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From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	willy@infradead.org, keescook@chromium.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	mhocko@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net
Cc: labbott@redhat.com, david@fromorbit.com, rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 18:35:18 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <34d804c6-8aea-52ee-41b8-139aaf188d80@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <13ee6991-db48-d484-66a6-90de45fad2df@tycho.nsa.gov>



On 24/04/18 16:49, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 04/23/2018 08:54 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote:

[...]

>> The patch is probably in need of rework, to make it fit better with the
>> new SELinux internal data structures, however it shows how to deny an
>> easy target to the attacker.
> 
> I know this is just an example, but not sure why you wouldn't just protect the
> entire selinux_state.

Because I have much more to discuss about SELinux, which would involve 
the whole state, the policyDB and the AVC

I will start a separate thread about that. This was merely as simple as 
possible example of the use of the API.

I just wanted to have a feeling about how it would be received :-)

> Note btw that the selinux_state encapsulation is preparatory work
> for selinux namespaces [1], at which point the structure is in fact dynamically allocated
> and there can be multiple instances of it.  That however is work-in-progress, highly experimental,
> and might not ever make it upstream (if we can't resolve the various challenges it poses in a satisfactory
> way).

Yes, I am aware of this and I would like to discuss also in the light of 
the future directions.

I just didn't want to waste too much time on something that you might 
want to change radically in a month :-)

I already was caught once by surprise when ss_initalized disappeared 
just when I had a patch ready for it :-)

--
igor

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: igor.stoppa@gmail.com (Igor Stoppa)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 18:35:18 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <34d804c6-8aea-52ee-41b8-139aaf188d80@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <13ee6991-db48-d484-66a6-90de45fad2df@tycho.nsa.gov>



On 24/04/18 16:49, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 04/23/2018 08:54 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote:

[...]

>> The patch is probably in need of rework, to make it fit better with the
>> new SELinux internal data structures, however it shows how to deny an
>> easy target to the attacker.
> 
> I know this is just an example, but not sure why you wouldn't just protect the
> entire selinux_state.

Because I have much more to discuss about SELinux, which would involve 
the whole state, the policyDB and the AVC

I will start a separate thread about that. This was merely as simple as 
possible example of the use of the API.

I just wanted to have a feeling about how it would be received :-)

> Note btw that the selinux_state encapsulation is preparatory work
> for selinux namespaces [1], at which point the structure is in fact dynamically allocated
> and there can be multiple instances of it.  That however is work-in-progress, highly experimental,
> and might not ever make it upstream (if we can't resolve the various challenges it poses in a satisfactory
> way).

Yes, I am aware of this and I would like to discuss also in the light of 
the future directions.

I just didn't want to waste too much time on something that you might 
want to change radically in a month :-)

I already was caught once by surprise when ss_initalized disappeared 
just when I had a patch ready for it :-)

--
igor
--
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-24 14:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-23 12:54 [RFC PATCH v23 0/6] mm: security: write protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 1/9] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 2/9] vmalloc: rename llist field in vmap_area Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 3/9] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 4/9] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 5/9] Pmalloc selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 6/9] lkdtm: crash on overwriting protected pmalloc var Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 11:50   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-04-24 12:32     ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 12:32       ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 12:39       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:39         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 14:44       ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-04-24 15:03         ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 15:03           ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 15:29           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-25 20:58         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-25 20:58           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:33     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:33       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:52     ` Correct way to access the physmap? - Was: " Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:52       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:55       ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 21:55         ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:52         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 22:52           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 8/9] Preliminary self test for pmalloc rare write Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24  5:58   ` kbuild test robot
2018-04-24  5:58     ` kbuild test robot
2018-04-24 12:49   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 12:49     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 14:35     ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-04-24 14:35       ` Igor Stoppa

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