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From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
To: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 11:08:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <74e7c9f0-5eb4-904c-a6d8-2972e10a5729@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180522150648.28297-6-marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Hi Marc,

On 05/22/2018 04:06 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2,
> it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the
> workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather
> not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently
> on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit.
> 
> In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>

Cheers,

> ---
>   Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  17 ++++
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |   6 ++
>   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++----
>   3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index f2040d46f095..646e112c6f63 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -4092,6 +4092,23 @@
>   			expediting.  Set to zero to disable automatic
>   			expediting.
>   
> +	ssbd=		[ARM64,HW]
> +			Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
> +
> +			On CPUs that are vulnerable to the Speculative
> +			Store Bypass vulnerability and offer a
> +			firmware based mitigation, this parameter
> +			indicates how the mitigation should be used:
> +
> +			force-on:  Unconditionnaly enable mitigation for
> +				   for both kernel and userspace
> +			force-off: Unconditionnaly disable mitigation for
> +				   for both kernel and userspace
> +			kernel:    Always enable mitigation in the
> +				   kernel, and offer a prctl interface
> +				   to allow userspace to register its
> +				   interest in being mitigated too.
> +
>   	stack_guard_gap=	[MM]
>   			override the default stack gap protection. The value
>   			is in page units and it defines how many pages prior
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> index 09b0f2a80c8f..9bc548e22784 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ static inline u64 read_zcr_features(void)
>   	return zcr;
>   }
>   
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY		1
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
> +
>   #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>   
>   #endif
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index 7fd6d5b001f5..f1d4e75b0ddd 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
>   DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
>   
> +int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY;
> +
> +static const struct ssbd_options {
> +	const char	*str;
> +	int		state;
> +} ssbd_options[] = {
> +	{ "force-on",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, },
> +	{ "force-off",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, },
> +	{ "kernel",	ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY, },
> +};
> +
> +static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	if (!buf || !buf[0])
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) {
> +		int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str);
> +
> +		if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg);
> +
>   void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
>   				       __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
>   				       int nr_inst)
> @@ -272,44 +304,82 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>   				    int scope)
>   {
>   	struct arm_smccc_res res;
> -	bool supported = true;
> +	bool required = true;
> +	s32 val;
>   
>   	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>   
> -	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
> +	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
>   		return false;
> +	}
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * The probe function return value is either negative
> -	 * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
> -	 * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
> -	 * last case.
> -	 */
>   	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
>   	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
>   		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
>   				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
> -		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> -			supported = false;
>   		break;
>   
>   	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
>   		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
>   				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
> -		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> -			supported = false;
>   		break;
>   
>   	default:
> -		supported = false;
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> +		return false;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (supported) {
> -		__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
> +	val = (s32)res.a0;
> +
> +	switch (val) {
> +	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> +		return false;
> +
> +	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
> +		return false;
> +
> +	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
> +		required = true;
> +		break;
> +
> +	case 1:	/* Mitigation not required on this CPU */
> +		required = false;
> +		break;
> +
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON(1);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	switch (ssbd_state) {
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
> +		pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
> +		do_ssbd(false);
> +		required = false;
> +		break;
> +
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY:
> +		if (required) {
> +			__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
> +			do_ssbd(true);
> +		}
> +		break;
> +
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
> +		pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
>   		do_ssbd(true);
> +		required = true;
> +		break;
> +
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON(1);
> +		break;
>   	}
>   
> -	return supported;
> +	return required;
>   }
>   #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
>   
> 

-- 
Julien Grall

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: julien.grall@arm.com (Julien Grall)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 11:08:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <74e7c9f0-5eb4-904c-a6d8-2972e10a5729@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180522150648.28297-6-marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Hi Marc,

On 05/22/2018 04:06 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2,
> it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the
> workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather
> not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently
> on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit.
> 
> In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>

