From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: lukas@wunner.de, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:47:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123104757.GE24624@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147986057768.13790.3027173260868896792.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 12:22:57AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> @@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
> else
> setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
>
> + boot_params->secure_boot = (efi_get_secureboot(sys_table) == 1);
In the arm stub's efi_entry(), we fail-safe, and assume secure boot for any
non-zero status (including errors). e.g.
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0) {
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
}
/*
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
* ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
*/
if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
... should we not do likewise here, e.g.
int secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0)
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
/*
* Fail-safe in the case of an error determining the secure boot
* status.
*/
boot_params->secure_boot = (secure_boot != 0);
... ?
Thanks,
Mark.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: lukas-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
keyrings-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:47:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161123104757.GE24624@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147986057768.13790.3027173260868896792.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 12:22:57AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> @@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
> else
> setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
>
> + boot_params->secure_boot = (efi_get_secureboot(sys_table) == 1);
In the arm stub's efi_entry(), we fail-safe, and assume secure boot for any
non-zero status (including errors). e.g.
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0) {
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
}
/*
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
* ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
*/
if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
... should we not do likewise here, e.g.
int secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0)
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
/*
* Fail-safe in the case of an error determining the secure boot
* status.
*/
boot_params->secure_boot = (secure_boot != 0);
... ?
Thanks,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 10:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20161123104757.GE24624@leverpostej \
--to=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lukas@wunner.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.