From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
steve.capper@arm.com, punit.agrawal@arm.com,
aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, npiggin@gmail.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
bhsharma@redhat.com, riel@redhat.com, nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linux-metag@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 18:48:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking…
>>
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And problem
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>
> Regards,
>
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>=20
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a =
performance
>> issue.
>=20
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>=20
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking=E2=80=A6
>>=20
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing =
ASLR in=20
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say =E2=80=98nether=E2=80=99 or =
=E2=80=98some-day=E2=80=99. And problem=20
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>=20
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
steve.capper@arm.com, punit.agrawal@arm.com,
aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, npiggin@gmail.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
bhsharma@redhat.com, riel@redhat.com, nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linux-metag@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking…
>>
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And problem
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>
> Regards,
>
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
steve.capper@arm.com, punit.agrawal@arm.com,
aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, npiggin@gmail.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
bhsharma@redhat.com, riel@redhat.com, nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linux-metag@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>=20
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a =
performance
>> issue.
>=20
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>=20
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking=E2=80=A6
>>=20
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing =
ASLR in=20
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say =E2=80=98nether=E2=80=99 or =
=E2=80=98some-day=E2=80=99. And problem=20
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>=20
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: blackzert@gmail.com (Ilya Smith)
To: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018,@01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018@04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking?
>>
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ?nether? or ?some-day?. And problem
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>
> Regards,
>
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:48:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <B217D90A-6200-4257-804A-50D6C0308470@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org>
> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>>
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance
>> issue.
>
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
>
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking…
>>
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And problem
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
>
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
>
> Regards,
>
> - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.
Best regards,
Ilya
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-28 18:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 185+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-22 16:36 [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] " Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:53 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] Architecture defined limit on memory region random shift Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 16:36 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 20:54 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:54 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:54 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:54 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 20:57 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:57 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:57 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-22 20:57 ` Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 12:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 12:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 12:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 12:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-27 23:58 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-27 23:58 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-27 23:58 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-27 23:58 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith [this message]
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 23:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-27 23:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-27 23:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-27 23:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-27 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-28 0:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 0:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 0:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 0:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-30 7:55 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 7:55 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 7:55 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 7:55 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:57 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 9:57 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 9:57 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 9:57 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
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