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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 15:31:16 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJusPpis1JJgfNOrQoqPcVk0q2OGbosrXOVtZmG0cSqkotw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cb46d5ba-30de-664f-67d4-646da4592a6f@omprussia.ru>

On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 5:50 AM Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru> wrote:
> I want to be sure that no unsigned code page could be executed. So exploits
> could only be of ROP kind and not being able to download any extra code
> from their servers. That's why I found that disabling of anonymous executable
> pages could be useful for that (as well as disabling of making executable
> pages writable to modify already mapped code). In conjunction with IMA it
> should guarantee that no untrusted code could be executed.

Remember that many interpreted languages allow execution of code
provided to them on the command line (eg, python -c) and also grant
access to arbitrary syscalls, so there's still no guarantee that
you're only executing trusted code.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-02 22:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-18 15:18 Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA? Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-18 21:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19  7:50   ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-19 11:22     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 12:19       ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-19 17:05         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20  8:11           ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-20 17:23             ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-20 18:08               ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-21 11:21               ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-21 11:48                 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-21 18:04                   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-22  7:59                     ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-28 17:17                       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-29 10:00                         ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-29 10:59                           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-29 11:51                             ` Jordan Glover
2019-03-29 12:28                             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-03-29 12:50                               ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-02 22:31                                 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-04-03  9:59                                   ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 16:58                                     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 17:31                                       ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 18:19                                         ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 18:47                                           ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 19:25                                             ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 11:44                                               ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 12:11                                   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-03 13:18                                     ` Perez Yves-Alexis
2019-04-03 11:57                                 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-03 13:10                                   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-03 14:33                                     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-03 14:33                                       ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-03 16:21                                         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-21 18:13                 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-19 17:07         ` Matthew Garrett

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