From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/10] LSM: Blob sharing support for S.A.R.A and LandLock Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 14:51:57 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLapViSK-j08Tq8cCZodiZXFsXze71xFPg6MQhDWDHDAA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQwT4d3wC37cVrrX-hZq1L3e6=TEAse4m-YH9SiFnkieA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > The infrastructure bits aren't really my concern; in fact I *like* > that the infrastructure is always exercised, it makes > testing/debugging easier. I also like the ability to limit the > user/admin to one LSM at boot time to make support easier; my goal is > to allow a distro to build support for multiple LSMs without also > requiring that distro to support *stacked* LSMs I see your point, but as soon as SARA and Landlock appear, they'll have: depends on SECURITY_STACKING and then all distros will enable it and there will be no sensible runtime way to manage it. If, instead, we make it entirely runtime now, then a CONFIG can control the default state and we can provide guidance to how SARA and Landlock should expose their "enable"ness. At the very least, to avoid stacking now (i.e. TOMOYO being enabled with another major LSM), we just do nothing. The existing code already makes the existing major LSMs exclusive. Adding a stackable LSM would need to just have its own "enable" flag (i.e. ignore security_module_enable()), and then either check a runtime "is stacking allowed?" flag or have new "depends on SECURITY_STACKING". (I think the CONFIG will force distros into enabling it without any runtime opt-out.) > (see my earlier > comments about the difficulty in determining the source of a failed > operation). Agreed. I would hope that audit could help for that case. *stare at blue sky* -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 10/10] LSM: Blob sharing support for S.A.R.A and LandLock Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 14:51:57 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLapViSK-j08Tq8cCZodiZXFsXze71xFPg6MQhDWDHDAA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQwT4d3wC37cVrrX-hZq1L3e6=TEAse4m-YH9SiFnkieA@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > The infrastructure bits aren't really my concern; in fact I *like* > that the infrastructure is always exercised, it makes > testing/debugging easier. I also like the ability to limit the > user/admin to one LSM at boot time to make support easier; my goal is > to allow a distro to build support for multiple LSMs without also > requiring that distro to support *stacked* LSMs I see your point, but as soon as SARA and Landlock appear, they'll have: depends on SECURITY_STACKING and then all distros will enable it and there will be no sensible runtime way to manage it. If, instead, we make it entirely runtime now, then a CONFIG can control the default state and we can provide guidance to how SARA and Landlock should expose their "enable"ness. At the very least, to avoid stacking now (i.e. TOMOYO being enabled with another major LSM), we just do nothing. The existing code already makes the existing major LSMs exclusive. Adding a stackable LSM would need to just have its own "enable" flag (i.e. ignore security_module_enable()), and then either check a runtime "is stacking allowed?" flag or have new "depends on SECURITY_STACKING". (I think the CONFIG will force distros into enabling it without any runtime opt-out.) > (see my earlier > comments about the difficulty in determining the source of a failed > operation). Agreed. I would hope that audit could help for that case. *stare at blue sky* -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-13 21:52 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-11 16:26 [PATCH v2 00/10] LSM: Module stacking in support of S.A.R.A and Landlock Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` [PATCH 01/10] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 23:45 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2018-09-11 23:45 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2018-09-12 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 0:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:41 ` [PATCH 02/10] Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 23:04 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-12 23:04 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:41 ` [PATCH 03/10] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 23:10 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-12 23:10 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:41 ` [PATCH 04/10] LSM: Infrastructure management of the " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 23:53 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-12 23:53 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 19:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 19:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 21:12 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 21:12 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:41 ` [PATCH 05/10] SELinux: Abstract use of file " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-12 23:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-12 23:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:42 ` [PATCH 06/10] LSM: Infrastructure management of the " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 0:00 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 0:00 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:42 ` [PATCH 07/10] SELinux: Abstract use of inode " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 0:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 0:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:42 ` [PATCH 08/10] Smack: " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 0:24 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 0:24 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:42 ` [PATCH 09/10] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 0:30 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 0:30 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-11 16:42 ` [PATCH 10/10] LSM: Blob sharing support for S.A.R.A and LandLock Casey Schaufler 2018-09-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 4:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 4:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 13:16 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 13:16 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 15:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 15:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 19:12 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 19:12 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 20:58 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 20:58 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 20:58 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 21:50 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 21:50 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 22:04 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 22:04 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 22:04 ` Jordan Glover 2018-09-13 23:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 23:01 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 21:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 21:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 21:38 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 21:38 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-13 21:51 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-09-13 21:51 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:06 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:06 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:32 ` John Johansen 2018-09-13 23:32 ` John Johansen 2018-09-13 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:51 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 0:03 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 0:03 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:51 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 23:51 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-13 23:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-13 23:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 0:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 0:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 0:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 0:19 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 15:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 15:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 20:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 20:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 20:47 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 20:47 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-14 18:18 ` James Morris 2018-09-14 18:18 ` James Morris 2018-09-14 18:23 ` John Johansen 2018-09-14 18:23 ` John Johansen 2018-09-14 0:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 0:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-14 2:42 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-14 2:42 ` Paul Moore 2018-09-11 20:43 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] LSM: Module stacking in support of S.A.R.A and Landlock James Morris 2018-09-11 20:43 ` James Morris 2018-09-12 21:29 ` James Morris 2018-09-12 21:29 ` James Morris 2018-09-16 16:54 ` Salvatore Mesoraca 2018-09-16 16:54 ` Salvatore Mesoraca 2018-09-16 17:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-16 17:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-16 17:45 ` Salvatore Mesoraca 2018-09-16 17:45 ` Salvatore Mesoraca 2018-09-18 7:44 ` Mickaël Salaün 2018-09-18 15:23 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-18 15:23 ` Casey Schaufler
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