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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
	tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 12:56:26 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5202ac86-7438-eeae-61d7-23bf10b475f5@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220302142806.51844-30-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

On 3/2/22 06:28, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> WBINVD is not supported in TDX guest and triggers #VE. There's no robust
> way to emulate it. The kernel has to avoid it.

Not really.  It could just ignore any use of WBVIND.  That's why
hypervisors mostly do today.

> ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() flushes caches usign WBINVD on entering sleep

					 ^ using
			
> states. It is required to prevent data loss.
> 
> While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache
> flushing. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the
> host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.

How's this?

Before entering sleep states, the ACPI code flushes caches to prevent
data loss using the WBINVD instruction.  This mechanism is required on
bare metal.

But, any use WBINVD inside of a guest is worthless.  Changing sleep
state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state
and cannot lead to data loss, so most hypervisors simply ignore it.
Despite this, the ACPI code calls WBINVD unconditionally anyway.  It's
useless, but also normally harmless.

In TDX guests, though, WBINVD stops being harmless; it triggers a
virtualization exception (#VE).  If the ACPI cache-flushing WBINVD were
left in place, TDX guests would need handling to recover from the exception.

Avoid using WBINVD whenever running under a hypervisor.  This both
removes the useless WBINVDs and saves TDX from implementing WBINVD handling.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
> index 9aff97f0de7f..d937c55e717e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h
> @@ -13,7 +13,19 @@
>  
>  /* Asm macros */
>  
> -#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE()	wbinvd()
> +/*
> + * ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() flushes caches on entering sleep states.
> + * It is required to prevent data loss.
> + *
> + * While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing.
> + * Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system
> + * sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.
> + */
> +#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE()					\
> +do {								\
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))	\
> +		wbinvd();					\
> +} while (0)
>  
>  int __acpi_acquire_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);
>  int __acpi_release_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 20:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-02 14:27 [PATCHv5 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 01/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-04 15:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 15:47     ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 16:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-07 22:24         ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 18:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 19:56   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 12:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-10 14:44     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 03/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:03   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-10 21:20     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 21:48       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-15 15:56         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-12 10:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 04/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:17   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 16:01     ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 18:36       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 23:51         ` [PATCHv5.2 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10  0:07           ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-15 19:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 05/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 06/30] x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:18   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:29   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 20:33   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-09 16:15     ` [PATCH] " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:26   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10  0:51     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10  1:06       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 16:48         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-10 17:53           ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 17:18             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-11 17:22               ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-11 18:01               ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07 22:27   ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 15/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 17:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-02 19:41     ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 20:02       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 16/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:30   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 18/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 21:37   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:27 ` [PATCHv5 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07  9:29   ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-03-07 22:33     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08  1:19       ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-03-08 16:41         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-07 22:36     ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-08 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 19:44   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 27/30] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 20:07   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-10 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2022-03-10 14:51       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 20:39   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-02 16:13   ` Dan Williams
2022-03-09 20:56   ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-03-02 14:28 ` [PATCHv5 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-09 21:49   ` Dave Hansen

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