From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] VMX: replace plain numbers
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 14:01:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54C110BA020000780005829D@mail.emea.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54C10EE1020000780005827E@mail.emea.novell.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 8635 bytes --]
... making the code better document itself. No functional change
intended.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1406,7 +1406,9 @@ static void __vmx_inject_exception(int t
* VM entry]", PRM Vol. 3, 22.6.1 (Interruptibility State).
*/
- intr_fields = (INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (type<<8) | trap);
+ intr_fields = INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(type, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(trap, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
if ( error_code != HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE ) {
__vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
intr_fields |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
@@ -1430,7 +1432,9 @@ void vmx_inject_extint(int trap, uint8_t
PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK ) {
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR<<8) | trap,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(trap, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, source);
return;
}
@@ -1449,7 +1453,9 @@ void vmx_inject_nmi(void)
PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING ) {
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI<<8) | TRAP_nmi,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(TRAP_nmi, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, hvm_intsrc_nmi);
return;
}
@@ -1487,7 +1493,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
if ( guest_cpu_user_regs()->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF )
{
__restore_debug_registers(curr);
- write_debugreg(6, read_debugreg(6) | 0x4000);
+ write_debugreg(6, read_debugreg(6) | DR_STEP);
}
if ( cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
break;
@@ -1502,7 +1508,8 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
}
if ( unlikely(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- (((intr_info >> 8) & 7) == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION) )
+ (MASK_EXTR(intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) ==
+ X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION) )
{
_trap.vector = hvm_combine_hw_exceptions(
(uint8_t)intr_info, _trap.vector);
@@ -1517,7 +1524,9 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
nvmx_intercepts_exception(curr, _trap.vector, _trap.error_code) )
{
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (curr,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (_trap.type<<8) | _trap.vector,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(_trap.type, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(_trap.vector, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
_trap.error_code, hvm_intsrc_none);
return;
}
@@ -1976,8 +1985,11 @@ static int vmx_cr_access(unsigned long e
}
case VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_LMSW: {
unsigned long value = curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0];
- /* LMSW can: (1) set bits 0-3; (2) clear bits 1-3. */
- value = (value & ~0xe) | ((exit_qualification >> 16) & 0xf);
+
+ /* LMSW can (1) set PE; (2) set or clear MP, EM, and TS. */
+ value = (value & ~(X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS)) |
+ (VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(exit_qualification) &
+ (X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS));
HVMTRACE_LONG_1D(LMSW, value);
return hvm_set_cr0(value);
}
@@ -2803,7 +2815,7 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
*/
__vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification);
HVMTRACE_1D(TRAP_DEBUG, exit_qualification);
- write_debugreg(6, exit_qualification | 0xffff0ff0);
+ write_debugreg(6, exit_qualification | DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ONE);
if ( !v->domain->debugger_attached || cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
goto exit_and_crash;
domain_pause_for_debugger();
@@ -2872,8 +2884,8 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
hvm_inject_page_fault(regs->error_code, exit_qualification);
break;
case TRAP_nmi:
- if ( (intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
- (X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI << 8) )
+ if ( MASK_EXTR(intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
+ X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI )
goto exit_and_crash;
HVMTRACE_0D(NMI);
/* Already handled above. */
@@ -2924,7 +2936,8 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
* - TSW is a vectored event due to a SW exception or SW interrupt.
