All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	lin ux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:11:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5709dadf-81c6-5b40-93d4-fbef94d5aad8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103095247.GH4879@kernel.org>

On 03.11.20 10:52, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 06:51:09PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> Assume you have a system with quite some ZONE_MOVABLE memory (esp. in
>>>> virtualized environments), eating up a significant amount of !ZONE_MOVABLE
>>>> memory dynamically at runtime can lead to non-obvious issues. It looks like
>>>> you have plenty of free memory, but the kernel might still OOM when trying
>>>> to do kernel allocations e.g., for pagetables. With CMA we at least know
>>>> what we're dealing with - it behaves like ZONE_MOVABLE except for the owner
>>>> that can place unmovable pages there. We can use it to compute statically
>>>> the amount of ZONE_MOVABLE memory we can have in the system without doing
>>>> harm to the system.
>>>
>>> Why would you say that secretmem allocates from !ZONE_MOVABLE?
>>> If we put boot time reservations aside, the memory allocation for
>>> secretmem follows the same rules as the memory allocations for any file
>>> descriptor. That means we allocate memory with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.
>>
>> Oh, okay - I missed that! I had the impression that pages are unmovable and
>> allocating from ZONE_MOVABLE would be a violation of that?
>>
>>> After the allocation the memory indeed becomes unmovable but it's not
>>> like we are eating memory from other zones here.
>>
>> ... and here you have your problem. That's a no-no. We only allow it in very
>> special cases where it can't be avoided - e.g., vfio having to pin guest
>> memory when passing through memory to VMs.
>>
>> Hotplug memory, online it to ZONE_MOVABLE. Allocate secretmem. Try to unplug
>> the memory again -> endless loop in offline_pages().
>>
>> Or have a CMA area that gets used with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Allocate
>> secretmem. The owner of the area tries to allocate memory - always fails.
>> Purpose of CMA destroyed.
>>
>>>
>>>> Ideally, we would want to support page migration/compaction and allow for
>>>> allocation from ZONE_MOVABLE as well. Would involve temporarily mapping,
>>>> copying, unmapping. Sounds feasible, but not sure which roadblocks we would
>>>> find on the way.
>>>
>>> We can support migration/compaction with temporary mapping. The first
>>> roadblock I've hit there was that migration allocates 4K destination
>>> page and if we use it in secret map we are back to scrambling the direct
>>> map into 4K pieces. It still sounds feasible but not as trivial :)
>>
>> That sounds like the proper way for me to do it then.
>   
> Although migration of secretmem pages sounds feasible now, there maybe
> other issues I didn't see because I'm not very familiar with
> migration/compaction code.

Migration of PMDs might also be feasible -  and it would be even 
cleaner. But I agree that that might require more work and starting with 
something simpler (!movable) is the right way to move forward.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:11:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5709dadf-81c6-5b40-93d4-fbef94d5aad8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103095247.GH4879@kernel.org>

