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* [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
@ 2021-04-22 13:32 Arnd Bergmann
  2021-04-22 15:17 ` Dan Carpenter
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-04-22 13:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Fabio Aiuto, Ross Schmidt, Marco Cesati,
	Johannes Berg, Ivan Safonov, linux-staging, linux-kernel

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

gcc gets confused by some of the type casts and produces an
apparently senseless warning about an out-of-bound memcpy to
an unrelated array in the same structure:

drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c: In function 'rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption':
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
In file included from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/drv_types.h:32,
                 from drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c:10:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [184, 4264] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4
   98 |         u32   dot11AuthAlgrthm;         /*  802.11 auth, could be open, shared, 8021x and authswitch */
      |               ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: error: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/include/rtw_security.h:98:15: note: at offset [264, 4344] into destination object 'dot11AuthAlgrthm' of size 4

This is a known gcc bug, and the patch here is only a workaround,
but the approach of using a temporary variable to hold a pointer
to the key also improves readability in addition to avoiding the
warning, so overall this should still help.

Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99673
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 .../staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c | 27 ++++++++++---------
 .../staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c    | 21 ++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c
index 89a21eb63c0a..72ce3a3e7d5f 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c
@@ -523,6 +523,9 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 	struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv;
 	struct security_priv *psecuritypriv =  &(padapter->securitypriv);
 	struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv;
+	char *grpkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
+	char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
+	char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
 
 	param->u.crypt.err = 0;
 	param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0';
@@ -605,7 +608,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 		{
 			if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0)
 			{
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;
 				if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13)
@@ -618,12 +621,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 			{
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_;
 
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 				/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */
 				/* set mic key */
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
+				memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
+				memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
 
 				psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
 
@@ -632,7 +635,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 			{
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_;
 
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 			}
 			else
 			{
@@ -659,7 +662,6 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 		goto exit;
 
 	}
-
 	if (psecuritypriv->dot11AuthAlgrthm == dot11AuthAlgrthm_8021X && psta) /*  psk/802_1x */
 	{
 		if (check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_AP_STATE))
@@ -709,7 +711,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 			{
 				if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0)
 				{
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;
 					if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13)
@@ -721,12 +723,12 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 				{
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_;
 
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 					/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */
 					/* set mic key */
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
+					memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
+					memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
 
 					psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
 
@@ -735,7 +737,7 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 				{
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_;
 
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 				}
 				else
 				{
@@ -762,7 +764,6 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
 		}
 
 	}
-
 exit:
 
 	return ret;
@@ -885,8 +886,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param
 					if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0 || strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0)
 					{
 						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+#if 1
 						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
 						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
+#endif
 	                                        padapter->securitypriv.binstallGrpkey = true;
 
 						padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKeyid = param->u.crypt.idx;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index 816033b6847c..af77f03df7d0 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2963,6 +2963,9 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 	struct mlme_priv *pmlmepriv = &padapter->mlmepriv;
 	struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &(padapter->securitypriv);
 	struct sta_priv *pstapriv = &padapter->stapriv;
+	char *txkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
+	char *rxkey = padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
+	char *grpkey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey;
 
 	param->u.crypt.err = 0;
 	param->u.crypt.alg[IEEE_CRYPT_ALG_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0';
@@ -3064,7 +3067,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 	if (!psta && check_fwstate(pmlmepriv, WIFI_AP_STATE)) { /*  group key */
 		if (param->u.crypt.set_tx == 1) {
 			if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) {
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;
 				if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13)
@@ -3073,11 +3076,11 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 			} else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) {
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_;
 
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 				/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */
 				/* set mic key */
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
+				memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
 				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
 
 				psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
@@ -3086,7 +3089,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 			else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) {
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_;
 
-				memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+				memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 			} else {
 				psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_;
 			}
@@ -3142,7 +3145,7 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 
 			} else { /* group key??? */
 				if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "WEP") == 0) {
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _WEP40_;
 					if (param->u.crypt.key_len == 13)
@@ -3150,19 +3153,19 @@ static int rtw_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param *param,
 				} else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0) {
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _TKIP_;
 
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 
 					/* DEBUG_ERR("set key length :param->u.crypt.key_len =%d\n", param->u.crypt.key_len); */
 					/* set mic key */
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
+					memcpy(txkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
+					memcpy(rxkey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
 
 					psecuritypriv->busetkipkey = true;
 
 				} else if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0) {
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _AES_;
 
-					memcpy(psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
+					memcpy(grpkey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
 				} else {
 					psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpPrivacy = _NO_PRIVACY_;
 				}
-- 
2.29.2


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
  2021-04-22 13:32 [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning Arnd Bergmann
@ 2021-04-22 15:17 ` Dan Carpenter
  2021-04-22 15:25     ` Arnd Bergmann
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2021-04-22 15:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Arnd Bergmann
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann, Fabio Aiuto, Ross Schmidt,
	Marco Cesati, Johannes Berg, Ivan Safonov, linux-staging,
	linux-kernel

On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 03:32:04PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> @@ -762,7 +764,6 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
>  		}
>  
>  	}
> -

Since you're going to need to redo this, then please don't do this
unrelated whitespace change.

>  exit:
>  
>  	return ret;
> @@ -885,8 +886,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_param
>  					if (strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "TKIP") == 0 || strcmp(param->u.crypt.alg, "CCMP") == 0)
>  					{
>  						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, param->u.crypt.key, (param->u.crypt.key_len > 16 ? 16 : param->u.crypt.key_len));
> +#if 1

These seems unintetional?

>  						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrptxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[16]), 8);
>  						memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrprxmickey[param->u.crypt.idx].skey, &(param->u.crypt.key[24]), 8);
> +#endif
>  	                                        padapter->securitypriv.binstallGrpkey = true;
>  
>  						padapter->securitypriv.dot118021XGrpKeyid = param->u.crypt.idx;

regards,
dan carpenter


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
  2021-04-22 15:17 ` Dan Carpenter
@ 2021-04-22 15:25     ` Arnd Bergmann
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-04-22 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Carpenter
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Fabio Aiuto, Ross Schmidt, Marco Cesati,
	Johannes Berg, Ivan Safonov, linux-staging,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 5:19 PM Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 03:32:04PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > @@ -762,7 +764,6 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
> >               }
> >
> >       }
> > -
>
> Since you're going to need to redo this, then please don't do this
> unrelated whitespace change.
>
> > +#if 1
>
> These seems unintetional?
>

Indeed, both (and another removed line) are artifacts from debugging
that ended up making it into the commit by accident. Sending v2 now.

       Arnd

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning
@ 2021-04-22 15:25     ` Arnd Bergmann
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-04-22 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Carpenter
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Fabio Aiuto, Ross Schmidt, Marco Cesati,
	Johannes Berg, Ivan Safonov, linux-staging,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List

On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 5:19 PM Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 22, 2021 at 03:32:04PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > @@ -762,7 +764,6 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_ap_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, struct ieee_pa
> >               }
> >
> >       }
> > -
>
> Since you're going to need to redo this, then please don't do this
> unrelated whitespace change.
>
> > +#if 1
>
> These seems unintetional?
>

Indeed, both (and another removed line) are artifacts from debugging
that ended up making it into the commit by accident. Sending v2 now.

       Arnd

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-04-22 15:26 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2021-04-22 13:32 [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: avoid bogus gcc warning Arnd Bergmann
2021-04-22 15:17 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-04-22 15:25   ` Arnd Bergmann
2021-04-22 15:25     ` Arnd Bergmann

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