname, *disklast = NULL, *cipher, *mode, *hash,
> > > *keyfile, *uuid;
> > > + grub_size_t len, key_size, sector_size, keyfile_offset = 0,
> > > password_size = 0;
> > > + grub_err_t err;
> > > + const char *p;
> > > + grub_uint8_t key_data;
> > > +
> > > + if (argc < 1)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("device name
> > > required")); +
> > > + / Check whether required arguments are specified /
> > > + if (!state[OPTION_CIPHER].set || !state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].set)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cipher and key size
> > > must be set");
> > > + if (!state[OPTION_HASH].set && !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "hash algorithm must
> > > be set"); +
> > > + / Check hash /
> > > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > > + {
> > > + gcry_hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name
> > > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg);
> > > + if (!gcry_hash)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("couldn't load
> > > hash %s"),
> > > + state[OPTION_HASH].arg);
> > > +
> > > + if (gcry_hash->mdlen > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("hash length %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds
> > > maximum %d bits"),
> > > + gcry_hash->mdlen * GRUB_CHAR_BIT,
> > > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Check cipher mode /
> > > + if (!grub_strchr (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg,'-'))
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("invalid cipher mode, must be of format
> > > cipher-mode")); +
> > > + / Check password size /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && grub_strlen
> > > (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg) >
> > > +
> > > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("password exceeds maximium size"));
> > > +
> > > + / Check uuid length */
> > > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set && grub_strlen
> > > (state[OPTION_UUID].arg)
> > > 
> > > + sizeof (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID))
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("specified UUID exceeds maximum size"));
> > > +
> > > + /* Parse plainmount arguments */
> > > + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> > > + keyfile_offset = state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set ?
> > > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg,
> > > &p, 0) : 0;
> > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set &&
> > > + (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg[0] == '\0' || *p != '\0' ||
> > > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE))
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized
> > > keyfile offset")); +
> > > + sector_size = state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set ?
> > > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg, &p, 0)
> > > :
> > > + PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE;
> > > + if (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set &&
> > > (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' ||
> > > + p != '\0' || grub_errno !=
> > > GRUB_ERR_NONE))
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized
> > > sector size")); +
> > > + / Check key size */
> > > + key_size = grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg, &p, 0);
> > > + if (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' || p != '\0' ||
> > > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized key
> > > size"));
> > > + if ((key_size % GRUB_CHAR_BIT) != 0)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("key size is not multiple of %d bits"),
> > > GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > > + key_size = key_size / GRUB_CHAR_BIT;
> > > + if (key_size > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("key size %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds maximum
> > > %d bits"),
> > > + key_size * GRUB_CHAR_BIT,
> > > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
> > > +
> > > + / Check disk sector size /
> > > + if (sector_size < GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("sector size -S must be at least %d"),
> > > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE);
> > > + if ((sector_size & (sector_size - 1)) != 0)
> > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> > > + N_("sector size -S %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" is not
> > > power of 2"),
> > > + sector_size);
> > > +
> > > + / Allocate all stuff here */
> > > + hash = state[OPTION_HASH].set ? grub_strdup
> > > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg) : NULL;
> > > + cipher = grub_strdup (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg);
> > > + keyfile = state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set ?
> > > + grub_strdup (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].arg) : NULL;
> > > + dev = grub_zalloc (sizeof dev);
> > > + key_data = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE);
> > > + uuid = state[OPTION_UUID].set ? grub_strdup
> > > (state[OPTION_UUID].arg) : NULL;
> > > + if ((hash == NULL && state[OPTION_HASH].set) || cipher == NULL
> > > || dev == NULL ||
> > > + (keyfile == NULL && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) || key_data ==
> > > NULL ||
> > > + (uuid == NULL && state[OPTION_UUID].set))
> > > + {
> > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
> > > + goto exit;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Copy user password from -p option /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set)
> > > + {
> > > + /
> > > + * Password from the '-p' option is limited to C-string.
> > > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles.
