From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 09:19:06 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4a4a672f-a21e-f50d-9289-27456923f6df@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220307223353.f7cqzqispfeltvb2@black.fi.intel.com>
On 3/8/2022 6:33 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 07, 2022 at 05:29:27PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
...
>> Even though CPUID reports MCE is supported, all the access to MCE related
>> MSRs causes #VE. If they are accessed via mce_rdmsrl(), the #VE will be
>> fixed up and goes to ex_handler_msr_mce(). Finally lead to panic().
>
> It is not panic, but warning. Like this:
>
> unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x179 at rIP: 0xffffffff810df1e9 (__mcheck_cpu_cap_init+0x9/0x130)
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> mcheck_cpu_init+0x3d/0x2c0
> identify_cpu+0x85a/0x910
> identify_boot_cpu+0xc/0x98
> check_bugs+0x6/0xa7
> start_kernel+0x363/0x3d1
> secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb
> </TASK>
>
> It is annoying, but not fatal. The patchset is big enough as it is.
> I tried to keep patch number under control.
>
I did hit panic as below.
[ 0.578792] mce: MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x475 at rIP:
0xffffffffb94daa92 (mce_rdmsrl+0x22/0x60)
[ 0.578792] Call Trace:
[ 0.578792] <TASK>
[ 0.578792] machine_check_poll+0xf0/0x260
[ 0.578792] __mcheck_cpu_init_generic+0x3d/0xb0
[ 0.578792] mcheck_cpu_init+0x16b/0x4a0
[ 0.578792] identify_cpu+0x467/0x5c0
[ 0.578792] identify_boot_cpu+0x10/0x9a
[ 0.578792] check_bugs+0x2a/0xa06
[ 0.578792] start_kernel+0x6bc/0x6f1
[ 0.578792] x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
[ 0.578792] x86_64_start_kernel+0xad/0xb2
[ 0.578792] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe4/0xeb
[ 0.578792] </TASK>
[ 0.578792] Kernel panic - not syncing: MCA architectural violation!
[ 0.578792] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
5.17.0-rc5-td-guest-upstream+ #2
[ 0.578792] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 0.578792] Call Trace:
[ 0.578792] <TASK>
[ 0.578792] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f
[ 0.578792] dump_stack+0x10/0x12
[ 0.578792] panic+0xf9/0x2d0
[ 0.578792] ex_handler_msr_mce+0x5e/0x5e
[ 0.578792] fixup_exception+0x2f4/0x310
[ 0.578792] exc_virtualization_exception+0x9b/0x100
[ 0.578792] asm_exc_virtualization_exception+0x12/0x40
[ 0.578792] RIP: 0010:mce_rdmsrl+0x22/0x60
[ 0.578792] Code: a0 b9 e8 75 4d fb ff 90 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 89 fb
48 c7 c7 9c c1 f6 b9 e8 4b 28 00 00 65 8a 05 97 52 b4 46 84 c0 75 10 89
d9 <0f> 32 48 c1 e2 20 48 09 d0 5b 41 5c 5d c3 89 df e8 c9 5a 17 ff 4c
[ 0.578792] RSP: 0000:ffffffffba203cd8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 0.578792] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000475 RCX:
0000000000000475
[ 0.578792] RDX: 00000000000001d0 RSI: ffffffffb9f6c19c RDI:
ffffffffb9ece016
[ 0.578792] RBP: ffffffffba203ce8 R08: ffffffffba203cb0 R09:
ffffffffba203cb4
[ 0.578792] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000000f R12:
0000000000000001
[ 0.578792] R13: ffffffffba203dc0 R14: 000000000000000a R15:
000000000000001d
[ 0.578792] ? mce_rdmsrl+0x15/0x60
[ 0.578792] machine_check_poll+0xf0/0x260
[ 0.578792] __mcheck_cpu_init_generic+0x3d/0xb0
[ 0.578792] mcheck_cpu_init+0x16b/0x4a0
[ 0.578792] identify_cpu+0x467/0x5c0
[ 0.578792] identify_boot_cpu+0x10/0x9a
[ 0.578792] check_bugs+0x2a/0xa06
[ 0.578792] start_kernel+0x6bc/0x6f1
[ 0.578792] x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
[ 0.578792] x86_64_start_kernel+0xad/0xb2
[ 0.578792] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe4/0xeb
[ 0.578792] </TASK>
[ 0.578792] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: MCA architectural
violation! ]---
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-08 1:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-02 14:27 [PATCHv5 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 01/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-04 15:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 15:47 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-07 22:24 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 19:56 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 12:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-10 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 03/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:03 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-10 21:20 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 21:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-15 15:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-12 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 04/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:17 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 16:01 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 18:36 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 23:51 ` [PATCHv5.2 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 0:07 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-15 19:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 05/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 06/30] x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:18 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:29 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:33 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 16:15 ` [PATCH] " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:26 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 0:51 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 1:06 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 16:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 17:53 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 17:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-11 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 18:01 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07 22:27 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 15/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 17:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-02 19:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 20:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 16/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:30 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 18/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:37 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07 9:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-03-07 22:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 1:19 ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2022-03-08 16:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07 22:36 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 19:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 27/30] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 20:07 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-03-10 14:51 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 20:39 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 16:13 ` Dan Williams
2022-03-09 20:56 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 21:49 ` Dave Hansen
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