*/
inst_len = ((source != 3) || /* CALL, IRET, or JMP? */
- (idtv_info & (1u<<10))) /* IntrType > 3? */
+ (MASK_EXTR(idtv_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK)
+ > 3)) /* IntrType > 3? */
? get_instruction_length() /* Safe: SDM 3B 23.2.4 */ : 0;
if ( (source == 3) && (idtv_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) )
__vmread(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, &ecode);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static void sync_exception_state(struct
if ( !(nvmx->intr.intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
return;
- switch ( (nvmx->intr.intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) >> 8 )
+ switch ( MASK_EXTR(nvmx->intr.intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) )
{
case X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR:
/* rename exit_reason to EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT */
@@ -1327,10 +1327,10 @@ static void nvmx_update_apicv(struct vcp
ppr = vlapic_set_ppr(vlapic);
WARN_ON((ppr & 0xf0) != (vector & 0xf0));
- status = vector << 8;
+ status = vector << VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET;
rvi = vlapic_has_pending_irq(v);
if ( rvi != -1 )
- status |= rvi & 0xff;
+ status |= rvi & VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK;
__vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
@@ -2161,7 +2161,8 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
{
unsigned long intr_info;
- u32 valid_mask = (X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION << 8) |
+ u32 valid_mask = MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION,
+ INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
u64 exec_bitmap;
int vector;
@@ -2350,8 +2351,8 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
u32 mask = 0;
__vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification);
- cr = exit_qualification & 0xf;
- write = (exit_qualification >> 4) & 3;
+ cr = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_NUM(exit_qualification);
+ write = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE(exit_qualification);
/* also according to guest exec_control */
ctrl = __n2_exec_control(v);
@@ -2443,8 +2444,9 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
u64 cr0_gh_mask = __get_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
__vmread(CR0_READ_SHADOW, &old_val);
- old_val &= 0xf;
- val = (exit_qualification >> 16) & 0xf;
+ old_val &= X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS;
+ val = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(exit_qualification) &
+ (X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS);
changed_bits = old_val ^ val;
if ( changed_bits & cr0_gh_mask )
nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -207,8 +207,10 @@ static inline unsigned long pi_get_pir(s
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_MOV_FROM_CR 1
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_CLTS 2
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_LMSW 3
- /* 10:8 - general purpose register operand */
+ /* 11:8 - general purpose register operand */
#define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_GPR(eq) (((eq) >> 8) & 0xf)
+ /* 31:16 - LMSW source data */
+#define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(eq) ((uint32_t)(eq) >> 16)
/*
* Access Rights
[-- Attachment #2: VMX-literals.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 8661 bytes --]
VMX: replace plain numbers
... making the code better document itself. No functional change
intended.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1406,7 +1406,9 @@ static void __vmx_inject_exception(int t
* VM entry]", PRM Vol. 3, 22.6.1 (Interruptibility State).
*/
- intr_fields = (INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (type<<8) | trap);
+ intr_fields = INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(type, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(trap, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
if ( error_code != HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE ) {
__vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
intr_fields |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
@@ -1430,7 +1432,9 @@ void vmx_inject_extint(int trap, uint8_t
PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK ) {
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR<<8) | trap,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(trap, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, source);
return;
}
@@ -1449,7 +1453,9 @@ void vmx_inject_nmi(void)
PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING ) {
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI<<8) | TRAP_nmi,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(TRAP_nmi, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, hvm_intsrc_nmi);
return;
}
@@ -1487,7 +1493,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
if ( guest_cpu_user_regs()->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF )
{
__restore_debug_registers(curr);
- write_debugreg(6, read_debugreg(6) | 0x4000);
+ write_debugreg(6, read_debugreg(6) | DR_STEP);
}
if ( cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
break;
@@ -1502,7 +1508,8 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
}
if ( unlikely(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- (((intr_info >> 8) & 7) == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION) )
+ (MASK_EXTR(intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) ==
+ X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION) )
{
_trap.vector = hvm_combine_hw_exceptions(
(uint8_t)intr_info, _trap.vector);
@@ -1517,7 +1524,9 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t
nvmx_intercepts_exception(curr, _trap.vector, _trap.error_code) )
{
nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (curr,
- INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (_trap.type<<8) | _trap.vector,
+ INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK |
+ MASK_INSR(_trap.type, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
+ MASK_INSR(_trap.vector, INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK),
_trap.error_code, hvm_intsrc_none);
return;
}
@@ -1976,8 +1985,11 @@ static int vmx_cr_access(unsigned long e
}
case VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_LMSW: {
unsigned long value = curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0];
- /* LMSW can: (1) set bits 0-3; (2) clear bits 1-3. */
- value = (value & ~0xe) | ((exit_qualification >> 16) & 0xf);
+
+ /* LMSW can (1) set PE; (2) set or clear MP, EM, and TS. */
+ value = (value & ~(X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS)) |
+ (VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(exit_qualification) &
+ (X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS));
HVMTRACE_LONG_1D(LMSW, value);
return hvm_set_cr0(value);
}
@@ -2803,7 +2815,7 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
*/
__vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification);
HVMTRACE_1D(TRAP_DEBUG, exit_qualification);
- write_debugreg(6, exit_qualification | 0xffff0ff0);
+ write_debugreg(6, exit_qualification | DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ONE);
if ( !v->domain->debugger_attached || cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
goto exit_and_crash;
domain_pause_for_debugger();
@@ -2872,8 +2884,8 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
hvm_inject_page_fault(regs->error_code, exit_qualification);
break;
case TRAP_nmi:
- if ( (intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
- (X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI << 8) )
+ if ( MASK_EXTR(intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) !=
+ X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI )
goto exit_and_crash;
HVMTRACE_0D(NMI);
/* Already handled above. */
@@ -2924,7 +2936,8 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_
* - TSW is a vectored event due to a SW exception or SW interrupt.
