From: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kerne l.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:41:59 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <651318720.14321.1604918519928@office.mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201104170247.GT4879@kernel.org>
> On 11/04/2020 6:02 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this will work. The processes that share the memfd_secret file
> descriptor will have access to the same memory pages, pretty much like
> with shared memory.
Perfect!
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Thank you for the effort Mike, if zeroize feature will also included it will
be great! The memset-all-pages after use is just overkill, a dedicated flag for
memfd_secret (or mmap) would be superior.
Hagen
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:41:59 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <651318720.14321.1604918519928@office.mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201104170247.GT4879@kernel.org>
> On 11/04/2020 6:02 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this will work. The processes that share the memfd_secret file
> descriptor will have access to the same memory pages, pretty much like
> with shared memory.
Perfect!
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Thank you for the effort Mike, if zeroize feature will also included it will
be great! The memset-all-pages after use is just overkill, a dedicated flag for
memfd_secret (or mmap) would be superior.
Hagen
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:41:59 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <651318720.14321.1604918519928@office.mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201104170247.GT4879@kernel.org>
> On 11/04/2020 6:02 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this will work. The processes that share the memfd_secret file
> descriptor will have access to the same memory pages, pretty much like
> with shared memory.
Perfect!
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Thank you for the effort Mike, if zeroize feature will also included it will
be great! The memset-all-pages after use is just overkill, a dedicated flag for
memfd_secret (or mmap) would be superior.
Hagen
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:41:59 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <651318720.14321.1604918519928@office.mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201104170247.GT4879@kernel.org>
> On 11/04/2020 6:02 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this will work. The processes that share the memfd_secret file
> descriptor will have access to the same memory pages, pretty much like
> with shared memory.
Perfect!
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Thank you for the effort Mike, if zeroize feature will also included it will
be great! The memset-all-pages after use is just overkill, a dedicated flag for
memfd_secret (or mmap) would be superior.
Hagen
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-09 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 236+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 13:28 [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 4:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 4:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 4:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 4:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 4:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 20:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 10:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 20:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-11 9:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11 9:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11 9:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11 9:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11 9:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25 7:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 7:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 7:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 7:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 9:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25 9:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25 9:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25 9:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25 9:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 9:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 9:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 9:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 10:31 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31 ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 14:57 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57 ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-29 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:58 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 14:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:17 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:25 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:09 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-01 8:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01 8:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01 8:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01 8:14 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:03 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 10:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 14:55 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03 9:32 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03 9:32 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03 9:32 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03 9:32 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-05 7:32 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05 7:32 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05 7:32 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05 7:32 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-16 21:01 ` [PATCH v2] memfd_secret.2: New " Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01 ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-17 6:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17 6:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17 6:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17 6:26 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-21 21:46 ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2020-11-22 7:03 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25 2:34 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andrew Morton
2020-09-25 2:34 ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25 2:34 ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25 2:34 ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25 6:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25 6:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25 6:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25 6:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02 15:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 13:52 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 16:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 11:39 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-09 10:41 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer [this message]
2020-11-09 10:41 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02 9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:31 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:31 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:31 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 9:31 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:43 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:51 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 9:52 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 9:52 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 9:52 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 9:52 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 10:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11 ` David Hildenbrand
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