All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 10:35:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu92VwUo=1Fh39r1WxNWo-mQRLx8sDby+rGcero8oyi-WA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5320.1479893643@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 23 November 2016 at 09:34, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...)     sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__)
>
> Turns out it's not that simple - of course.  runtime->get_variable is just a
> void pointer.  The old arm stub was casting it by virtue of assignment to a
> function pointer variable.
>
> The x86_64 appears to be doing bypassing all the compile-time type checking by
> passing the arguments through an ellipsis and then fixing up the argument list
> in the ->call() function.
>
> What I've changed the ARM and ARM64 things to is:
>
>         #define efi_call_runtime(f, ...)        ((efi_##f##_t *)sys_table_arg->runtime->f)(__VA_ARGS__)
>

Could we please instead fix the definition of efi_runtime_services_t,
given that we have typedefs already for all its members?

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-23 10:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-23  0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27   ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22   ` David Howells
2016-11-23  0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23  9:31   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  9:53   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47   ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 10:47     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13     ` David Howells
2016-11-23 14:24       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55       ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11         ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-29 18:11           ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51   ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:51     ` David Howells
2016-11-23  0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38   ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 13:38     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23  0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23  9:27   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09   ` David Howells
2016-11-23  9:34 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35   ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2016-11-23 11:51   ` David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAKv+Gu92VwUo=1Fh39r1WxNWo-mQRLx8sDby+rGcero8oyi-WA@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lukas@wunner.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.