Cheers,

> ---
>   Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  17 ++++
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |   6 ++
>   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++----
>   3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index f2040d46f095..646e112c6f63 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -4092,6 +4092,23 @@
>   			expediting.  Set to zero to disable automatic
>   			expediting.
>   
> +	ssbd=		[ARM64,HW]
> +			Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
> +
> +			On CPUs that are vulnerable to the Speculative
> +			Store Bypass vulnerability and offer a
> +			firmware based mitigation, this parameter
> +			indicates how the mitigation should be used:
> +
> +			force-on:  Unconditionnaly enable mitigation for
> +				   for both kernel and userspace
> +			force-off: Unconditionnaly disable mitigation for
> +				   for both kernel and userspace
> +			kernel:    Always enable mitigation in the
> +				   kernel, and offer a prctl interface
> +				   to allow userspace to register its
> +				   interest in being mitigated too.
> +
>   	stack_guard_gap=	[MM]
>   			override the default stack gap protection. The value
>   			is in page units and it defines how many pages prior
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> index 09b0f2a80c8f..9bc548e22784 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ static inline u64 read_zcr_features(void)
>   	return zcr;
>   }
>   
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY		1
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
> +#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
> +
>   #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>   
>   #endif
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index 7fd6d5b001f5..f1d4e75b0ddd 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
>   DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
>   
> +int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY;
> +
> +static const struct ssbd_options {
> +	const char	*str;
> +	int		state;
> +} ssbd_options[] = {
> +	{ "force-on",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, },
> +	{ "force-off",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, },
> +	{ "kernel",	ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY, },
> +};
> +
> +static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf)
> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	if (!buf || !buf[0])
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) {
> +		int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str);
> +
> +		if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg);
> +
>   void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
>   				       __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
>   				       int nr_inst)
> @@ -272,44 +304,82 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>   				    int scope)
>   {
>   	struct arm_smccc_res res;
> -	bool supported = true;
> +	bool required = true;
> +	s32 val;
>   
>   	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>   
> -	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
> +	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
>   		return false;
> +	}
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * The probe function return value is either negative
> -	 * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
> -	 * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
> -	 * last case.
> -	 */
>   	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
>   	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
>   		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
>   				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
> -		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> -			supported = false;
>   		break;
>   
>   	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
>   		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
>   				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
> -		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> -			supported = false;
>   		break;
>   
>   	default:
> -		supported = false;
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> +		return false;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (supported) {
> -		__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
> +	val = (s32)res.a0;
> +
> +	switch (val) {
> +	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> +		return false;
> +
> +	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
> +		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
> +		return false;
> +
> +	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
> +		required = true;
> +		break;
> +
> +	case 1:	/* Mitigation not required on this CPU */
> +		required = false;
> +		break;
> +
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON(1);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	switch (ssbd_state) {
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
> +		pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
> +		do_ssbd(false);
> +		required = false;
> +		break;
> +
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY:
> +		if (required) {
> +			__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
> +			do_ssbd(true);
> +		}
> +		break;
> +
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
> +		pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
>   		do_ssbd(true);
> +		required = true;
> +		break;
> +
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON(1);
> +		break;
>   	}
>   
> -	return supported;
> +	return required;
>   }
>   #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
>   
> 

-- 
Julien Grall

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-23 10:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 110+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-22 15:06 [PATCH 00/14] arm64 SSBD (aka Spectre-v4) mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 01/14] arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 10:55   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 10:55     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 02/14] arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23  9:23   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23  9:23     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 10:52     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 10:52       ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:10       ` Robin Murphy
2018-05-24 12:10         ` Robin Murphy
2018-05-24 11:00   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:00     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:23     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:23       ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:28       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 11:28         ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 03/14] arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:03   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23 10:03     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:14   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:14     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 04/14] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:06   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23 10:06     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24  9:58   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24  9:58     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:39     ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 11:39       ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 13:34       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 13:34         ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:27   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:27     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:29   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-22 15:29     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-22 15:29     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-23 10:08   ` Julien Grall [this message]
2018-05-23 10:08     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:40   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:40     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:52     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 11:52       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 06/14] arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:11   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23 10:11     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:41     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:13   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23 10:13     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:43   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:43     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: ssbd: Disable mitigation on CPU resume if required by user Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:52   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-23 10:52     ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:55   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:55     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 09/14] arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:01   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:01     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:16     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:16       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:19       ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 12:19         ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 12:36         ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:36           ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 10/14] arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:48   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-05-22 15:48     ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-05-22 16:30     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 16:30       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 16:30       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:10   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:10     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:24   ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 12:24     ` Will Deacon
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 11/14] arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:11   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:11     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 12/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:15   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:15     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 13/14] arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:22   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:22     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 14/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:25   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:25     ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-20  9:47 [PATCH 00/14] arm64: 4.17 backport of the SSBD mitigation patches Marc Zyngier
2018-07-20  9:47 ` [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option Marc Zyngier

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