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From: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	michael@ellerman.id.au, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
	Linux PPC dev <linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 20:15:17 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8578.1368699317@ale.ozlabs.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130516090916.GF19669@dyad.programming.kicks-ass.net>

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 03:37:22PM +0200, Stephane Eranian wrote:
> > On Fri, May 3, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> wrote:
> > > We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
> > >
> > > Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> > > Cc: eranian@google.com
> > > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
> > > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-v0x9ky3ahzr6nm3c6ilwrili@git.kernel.org
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c |    5 ++++-
> > >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
> > > @@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte
> > >         if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER)
> > >                 mask |= X86_BR_USER;
> > >
> > > -       if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL)
> > > +       if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL) {
> > > +               if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > +                       return -EACCES;
> > >                 mask |= X86_BR_KERNEL;
> > > +       }
> > >
> > This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches.
> > But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus
> > some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated
> > by the sw_filter.
> > 
> > When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target
> > only.
> 
> How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags
> Mikey wanted for PowerPC.

Peter,

BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches.  Any
chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?

Mikey

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
index fb104e5..891c769 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL	= 1U << 4, /* any call branch */
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN	= 1U << 5, /* any return branch */
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL	= 1U << 6, /* indirect calls */
+	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL  = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */
 
-	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX		= 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */
+	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX		= 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */
 };
 
 #define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \
diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-record.c b/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
index cdf58ec..5b0b89d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {
 	BRANCH_OPT("any_call", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL),
 	BRANCH_OPT("any_ret", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN),
 	BRANCH_OPT("ind_call", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL),
+	BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),
 	BRANCH_END
 };
 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Linux PPC dev <linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 20:15:17 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8578.1368699317@ale.ozlabs.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130516090916.GF19669@dyad.programming.kicks-ass.net>

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:

> On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 03:37:22PM +0200, Stephane Eranian wrote:
> > On Fri, May 3, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> wrote:
> > > We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
> > >
> > > Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> > > Cc: eranian@google.com
> > > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
> > > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-v0x9ky3ahzr6nm3c6ilwrili@git.kernel.org
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c |    5 ++++-
> > >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
> > > @@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte
> > >         if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER)
> > >                 mask |= X86_BR_USER;
> > >
> > > -       if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL)
> > > +       if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL) {
> > > +               if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > +                       return -EACCES;
> > >                 mask |= X86_BR_KERNEL;
> > > +       }
> > >
> > This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches.
> > But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus
> > some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated
> > by the sw_filter.
> > 
> > When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target
> > only.
> 
> How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags
> Mikey wanted for PowerPC.

Peter,

BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches.  Any
chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?

Mikey

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
index fb104e5..891c769 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL	= 1U << 4, /* any call branch */
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN	= 1U << 5, /* any return branch */
 	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL	= 1U << 6, /* indirect calls */
+	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL  = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */
 
-	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX		= 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */
+	PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX		= 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */
 };
 
 #define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \
diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-record.c b/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
index cdf58ec..5b0b89d 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-record.c
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {
 	BRANCH_OPT("any_call", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL),
 	BRANCH_OPT("any_ret", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN),
 	BRANCH_OPT("ind_call", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL),
+	BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),
 	BRANCH_END
 };
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-05-16 10:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-05-03 12:11 [PATCH 0/3] Various perf patches Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 12:11 ` [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 14:35   ` Andi Kleen
2013-05-03 17:00     ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-15 14:20       ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-15 16:51         ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16 15:42           ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-16 16:07             ` Andi Kleen
2013-05-16 16:26               ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-04  8:20   ` [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for Ivy Bridge tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 12:11 ` [PATCH 2/3] perf, x86, lbr: Fix LBR filter Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 14:34   ` Andi Kleen
2013-05-04  6:34     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-05-04  8:21   ` [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: " tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 12:11 ` [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-03 14:41   ` Andi Kleen
2013-05-04  8:22   ` [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: " tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-04 11:19     ` Borislav Petkov
2013-05-05  9:05       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-05-06  8:07       ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-06  9:42         ` Ingo Molnar
2013-05-15 13:37   ` [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: " Stephane Eranian
2013-05-15 14:30     ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16  9:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16  9:17       ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16 10:09       ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-16 10:09         ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-16 10:15       ` Michael Neuling [this message]
2013-05-16 10:15         ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-16 11:16         ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16 11:16           ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-16 15:36           ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-16 15:36             ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-17 11:12             ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-17 11:12               ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-17 11:32               ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-17 11:32                 ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-17 11:39                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-17 11:39                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-17 21:39                   ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-17 21:39                     ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-17 22:14                     ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-17 22:14                       ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-17 22:59                       ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-17 22:59                         ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-21  5:41               ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-21  5:41                 ` Michael Neuling
2013-05-21  8:50                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-21  8:50                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2013-05-21 13:46                   ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-21 13:46                     ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-21 13:55         ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-21 13:55           ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-22  6:43           ` Anshuman Khandual
2013-05-22 12:23             ` Stephane Eranian
2013-05-22 14:51               ` Anshuman Khandual

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