*/
inst_len = ((source != 3) || /* CALL, IRET, or JMP? */
- (idtv_info & (1u<<10))) /* IntrType > 3? */
+ (MASK_EXTR(idtv_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK)
+ > 3)) /* IntrType > 3? */
? get_instruction_length() /* Safe: SDM 3B 23.2.4 */ : 0;
if ( (source == 3) && (idtv_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) )
__vmread(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE, &ecode);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ static void sync_exception_state(struct
if ( !(nvmx->intr.intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) )
return;
- switch ( (nvmx->intr.intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) >> 8 )
+ switch ( MASK_EXTR(nvmx->intr.intr_info, INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) )
{
case X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR:
/* rename exit_reason to EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT */
@@ -1327,10 +1327,10 @@ static void nvmx_update_apicv(struct vcp
ppr = vlapic_set_ppr(vlapic);
WARN_ON((ppr & 0xf0) != (vector & 0xf0));
- status = vector << 8;
+ status = vector << VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET;
rvi = vlapic_has_pending_irq(v);
if ( rvi != -1 )
- status |= rvi & 0xff;
+ status |= rvi & VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK;
__vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
@@ -2161,7 +2161,8 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
{
unsigned long intr_info;
- u32 valid_mask = (X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION << 8) |
+ u32 valid_mask = MASK_INSR(X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION,
+ INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) |
INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
u64 exec_bitmap;
int vector;
@@ -2350,8 +2351,8 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
u32 mask = 0;
__vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION, &exit_qualification);
- cr = exit_qualification & 0xf;
- write = (exit_qualification >> 4) & 3;
+ cr = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_NUM(exit_qualification);
+ write = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE(exit_qualification);
/* also according to guest exec_control */
ctrl = __n2_exec_control(v);
@@ -2443,8 +2444,9 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us
u64 cr0_gh_mask = __get_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
__vmread(CR0_READ_SHADOW, &old_val);
- old_val &= 0xf;
- val = (exit_qualification >> 16) & 0xf;
+ old_val &= X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS;
+ val = VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(exit_qualification) &
+ (X86_CR0_PE|X86_CR0_MP|X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS);
changed_bits = old_val ^ val;
if ( changed_bits & cr0_gh_mask )
nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -207,8 +207,10 @@ static inline unsigned long pi_get_pir(s
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_MOV_FROM_CR 1
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_CLTS 2
# define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_TYPE_LMSW 3
- /* 10:8 - general purpose register operand */
+ /* 11:8 - general purpose register operand */
#define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_GPR(eq) (((eq) >> 8) & 0xf)
+ /* 31:16 - LMSW source data */
+#define VMX_CONTROL_REG_ACCESS_DATA(eq) ((uint32_t)(eq) >> 16)
/*
* Access Rights
[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-22 14:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-01-22 13:53 [PATCH 0/4] x86: replace plain numbers Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 13:57 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/HVM: replace plain number in hvm_combine_hw_exceptions() Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 14:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-01-22 14:36 ` Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 14:42 ` Tim Deegan
2015-01-22 15:12 ` Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 15:27 ` Tim Deegan
2015-01-22 13:57 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/HVM: replace plain numbers Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 14:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-01-22 15:17 ` Jan Beulich
2015-01-23 13:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-01-23 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2015-01-23 13:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-01-22 14:00 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/traps: " Jan Beulich
2015-01-22 14:45 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-01-22 14:01 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2015-01-22 15:21 ` [PATCH 4/4] VMX: " Andrew Cooper
2015-01-23 6:25 ` Tian, Kevin
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