> > > + /
> > > + password_size = grub_strlen (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg);
> > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg,
> > > password_size);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Copy user UUID from -u option /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set)
> > > + grub_memcpy (uuid, state[OPTION_UUID].arg,
> > > + grub_strlen (state[OPTION_UUID].arg));
> > > +
> > > + / Set cipher mode (tested above) */
> > > + mode = grub_strchr (cipher,'-');
> > > + mode++ = '\0';
> > > +
> > > + / Check cipher /
> > > + if (grub_cryptodisk_setcipher (dev, cipher, mode) !=
> > > GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + {
> > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("invalid cipher
> > > %s"), cipher);
> > > + goto exit;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Open SOURCE disk */
> > > + diskname = args[0];
> > > + len = grub_strlen (diskname);
> > > + if (len && diskname[0] == '(' && diskname[len - 1] == ')')
> > > + {
> > > + disklast = &diskname[len - 1];
> > > + *disklast = '\0';
> > > + diskname++;
> > > + }
> > > + disk = grub_disk_open (diskname);
> > > + if (disk == NULL)
> > > + {
> > > + if (disklast)
> > > + disklast = ')';
> > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot open disk
> > > %s"), diskname);
> > > + goto exit;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + / Get password from console */
> > > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && key_data[0] == '\0')
> > > + {
> > > + char part = grub_partition_get_name (disk->partition);
> > > + grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s: "), disk->name,
> > > + disk->partition != NULL ? "," : "",
> > > + part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN"));
> > > + grub_free (part);
> > > +
> > > + if (!grub_password_get ((char)key_data,
> > > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE-1))
> > 
> > 
> > Space between cast and key_data.
> > 
> > > + {
> > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("error reading
> > > password"));
> > > + goto exit;
> > > + }
> > > + /*
> > > + * Password from interactive console is limited to C-string.
> > > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles.
> > > + */
> > > + password_size = grub_strlen (key_data);
> > 
> > 
> > This caused x86_64 to fail to compile with sign mismatch. Should
> > probably cast to char * as above.
> > 
> > Glenn
> > 
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* Warn if hash and keyfile are both provided /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && state[OPTION_HASH].arg)
> > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: hash is ignored if keyfile is
> > > specified\n")); +
> > > + / Warn if -p option is specified with keyfile /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: password specified with -p option "
> > > + "is ignored if keyfile is provided\n"));
> > > +
> > > + / Warn of -O is provided without keyfile /
> > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set &&
> > > !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: keyfile offset option -O "
> > > + "specified without keyfile option -d\n"));
> > > +
> > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "parameters: cipher=%s, hash=%s,
> > > key_size=%"
> > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE", keyfile=%s, keyfile
> > > offset=%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n",
> > > + cipher, hash, key_size, keyfile, keyfile_offset);
> > > +
> > > + err = plainmount_configure_sectors (dev, disk, sector_size);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + goto exit;
> > > +
> > > + / Configure keyfile or password */
> > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set)
> > > + err = plainmount_configure_keyfile (keyfile, key_data, key_size,
> > > keyfile_offset);
> > > + else
> > > + err = plainmount_configure_password (dev, hash, key_data,
> > > key_size, password_size);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + goto exit;
> > > +
> > > + err = plainmount_setkey (dev, key_data, key_size);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + goto exit;
> > > +
> > > + err = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, diskname, disk);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> > > + goto exit;
> > > +
> > > + dev->modname = "plainmount";
> > > + dev->source_disk = disk;
> > > + plainmount_set_uuid (dev, uuid);
> > > +
> > > +exit:
> > > + grub_free (hash);
> > > + grub_free (cipher);
> > > + grub_free (keyfile);
> > > + grub_free (key_data);
> > > + grub_free (uuid);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && disk)
> > > + grub_disk_close (disk);
> > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && dev)
> > > + grub_free (dev);
> > > + return err;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
> > > +GRUB_MOD_INIT (plainmount)
> > > +{
> > > + cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("plainmount", grub_cmd_plainmount,
> > > 0,
> > > + N_("-c cipher -s key-size [-h hash]
> > > [-S sector-size]"
> > > + " [-o offset] [-p password] [-u uuid] "
> > > + " [[-d keyfile] [-O keyfile offset]]
> > > <SOURCE>"),
> > > + N_("Open partition encrypted in plain
> > > mode."),
> > > + options);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +GRUB_MOD_FINI (plainmount)
> > > +{
> > > + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd);
> > > +}


  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-24  1:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-29 17:40 [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode Maxim Fomin
2022-11-29 17:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2022-12-01  5:58   ` Glenn Washburn
2022-12-01 19:38     ` Daniel Kiper
2022-12-02 16:41   ` Maxim Fomin
2022-12-01 21:00 ` Glenn Washburn
2022-12-02 17:11   ` Maxim Fomin
2022-12-24  1:54     ` Glenn Washburn [this message]
2022-12-24  2:09       ` Glenn Washburn
2022-12-28 18:05         ` Maxim Fomin
2023-01-10 18:19           ` Glenn Washburn
2023-01-14 12:07             ` Maxim Fomin

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