From: "Håkon Bugge" <haakon.bugge@oracle.com> To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>, Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>, Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, OFED mailing list <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>, rds-devel@oss.oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get() Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 13:14:09 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <81B40AF5-EBCA-4628-8CF6-687C12134552@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200731095943.GI5493@kadam> > On 31 Jul 2020, at 11:59, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 07:53:01AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 03:20:26PM -0400, Peilin Ye wrote: >>> rds_notify_queue_get() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack >>> memory to userspace since the compiler may leave a 4-byte hole at the end >>> of `cmsg`. >>> >>> In 2016 we tried to fix this issue by doing `= { 0 };` on `cmsg`, which >>> unfortunately does not always initialize that 4-byte hole. Fix it by using >>> memset() instead. >> >> Of course, this is the difference between "{ 0 }" and "{}" initializations. >> > > No, there is no difference. Even struct assignments like: > > foo = *bar; > > can leave struct holes uninitialized. Depending on the compiler the > assignment can be implemented as a memset() or as a series of struct > member assignments. What about: struct rds_rdma_notify { __u64 user_token; __s32 status; } __attribute__((packed)); Thxs, Håkon > regards, > dan carpenter >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Håkon Bugge" <haakon.bugge@oracle.com> To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: rds-devel@oss.oracle.com, Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, OFED mailing list <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>, Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get() Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 13:14:09 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <81B40AF5-EBCA-4628-8CF6-687C12134552@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200731095943.GI5493@kadam> > On 31 Jul 2020, at 11:59, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 07:53:01AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 03:20:26PM -0400, Peilin Ye wrote: >>> rds_notify_queue_get() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack >>> memory to userspace since the compiler may leave a 4-byte hole at the end >>> of `cmsg`. >>> >>> In 2016 we tried to fix this issue by doing `= { 0 };` on `cmsg`, which >>> unfortunately does not always initialize that 4-byte hole. Fix it by using >>> memset() instead. >> >> Of course, this is the difference between "{ 0 }" and "{}" initializations. >> > > No, there is no difference. Even struct assignments like: > > foo = *bar; > > can leave struct holes uninitialized. Depending on the compiler the > assignment can be implemented as a memset() or as a series of struct > member assignments. What about: struct rds_rdma_notify { __u64 user_token; __s32 status; } __attribute__((packed)); Thxs, Håkon > regards, > dan carpenter > _______________________________________________ Linux-kernel-mentees mailing list Linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-kernel-mentees
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-31 11:14 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-30 19:20 [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get() Peilin Ye 2020-07-30 19:20 ` Peilin Ye 2020-07-30 19:29 ` santosh.shilimkar 2020-07-30 19:29 ` santosh.shilimkar 2020-07-31 4:53 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-07-31 4:53 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-07-31 5:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 5:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 5:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 5:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 6:29 ` Andy Shevchenko 2020-07-31 7:00 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-07-31 7:00 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-07-31 7:05 ` Andy Shevchenko 2020-07-31 7:05 ` Andy Shevchenko 2020-07-31 14:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 14:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 14:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 14:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 14:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 14:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 17:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 17:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 18:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 18:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-01 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-08-01 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-08-01 14:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-01 14:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-03 9:34 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-08-03 9:34 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-08-01 5:38 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-01 5:38 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-02 22:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-02 22:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-02 22:23 ` Joe Perches 2020-08-02 22:23 ` Joe Perches 2020-08-02 22:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-02 22:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-02 22:45 ` Joe Perches 2020-08-02 22:45 ` Joe Perches 2020-08-03 4:58 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-03 4:58 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-03 23:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-03 23:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-08 22:57 ` Jack Leadford 2020-08-08 22:57 ` Jack Leadford 2020-08-09 7:04 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-09 7:04 ` Leon Romanovsky 2020-08-14 17:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-08-14 17:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe 2020-07-31 6:31 ` Andy Shevchenko 2020-07-31 9:59 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-07-31 9:59 ` Dan Carpenter 2020-07-31 11:14 ` Håkon Bugge [this message] 2020-07-31 11:14 ` Håkon Bugge 2020-07-31 11:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 11:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2020-07-31 12:03 ` Håkon Bugge 2020-07-31 12:03 ` Håkon Bugge 2020-07-31 23:54 ` David Miller 2020-07-31 23:54 ` David Miller
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