Re: Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On 4/3/19 10:33 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-04-03 at 09:10 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 4/3/19 7:57 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
>>> Let's separate the different types of attacks.  From an IMA
>>> perspective, memory attacks are out of scope.  That leaves mmap'ed
>>> files, possibly just mmap'ed shared files.  Currently IMA can be
>>> configured to verify a file's integrity, based on signatures, being
>>> mmap'ed execute.  Assuming that not all files opened require a file
>>> signature, a file could be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to
>>> execute to circumvent the mmap'ed execute signature requirement.  If
>>> the existing LSMs are able to prevent this sort of attack, we could
>>> just document this requirement.
>>
>> I guess I don't understand why IMA isn't already being called from
>> security_file_mprotect(). security_file_mprotect() could just call
>> ima_file_mmap(vma->vm_file, prot) if all of the security hooks pass.
>>
>> SELinux can be used to prevent unauthorized mprotect PROT_EXEC but it
>> won't perform a measurement of the file if it is allowed by policy.
> 
>  From a measurement perspective, this will at least measure the file,
> but the call to ima_file_mmap() will verify the file signature against
> the file, not what is currently in memory, right?

Yes, but you can use SELinux to prevent that (don't allow execmem or 
execmod permissions for that domain).