On 03.11.20 10:52, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 06:51:09PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> Assume you have a system with quite some ZONE_MOVABLE memory (esp. in
>>>> virtualized environments), eating up a significant amount of !ZONE_MOVABLE
>>>> memory dynamically at runtime can lead to non-obvious issues. It looks like
>>>> you have plenty of free memory, but the kernel might still OOM when trying
>>>> to do kernel allocations e.g., for pagetables. With CMA we at least know
>>>> what we're dealing with - it behaves like ZONE_MOVABLE except for the owner
>>>> that can place unmovable pages there. We can use it to compute statically
>>>> the amount of ZONE_MOVABLE memory we can have in the system without doing
>>>> harm to the system.
>>>
>>> Why would you say that secretmem allocates from !ZONE_MOVABLE?
>>> If we put boot time reservations aside, the memory allocation for
>>> secretmem follows the same rules as the memory allocations for any file
>>> descriptor. That means we allocate memory with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.
>>
>> Oh, okay - I missed that! I had the impression that pages are unmovable and
>> allocating from ZONE_MOVABLE would be a violation of that?
>>
>>> After the allocation the memory indeed becomes unmovable but it's not
>>> like we are eating memory from other zones here.
>>
>> ... and here you have your problem. That's a no-no. We only allow it in very
>> special cases where it can't be avoided - e.g., vfio having to pin guest
>> memory when passing through memory to VMs.
>>
>> Hotplug memory, online it to ZONE_MOVABLE. Allocate secretmem. Try to unplug
>> the memory again -> endless loop in offline_pages().
>>
>> Or have a CMA area that gets used with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Allocate
>> secretmem. The owner of the area tries to allocate memory - always fails.
>> Purpose of CMA destroyed.
>>
>>>
>>>> Ideally, we would want to support page migration/compaction and allow for
>>>> allocation from ZONE_MOVABLE as well. Would involve temporarily mapping,
>>>> copying, unmapping. Sounds feasible, but not sure which roadblocks we would
>>>> find on the way.
>>>
>>> We can support migration/compaction with temporary mapping. The first
>>> roadblock I've hit there was that migration allocates 4K destination
>>> page and if we use it in secret map we are back to scrambling the direct
>>> map into 4K pieces. It still sounds feasible but not as trivial :)
>>
>> That sounds like the proper way for me to do it then.
>   
> Although migration of secretmem pages sounds feasible now, there maybe
> other issues I didn't see because I'm not very familiar with
> migration/compaction code.

Migration of PMDs might also be feasible -  and it would be even 
cleaner. But I agree that that might require more work and starting with 
something simpler (!movable) is the right way to move forward.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:11:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5709dadf-81c6-5b40-93d4-fbef94d5aad8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103095247.GH4879@kernel.org>

On 03.11.20 10:52, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 06:51:09PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> Assume you have a system with quite some ZONE_MOVABLE memory (esp. in
>>>> virtualized environments), eating up a significant amount of !ZONE_MOVABLE
>>>> memory dynamically at runtime can lead to non-obvious issues. It looks like
>>>> you have plenty of free memory, but the kernel might still OOM when trying
>>>> to do kernel allocations e.g., for pagetables. With CMA we at least know
>>>> what we're dealing with - it behaves like ZONE_MOVABLE except for the owner
>>>> that can place unmovable pages there. We can use it to compute statically
>>>> the amount of ZONE_MOVABLE memory we can have in the system without doing
>>>> harm to the system.
>>>
>>> Why would you say that secretmem allocates from !ZONE_MOVABLE?
>>> If we put boot time reservations aside, the memory allocation for
>>> secretmem follows the same rules as the memory allocations for any file
>>> descriptor. That means we allocate memory with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.
>>
>> Oh, okay - I missed that! I had the impression that pages are unmovable and
>> allocating from ZONE_MOVABLE would be a violation of that?
>>
>>> After the allocation the memory indeed becomes unmovable but it's not
>>> like we are eating memory from other zones here.
>>
>> ... and here you have your problem. That's a no-no. We only allow it in very
>> special cases where it can't be avoided - e.g., vfio having to pin guest
>> memory when passing through memory to VMs.
>>
>> Hotplug memory, online it to ZONE_MOVABLE. Allocate secretmem. Try to unplug
>> the memory again -> endless loop in offline_pages().
>>
>> Or have a CMA area that gets used with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Allocate
>> secretmem. The owner of the area tries to allocate memory - always fails.
>> Purpose of CMA destroyed.
>>
>>>
>>>> Ideally, we would want to support page migration/compaction and allow for
>>>> allocation from ZONE_MOVABLE as well. Would involve temporarily mapping,
>>>> copying, unmapping. Sounds feasible, but not sure which roadblocks we would
>>>> find on the way.
>>>
>>> We can support migration/compaction with temporary mapping. The first
>>> roadblock I've hit there was that migration allocates 4K destination
>>> page and if we use it in secret map we are back to scrambling the direct
>>> map into 4K pieces. It still sounds feasible but not as trivial :)
>>
>> That sounds like the proper way for me to do it then.
>   
> Although migration of secretmem pages sounds feasible now, there maybe
> other issues I didn't see because I'm not very familiar with
> migration/compaction code.

