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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 11/16] x86/ldt: Force access bit for CS/SS
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 10:03:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrX+d+5COyWX1gDxi3gX93zFuq79UE+fhs27+ySq85j3+Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171212173334.176469949@linutronix.de>

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
>
> When mapping the LDT RO the hardware will typically generate write faults
> on first use. These faults can be trapped and the backing pages can be
> modified by the kernel.
>
> There is one exception; IRET will immediately load CS/SS and unrecoverably
> #GP. To avoid this issue access the LDT descriptors used by CS/SS before
> the IRET to userspace.
>
> For this use LAR, which is a safe operation in that it will happily consume
> an invalid LDT descriptor without traps. It gets the CPU to load the
> descriptor and observes the (preset) ACCESS bit.
>
> So far none of the obvious candidates like dosemu/wine/etc. do care about
> the ACCESS bit at all, so it should be rather safe to enforce it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/common.c            |    8 ++++-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h        |    2 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    4 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c              |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  |    2 -
>  arch/x86/power/cpu.c               |    2 -
>  8 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <asm/vdso.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> +#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>
>  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
>  #include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
> @@ -130,8 +131,8 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct p
>         return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
>  }
>
> -#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS                            \
> -       (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE |   \
> +#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS                                    \
> +       (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_LDT |\
>          _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
>
>  static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
> @@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct
>                 /* Disable IRQs and retry */
>                 local_irq_disable();
>
> +               if (cached_flags & _TIF_LDT)
> +                       ldt_exit_user(regs);

Nope.  To the extent that this code actually does anything (which it
shouldn't since you already forced the access bit), it's racy against
flush_ldt() from another thread, and that race will be exploitable for
privilege escalation.  It needs to be outside the loopy part.

--Andy

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 11/16] x86/ldt: Force access bit for CS/SS
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 10:03:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrX+d+5COyWX1gDxi3gX93zFuq79UE+fhs27+ySq85j3+Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171212173334.176469949@linutronix.de>

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 9:32 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
>
> When mapping the LDT RO the hardware will typically generate write faults
> on first use. These faults can be trapped and the backing pages can be
> modified by the kernel.
>
> There is one exception; IRET will immediately load CS/SS and unrecoverably
> #GP. To avoid this issue access the LDT descriptors used by CS/SS before
> the IRET to userspace.
>
> For this use LAR, which is a safe operation in that it will happily consume
> an invalid LDT descriptor without traps. It gets the CPU to load the
> descriptor and observes the (preset) ACCESS bit.
>
> So far none of the obvious candidates like dosemu/wine/etc. do care about
> the ACCESS bit at all, so it should be rather safe to enforce it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/common.c            |    8 ++++-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h        |    2 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    4 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c              |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  |    2 -
>  arch/x86/power/cpu.c               |    2 -
>  8 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <asm/vdso.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> +#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>
>  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
>  #include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
> @@ -130,8 +131,8 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct p
>         return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
>  }
>
> -#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS                            \
> -       (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE |   \
> +#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS                                    \
> +       (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | _TIF_LDT |\
>          _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
>
>  static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
> @@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct
>                 /* Disable IRQs and retry */
>                 local_irq_disable();
>
> +               if (cached_flags & _TIF_LDT)
> +                       ldt_exit_user(regs);

Nope.  To the extent that this code actually does anything (which it
shouldn't since you already forced the access bit), it's racy against
flush_ldt() from another thread, and that race will be exploitable for
privilege escalation.  It needs to be outside the loopy part.

--Andy

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-12 18:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 134+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-12 17:32 [patch 00/16] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 01/16] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 02/16] x86/ldt: Rework locking Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 03/16] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 04/16] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:00   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:05       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:06       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:06         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:25         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:25           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:22     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:22       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 12:57       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 12:57         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 14:34         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 14:34           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 14:43           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 14:43             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-12-13 15:00             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:00               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:04               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:14         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:14           ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:32           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:32             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:47             ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:47               ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 15:54               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 15:54                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:08                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:08                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:21                   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 18:21                     ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-13 18:23                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:31                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-13 18:31                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-13 18:32                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:32                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 18:35                     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-13 18:35                       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14  4:53                   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-12-14  4:53                     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-12-13 21:50   ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-13 21:50     ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-13 22:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-13 22:12       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14  0:10       ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-14  0:10         ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-14  0:16         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14  0:16           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 06/16] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 07/16] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 08/16] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 09/16] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 10/16] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:57     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 11/16] x86/ldt: Force access bit for CS/SS Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:03   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-12-12 18:03     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:09       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:10       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:10         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:22         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:22           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:29           ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:29             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:41             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:41               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:04               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 19:04                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 19:05   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:05     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:26     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 19:26       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-19 12:10       ` David Laight
2017-12-19 12:10         ` David Laight
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 12/16] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 13/16] x86/ldt: Introduce LDT write fault handler Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:58   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 17:58     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:19     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:19       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 18:43       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:43         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:01     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:21       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 19:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 19:51         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-12 20:21       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-12 20:21         ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-12 20:37         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 20:37           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:35           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 21:35             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 21:42             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:42               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:41           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:41             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:46             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 21:46               ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 22:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 22:25               ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 14/16] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 15/16] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32 ` [patch 16/16] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-12 18:03 ` [patch 00/16] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-12 18:03   ` Andy Lutomirski

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