From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>,
Martin Pohlack <mpohlack@amazon.de>,
Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>,
nmanthey@amazon.de, "Martin Mazein(amazein)" <amazein@amazon.de>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@amazon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
Subject: Re: SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 01:28:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5C4EBD1A0200007800211954@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1548244285-30813-1-git-send-email-nmanthey@amazon.de>
Jürgen,
>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, <nmanthey@amazon.de> wrote:
> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
> that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can
> be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.
>
> The lfence instruction should be added on x86 platforms only. To not affect
> platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability, the lfence
> instruction is patched in via alternative patching on Intel CPUs only.
> Furthermore, the compile time configuration allows to choose how to protect the
> evaluation of conditions with the lfence instruction.
I've noticed only now that you weren't Cc-ed on this series. It
clearly is something to at least be considered for 4.12. May I
ask what your view on this is? Perhaps in particular whether
you would want to set some boundary in time until which pieces
of it (as they become ready, which looks to be the case for
patches 10 and 11 at this point in time) may go in?
Jan
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-28 8:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 150+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-23 11:51 SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 01/11] is_control_domain: block speculation Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 13:07 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 13:20 ` Julien Grall
2019-01-23 13:40 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 13:20 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-24 12:07 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-24 20:33 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-01-25 9:19 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 02/11] is_hvm/pv_domain: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 03/11] config: introduce L1TF_LFENCE option Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 13:18 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-24 12:11 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 13:24 ` Julien Grall
2019-01-23 13:39 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 13:44 ` Julien Grall
2019-01-23 14:45 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-24 12:21 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-24 21:29 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-01-25 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-25 10:50 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-25 13:09 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-27 20:28 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 7:35 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-28 7:56 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 8:24 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-28 10:07 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-31 22:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-01 8:02 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 04/11] x86/hvm: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-01-31 19:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-01 9:06 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 05/11] common/grant_table: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 13:37 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-28 14:45 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 15:09 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-29 8:33 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 9:46 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-29 13:47 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 15:11 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-30 8:06 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-30 11:35 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:51 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 06/11] common/memory: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 11:57 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 07/11] nospec: enable lfence on Intel Norbert Manthey
2019-01-24 22:29 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-01-27 20:09 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 11:57 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 08/11] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-01-24 16:56 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-24 19:50 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-25 9:23 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:57 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 09/11] x86/vioapic: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-25 16:34 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-28 11:03 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 11:12 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-28 12:20 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-23 11:57 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 10/11] x86/hvm/hpet: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-25 16:50 ` Jan Beulich
2019-01-23 11:57 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 11/11] x86/CPUID: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-24 21:05 ` SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series Andrew Cooper
2019-01-28 13:56 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 8:28 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
[not found] ` <5C4EBD1A0200007800211954@suse.com>
2019-01-28 8:47 ` Juergen Gross
2019-01-28 9:56 ` Jan Beulich
[not found] ` <9C03B9BA0200004637554D14@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
[not found] ` <00FAA7AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
[not found] ` <00FAE7AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-01-31 15:05 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Jan Beulich
2019-02-01 13:45 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-01 14:08 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-05 13:42 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <00FA27AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-01-31 16:05 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 2/9] x86/vioapic: " Jan Beulich
2019-02-01 13:54 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <00F867AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-01-31 16:19 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 3/9] x86/hvm: " Jan Beulich
2019-01-31 20:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-01 8:23 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-01 14:06 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-01 14:31 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-01 14:05 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <0101A7AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-01-31 16:35 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier Jan Beulich
2019-02-05 14:23 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-05 14:43 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-06 13:02 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-06 13:20 ` Jan Beulich
[not found] ` <0101E7AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-01-31 17:05 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 5/9] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec Jan Beulich
2019-02-05 14:32 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series v6 Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 2/9] x86/vioapic: " Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 3/9] x86/hvm: " Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 5/9] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 6/9] is_control_domain: block speculation Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 7/9] is_hvm/pv_domain: " Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 8/9] common/grant_table: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 9/9] common/memory: " Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 14:32 ` SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series v6 Julien Grall
[not found] ` <A18FF6C80200006BB1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
[not found] ` <01CCAAAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
[not found] ` <01CCEAAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 13:08 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 13:10 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-14 13:20 ` Jan Beulich
[not found] ` <01CC2AAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 13:16 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 2/9] x86/vioapic: " Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 13:16 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <01CE6AAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 13:25 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 3/9] x86/hvm: " Jan Beulich
2019-02-12 14:05 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-12 14:14 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-15 8:05 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-15 8:55 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-15 10:50 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-15 11:46 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-18 14:47 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-18 15:56 ` Jan Beulich
[not found] ` <01CFAAAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 13:44 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier Jan Beulich
2019-02-15 9:13 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <01CFEAAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 13:50 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 5/9] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 13:37 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-12 14:12 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 13:42 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <01CF2AAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 14:11 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 6/9] is_control_domain: block speculation Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 13:45 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <23D9419E02000017B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-12 14:31 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 9/9] common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Jan Beulich
2019-02-14 14:04 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <01CEAAAF02000039B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-13 11:50 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 8/9] common/grant_table: " Jan Beulich
2019-02-15 9:55 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-15 10:34 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-18 13:49 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-18 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-19 21:47 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <0104A7AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-06 14:52 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 " Jan Beulich
2019-02-06 15:06 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-06 15:53 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-07 9:50 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-07 10:20 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-07 14:00 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-07 16:20 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <010527AF020000F8B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-06 15:03 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 6/9] is_control_domain: block speculation Jan Beulich
2019-02-06 15:36 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-06 16:01 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-07 10:02 ` Norbert Manthey
[not found] ` <20F3469E02000096B1E090C7@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
2019-02-06 15:25 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 9/9] common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Jan Beulich
2019-02-06 15:39 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-02-06 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-07 7:20 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-01-28 10:01 SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series Juergen Gross
2019-01-29 14:43 ` SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series v5 Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 2/9] x86/vioapic: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 3/9] x86/hvm: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 5/9] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec Norbert Manthey
2019-02-08 9:20 ` Julien Grall
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 6/9] is_control_domain: block speculation Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 7/9] is_hvm/pv_domain: " Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 8/9] common/grant_table: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-01-29 14:43 ` [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 9/9] common/memory: " Norbert Manthey
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