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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 13/16] x86/ldt: Introduce LDT write fault handler
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 09:58:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWHQW19G2J2hCS4ZG_U5knG-0RBzruioQzojqWr6ceTBg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171212173334.345422294@linutronix.de>

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> When the LDT is mapped RO, the CPU will write fault the first time it uses
> a segment descriptor in order to set the ACCESS bit (for some reason it
> doesn't always observe that it already preset). Catch the fault and set the
> ACCESS bit in the handler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    7 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c              |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/fault.c                |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static inline void init_new_context_ldt(
>  int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm);
>  void ldt_exit_user(struct pt_regs *regs);
>  void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
> +bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address);
> +static inline bool ldt_is_active(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> +       return mm && mm->context.ldt != NULL;
> +}
>  #else  /* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
>  static inline void init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *task,
>                                         struct mm_struct *mm) { }
> @@ -86,6 +91,8 @@ static inline int ldt_dup_context(struct
>  }
>  static inline void ldt_exit_user(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
>  static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
> +static inline bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address) { return false; }
> +static inline bool ldt_is_active(struct mm_struct *mm)  { return false; }
>  #endif
>
>  static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk)
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> @@ -82,6 +82,36 @@ static void ldt_install_mm(struct mm_str
>         mutex_unlock(&mm->context.lock);
>  }
>
> +/*
> + * ldt_write_fault() already checked whether there is an ldt installed in
> + * __do_page_fault(), so it's safe to access it here because interrupts are
> + * disabled and any ipi which would change it is blocked until this
> + * returns.  The underlying page mapping cannot change as long as the ldt
> + * is the active one in the context.
> + *
> + * The fault error code is X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_PROT and checked in
> + * __do_page_fault() already. This happens when a segment is selected and
> + * the CPU tries to set the accessed bit in desc_struct.type because the
> + * LDT entries are mapped RO. Set it manually.
> + */
> +bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address)
> +{
> +       struct ldt_struct *ldt = current->mm->context.ldt;
> +       unsigned long start, end, entry;
> +       struct desc_struct *desc;
> +
> +       start = (unsigned long) ldt->entries;
> +       end = start + ldt->nr_entries * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
> +
> +       if (address < start || address >= end)
> +               return false;
> +
> +       desc = (struct desc_struct *) ldt->entries;
> +       entry = (address - start) / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
> +       desc[entry].type |= 0x01;

You have another patch that unconditionally sets the accessed bit on
installation.  What gives?

Also, this patch is going to die a horrible death if IRET ever hits
this condition.  Or load gs.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 13/16] x86/ldt: Introduce LDT write fault handler
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 09:58:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWHQW19G2J2hCS4ZG_U5knG-0RBzruioQzojqWr6ceTBg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171212173334.345422294@linutronix.de>

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> When the LDT is mapped RO, the CPU will write fault the first time it uses
> a segment descriptor in order to set the ACCESS bit (for some reason it
> doesn't always observe that it already preset). Catch the fault and set the
> ACCESS bit in the handler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    7 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c              |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/fault.c                |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static inline void init_new_context_ldt(
>  int ldt_dup_context(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm);
>  void ldt_exit_user(struct pt_regs *regs);
>  void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
> +bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address);
> +static inline bool ldt_is_active(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> +       return mm && mm->context.ldt != NULL;
> +}
>  #else  /* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
>  static inline void init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *task,
>                                         struct mm_struct *mm) { }
> @@ -86,6 +91,8 @@ static inline int ldt_dup_context(struct
>  }
>  static inline void ldt_exit_user(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
>  static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) { }
> +static inline bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address) { return false; }
> +static inline bool ldt_is_active(struct mm_struct *mm)  { return false; }
>  #endif
>
>  static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk)
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> @@ -82,6 +82,36 @@ static void ldt_install_mm(struct mm_str
>         mutex_unlock(&mm->context.lock);
>  }
>
> +/*
> + * ldt_write_fault() already checked whether there is an ldt installed in
> + * __do_page_fault(), so it's safe to access it here because interrupts are
> + * disabled and any ipi which would change it is blocked until this
> + * returns.  The underlying page mapping cannot change as long as the ldt
> + * is the active one in the context.
> + *
> + * The fault error code is X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_PROT and checked in
> + * __do_page_fault() already. This happens when a segment is selected and
> + * the CPU tries to set the accessed bit in desc_struct.type because the
> + * LDT entries are mapped RO. Set it manually.
> + */
> +bool __ldt_write_fault(unsigned long address)
> +{
> +       struct ldt_struct *ldt = current->mm->context.ldt;
> +       unsigned long start, end, entry;
> +       struct desc_struct *desc;
> +
> +       start = (unsigned long) ldt->entries;
> +       end = start + ldt->nr_entries * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
> +
> +       if (address < start || address >= end)
> +               return false;
> +
> +       desc = (struct desc_struct *) ldt->entries;
> +       entry = (address - start) / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
> +       desc[entry].type |= 0x01;

You have another patch that unconditionally sets the accessed bit on
installation.  What gives?

Also, this patch is going to die a horrible death if IRET ever hits
this condition.  Or load gs.

--
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-12 17:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 134+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-12 17:32 [patch 00/16] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 01/16] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 02/16] x86/ldt: Rework locking Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 03/16] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 04/16] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:00   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:05       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:06       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:06         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:25         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:25           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:22     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:22       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:57       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 12:57         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 14:34         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 14:34           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 14:43           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 14:43             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 15:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:00               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:04               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:14         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:14           ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:32           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:32             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:47             ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:47               ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:54               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:54                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:08                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:08                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:21                   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 18:21                     ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 18:23                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:31                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-13 18:31                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-13 18:32                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:32                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:35                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:35                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14  4:53                   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-12-14  4:53                     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-12-13 21:50   ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-13 21:50     ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-13 22:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 22:12       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14  0:10       ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-14  0:10         ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-14  0:16         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14  0:16           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 06/16] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 07/16] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 08/16] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 09/16] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 10/16] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:57     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 11/16] x86/ldt: Force access bit for CS/SS Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:03   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:03     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:09       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:10       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:22         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:22           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:29           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:29             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:41             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:41               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:04               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 19:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 19:05   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:05     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:26     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 19:26       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-19 12:10       ` David Laight
2017-12-19 12:10         ` David Laight
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 12/16] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 13/16] x86/ldt: Introduce LDT write fault handler Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:58   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-12-12 17:58     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:19     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:19       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:43       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:43         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:01     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:21       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:51         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 20:21       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-12 20:21         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-12 20:37         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 20:37           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:35           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 21:35             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 21:42             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:42               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:41           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:41             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:46             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:46               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 22:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 22:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 14/16] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 15/16] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 16/16] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:03 ` [patch 00/16] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:03   ` Andy Lutomirski

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