Migration of PMDs might also be feasible -  and it would be even 
cleaner. But I agree that that might require more work and starting with 
something simpler (!movable) is the right way to move forward.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:11:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5709dadf-81c6-5b40-93d4-fbef94d5aad8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103095247.GH4879@kernel.org>

On 03.11.20 10:52, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 06:51:09PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> Assume you have a system with quite some ZONE_MOVABLE memory (esp. in
>>>> virtualized environments), eating up a significant amount of !ZONE_MOVABLE
>>>> memory dynamically at runtime can lead to non-obvious issues. It looks like
>>>> you have plenty of free memory, but the kernel might still OOM when trying
>>>> to do kernel allocations e.g., for pagetables. With CMA we at least know
>>>> what we're dealing with - it behaves like ZONE_MOVABLE except for the owner
>>>> that can place unmovable pages there. We can use it to compute statically
>>>> the amount of ZONE_MOVABLE memory we can have in the system without doing
>>>> harm to the system.
>>>
>>> Why would you say that secretmem allocates from !ZONE_MOVABLE?
>>> If we put boot time reservations aside, the memory allocation for
>>> secretmem follows the same rules as the memory allocations for any file
>>> descriptor. That means we allocate memory with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE.
>>
>> Oh, okay - I missed that! I had the impression that pages are unmovable and
>> allocating from ZONE_MOVABLE would be a violation of that?
>>
>>> After the allocation the memory indeed becomes unmovable but it's not
>>> like we are eating memory from other zones here.
>>
>> ... and here you have your problem. That's a no-no. We only allow it in very
>> special cases where it can't be avoided - e.g., vfio having to pin guest
>> memory when passing through memory to VMs.
>>
>> Hotplug memory, online it to ZONE_MOVABLE. Allocate secretmem. Try to unplug
>> the memory again -> endless loop in offline_pages().
>>
>> Or have a CMA area that gets used with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Allocate
>> secretmem. The owner of the area tries to allocate memory - always fails.
>> Purpose of CMA destroyed.
>>
>>>
>>>> Ideally, we would want to support page migration/compaction and allow for
>>>> allocation from ZONE_MOVABLE as well. Would involve temporarily mapping,
>>>> copying, unmapping. Sounds feasible, but not sure which roadblocks we would
>>>> find on the way.
>>>
>>> We can support migration/compaction with temporary mapping. The first
>>> roadblock I've hit there was that migration allocates 4K destination
>>> page and if we use it in secret map we are back to scrambling the direct
>>> map into 4K pieces. It still sounds feasible but not as trivial :)
>>
>> That sounds like the proper way for me to do it then.
>   
> Although migration of secretmem pages sounds feasible now, there maybe
> other issues I didn't see because I'm not very familiar with
> migration/compaction code.

Migration of PMDs might also be feasible -  and it would be even 
cleaner. But I agree that that might require more work and starting with 
something simpler (!movable) is the right way to move forward.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-03 10:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 236+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-24 13:28 [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29  4:58   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 13:06     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 20:06       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 10:35         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 20:11           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-11  9:42             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  7:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:00     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 10:31         ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 14:57           ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-29 14:04           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:12       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:31         ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:58         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:15           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:27             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 14:39               ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:45                 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:17                   ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:25                     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:09               ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-01  8:14                 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:03         ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 10:20         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:43           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 14:55   ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-05  7:32       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-16 21:01         ` [PATCH v2] memfd_secret.2: New " Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-17  6:26           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-21 21:46             ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2020-11-22  7:03               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  2:34 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  6:42   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02 15:40   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 13:52     ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 16:30       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 11:39         ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 17:02           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-09 10:41             ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02  9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:43   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:51     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03  9:52       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 10:11         ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5709dadf-81c6-5b40-93d4-fbef94d5aad8@redhat.com \
    --to=david@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=idan.yaniv@ibm.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
    --cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
    --cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=shuah@kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tycho@tycho.ws \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=willy@infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.