From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] x86: restrict pid namespaces to 32 or 64 bit syscalls
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 08:36:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4E47EB99.1020909@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110814152729.GU5782@one.firstfloor.org>
On 08/14/2011 08:27 AM, Andi Kleen wrote:
>> i386 vs x86-64 vs x32 is just one of many axes along which syscalls can be restricted (and for that matter, one axis if backward compatibility), and it does not make sense to burden the code with ad hoc filters. Designing a general filter facility which can be used to restrict any container to the subset of system calls it actually needs would make more sense, no?
>
> I believe this is already in the newer versions of seccomp.
>
Last I looked seccomp still had a hardcoded list of system calls, but
perhaps I've been looking in the wrong place. However, since that's
exactly what seccomp is -- a system call filter -- this can, and should,
be unified that way.
-hpa
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] x86: restrict pid namespaces to 32 or 64 bit syscalls
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 08:36:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4E47EB99.1020909@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110814152729.GU5782@one.firstfloor.org>
On 08/14/2011 08:27 AM, Andi Kleen wrote:
>> i386 vs x86-64 vs x32 is just one of many axes along which syscalls can be restricted (and for that matter, one axis if backward compatibility), and it does not make sense to burden the code with ad hoc filters. Designing a general filter facility which can be used to restrict any container to the subset of system calls it actually needs would make more sense, no?
>
> I believe this is already in the newer versions of seccomp.
>
Last I looked seccomp still had a hardcoded list of system calls, but
perhaps I've been looking in the wrong place. However, since that's
exactly what seccomp is -- a system call filter -- this can, and should,
be unified that way.
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-08-14 15:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-08-12 15:03 [RFC] x86: restrict pid namespaces to 32 or 64 bit syscalls Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-12 15:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-12 20:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-12 20:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-13 6:22 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-13 6:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-13 15:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-13 15:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-13 16:32 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-14 9:09 ` Solar Designer
2011-08-14 9:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-08-18 14:40 ` [RFC v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-18 14:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-14 2:38 ` [RFC] " Andi Kleen
2011-08-14 2:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-08-14 5:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-14 5:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-14 9:20 ` Solar Designer
2011-08-14 9:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-08-14 14:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-14 14:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-14 15:27 ` Andi Kleen
2011-08-14 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-08-14 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2011-08-14 15:36 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-14 23:29 ` James Morris
2011-08-14 23:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2011-08-15 0:18 ` Andi Kleen
2011-08-15 0:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-08-15 0:32 ` Will Drewry
2011-08-15 0:58 ` Andi Kleen
[not found] ` <20110814152729.GU5782-qrUzlfsMFqo/4alezvVtWx2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org>
2011-08-14 16:08 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-14 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-14 16:08 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-08-15 18:51 ` Solar Designer
2011-08-15 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-08-15 18:59 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-15 18:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-15 20:14 ` Solar Designer
2011-08-15 20:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-08-15 20:27 ` Andi Kleen
2011-08-15 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2011-08-15 20:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-15 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-08-15 22:13 ` Eric Paris
2011-08-15 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2011-08-16 1:18 ` Andi Kleen
2011-08-16 1:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=4E47EB99.1020909@zytor.com \
--to=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=andi@firstfloor.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=segoon@openwall.com \
--cc=solar@openwall.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.