From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, lukas@wunner.de, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 11:46:38 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6125.1479901598@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161123102747.GD24624@leverpostej>
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> Any reason to not Cc LAKML?
Probably not.
> On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 12:22:43AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > Provide the ability to perform mixed-mode runtime service calls for arm in
> > the same way that commit 0a637ee61247bd4bed9b2a07568ef7a1cfc76187
> > ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services") provides the
> > ability to invoke arbitrary boot services.
>
> I'm not sure I understand. On arm/arm64, "mixed-mode" simply isn't possible.
>
> I see we already call runtime services directly in efi_get_secureboot()
> in drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c.
>
> If this is just to provide a consistent API for the stub, please note
> that.
How about:
arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
efi_call_runtime() is provided for x86 to be able abstract mixed mode
support. Provide this for ARM also so that common code work in mixed mode
also.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 11:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells
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