From: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> To: mptcp at lists.01.org Subject: [MPTCP] Re: [RFC PATCH] selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 18:35:03 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQmZ_Ra8eY3O-qNo-QN9wLXBFP3VHuHvjY8vWOMSfGafA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: 08b7534580e1bdb134ba0c2816977836cd446c5d.camel@redhat.com [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2653 bytes --] On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 10:35 AM Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> wrote: > > Hello, > > I'm sorry for the latency, I'll have limited internet access till > tomorrow. > > On Fri, 2020-12-04 at 18:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > For SELinux the issue is that we need to track state in the sock > > struct, via sock->sk_security, and that state needs to be initialized > > and set properly. > > As far as I can see, for regular sockets, sk_security is allocated via: > > - sk_prot_alloc() -> security_sk_alloc() for client/listener sockets > - sk_clone_lock() -> sock_copy() for server sockets > > MPTCP uses the above helpers, sk_security should be initialized > properly. At least for SELinux, the security_socket_post_create() hook is critical too as that is where the SELinux sock/socket state values are actually set; see selinux_socket_post_create() for the SELinux hook. > MPTCP goes through an additional sk_prot_alloc() for each subflow, so > each of them will get it's own independent context. The subflows are > not exposed to any syscall (accept()/recvmsg()/sendmsg()/poll()/...), > so I guess selinux will mostly ignored them right? SELinux cares quite a bit about the sock structs, they are an important part of the per-packet access controls as well as a few other things, so we need to make sure the SELinux state is managed properly. From what you have said so far, it is starting to sound like labeling the subflows with the same label as the parent socket is a reasonable solution. In that case, it seems like doing a security_sk_clone() between the main socket/sock and the new subflow sock should work. > > Similarly with TCP request_sock structs, via > > request_sock->{secid,peer_secid}. Is the MPTCP code allocating and/or > > otherwise creating socks or request_socks outside of the regular TCP > > code? > > Request sockets are easier, I guess/hope: MPTCP handles them very > closely to plain TCP. Are there a calls to security_inet_conn_request() and security_inet_csk_clone() in the MPTCP code path? As an example look at tcp_conn_request() and inet_csk_clone_lock() for IPv4. > > We would also be concerned about socket structs, but I'm > > guessing that code reuses the TCP code based on what you've said. > > Only the main MPTCP 'struct socket' is exposed to the user space, and > that is allocated via the usual __sys_socket() call-chain. I guess that > should be fine. If you could provide some more context (what I should > look after) I can dig more. Hopefully the stuff above should help, if not let me know :) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> To: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, mptcp@lists.01.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [MPTCP] Re: [RFC PATCH] selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 18:35:03 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQmZ_Ra8eY3O-qNo-QN9wLXBFP3VHuHvjY8vWOMSfGafA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <08b7534580e1bdb134ba0c2816977836cd446c5d.camel@redhat.com> On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 10:35 AM Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> wrote: > > Hello, > > I'm sorry for the latency, I'll have limited internet access till > tomorrow. > > On Fri, 2020-12-04 at 18:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > For SELinux the issue is that we need to track state in the sock > > struct, via sock->sk_security, and that state needs to be initialized > > and set properly. > > As far as I can see, for regular sockets, sk_security is allocated via: > > - sk_prot_alloc() -> security_sk_alloc() for client/listener sockets > - sk_clone_lock() -> sock_copy() for server sockets > > MPTCP uses the above helpers, sk_security should be initialized > properly. At least for SELinux, the security_socket_post_create() hook is critical too as that is where the SELinux sock/socket state values are actually set; see selinux_socket_post_create() for the SELinux hook. > MPTCP goes through an additional sk_prot_alloc() for each subflow, so > each of them will get it's own independent context. The subflows are > not exposed to any syscall (accept()/recvmsg()/sendmsg()/poll()/...), > so I guess selinux will mostly ignored them right? SELinux cares quite a bit about the sock structs, they are an important part of the per-packet access controls as well as a few other things, so we need to make sure the SELinux state is managed properly. From what you have said so far, it is starting to sound like labeling the subflows with the same label as the parent socket is a reasonable solution. In that case, it seems like doing a security_sk_clone() between the main socket/sock and the new subflow sock should work. > > Similarly with TCP request_sock structs, via > > request_sock->{secid,peer_secid}. Is the MPTCP code allocating and/or > > otherwise creating socks or request_socks outside of the regular TCP > > code? > > Request sockets are easier, I guess/hope: MPTCP handles them very > closely to plain TCP. Are there a calls to security_inet_conn_request() and security_inet_csk_clone() in the MPTCP code path? As an example look at tcp_conn_request() and inet_csk_clone_lock() for IPv4. > > We would also be concerned about socket structs, but I'm > > guessing that code reuses the TCP code based on what you've said. > > Only the main MPTCP 'struct socket' is exposed to the user space, and > that is allocated via the usual __sys_socket() call-chain. I guess that > should be fine. If you could provide some more context (what I should > look after) I can dig more. Hopefully the stuff above should help, if not let me know :) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
next reply other threads:[~2020-12-08 23:35 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-08 23:35 Paul Moore [this message] 2020-12-08 23:35 ` [MPTCP] Re: [RFC PATCH] selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP Paul Moore -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2020-12-10 2:43 Paul Moore 2020-12-10 2:43 ` Paul Moore 2020-12-09 10:02 Paolo Abeni 2020-12-09 10:02 ` Paolo Abeni 2020-12-08 15:35 Paolo Abeni 2020-12-08 15:35 ` Paolo Abeni 2020-12-04 23:22 Paul Moore 2020-12-04 23:22 ` Paul Moore 2020-12-04 10:04 Paolo Abeni 2020-12-04 10:04 ` Paolo Abeni 2020-12-04 2:24 Paul Moore 2020-12-04 2:24 ` Paul Moore 2020-12-03 23:54 Florian Westphal 2020-12-03 23:54 ` Florian Westphal 2020-12-03 23:30 Paul Moore 2020-12-03 23:30 ` Paul Moore 2020-12-03 17:24 Mat Martineau 2020-12-03 17:24 ` Mat Martineau 2020-12-02 11:17 Paolo Abeni 2020-12-02 11:17 ` [MPTCP] " Paolo Abeni 2020-12-02 10:31 Paolo Abeni 2020-12-02 10:31 ` Paolo Abeni
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