From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> To: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de, Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com, rientjes@google.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration. Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 21:21:44 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <697cbb9301acf18296b65bb63686b6c0d422e382.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings. The host's page encryption bitmap is maintained for the guest to keep the encrypted/decrypted state of the guest pages, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel. Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index 4b29815de873..a8bc30d5b15b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <asm/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h> +#include <asm/e820/api.h> static int kvmapf = 1; @@ -358,6 +359,33 @@ static void kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused) */ if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0); + /* + * Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel + * specific page encryption status settings before we load a + * new kernel by kexec. NOTE: We cannot reset the complete + * page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the + * UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings. + */ + if (sev_live_migration_enabled() & (smp_processor_id() == 0)) { + int i; + unsigned long nr_pages; + + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { + struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; + unsigned long start_pfn; + unsigned long end_pfn; + + if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM) + continue; + + start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + end_pfn = (entry->addr + entry->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE); + + kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS, + entry->addr, nr_pages, 1); + } + } kvm_pv_disable_apf(); kvm_disable_steal_time(); } -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> To: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@suse.de, venu.busireddy@oracle.com Subject: [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration. Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 21:21:44 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <697cbb9301acf18296b65bb63686b6c0d422e382.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel specific page encryption status settings before we load a new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings. The host's page encryption bitmap is maintained for the guest to keep the encrypted/decrypted state of the guest pages, therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel. Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index 4b29815de873..a8bc30d5b15b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <asm/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h> +#include <asm/e820/api.h> static int kvmapf = 1; @@ -358,6 +359,33 @@ static void kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused) */ if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI)) wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0); + /* + * Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel + * specific page encryption status settings before we load a + * new kernel by kexec. NOTE: We cannot reset the complete + * page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the + * UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings. + */ + if (sev_live_migration_enabled() & (smp_processor_id() == 0)) { + int i; + unsigned long nr_pages; + + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { + struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; + unsigned long start_pfn; + unsigned long end_pfn; + + if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM) + continue; + + start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + end_pfn = (entry->addr + entry->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE); + + kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS, + entry->addr, nr_pages, 1); + } + } kvm_pv_disable_apf(); kvm_disable_steal_time(); } -- 2.17.1 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-05 21:21 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-05 21:13 [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 01/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 02/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 22:48 ` Venu Busireddy 2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 03/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 22:51 ` Venu Busireddy 2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 04/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 22:52 ` Venu Busireddy 2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 05/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 06/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 07/18] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 08/18] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:05 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 09/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:05 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 10/18] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:06 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:06 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for static allocation of unified Page Encryption Bitmap Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-30 5:49 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-12-04 11:08 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-12-04 21:38 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-12-06 10:19 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-05-05 21:19 ` [PATCH v8 13/18] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-12-04 11:20 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-12-04 16:48 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-12-04 17:08 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-12-04 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-12-06 10:57 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-12-06 14:09 ` Kalra, Ashish 2020-12-04 18:06 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-12-04 18:41 ` Sean Christopherson 2020-12-04 18:48 ` Kalra, Ashish 2020-12-04 19:02 ` Tom Lendacky 2020-12-04 21:42 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 14/18] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-30 5:51 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 15/18] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 16/18] KVM: x86: Mark _bss_decrypted section variables as decrypted in page encryption bitmap Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:21 ` Ashish Kalra [this message] 2020-05-05 21:21 ` [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-05-05 21:22 ` [PATCH v8 18/18] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV live migration feature implicitly on Incoming VM(s) Ashish Kalra 2020-05-30 2:09 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-12-04 11:11 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-12-04 11:22 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-12-04 21:46 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-12-06 10:18 ` Paolo Bonzini 2020-05-18 19:07 ` [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra 2020-06-01 20:02 ` Steve Rutherford 2020-06-03 22:14 ` Ashish Kalra 2020-08-05 18:29 ` Steve Rutherford
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