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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 09:30:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gc_KWedC12bTcX24KwjKiBCF=yvouRNzCbJKaLrgJdDg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com>

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> >> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> >> trusted-key operations.
> >>
> >> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> >> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> >
> > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
> > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
> > are kind of inconsistent.
>
> If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key
> instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems
> sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until
> module unloading, since we incremented the reference count.
>
> I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls
> to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted().
>
> trusted_instantiate() should look like:
> ---
> if (!chip) {
>         chip = tpm_default_chip();
>         if (!chip)
>                 return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> if (!digests) {
>         ret = init_digests();
>         if (ret < 0)
>                 return ret;
> }

This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail
and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list
Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 16:30:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gc_KWedC12bTcX24KwjKiBCF=yvouRNzCbJKaLrgJdDg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com>

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> >> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> >> trusted-key operations.
> >>
> >> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> >> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> >
> > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
> > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
> > are kind of inconsistent.
>
> If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key
> instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems
> sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until
> module unloading, since we incremented the reference count.
>
> I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls
> to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted().
>
> trusted_instantiate() should look like:
> ---
> if (!chip) {
>         chip = tpm_default_chip();
>         if (!chip)
>                 return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> if (!digests) {
>         ret = init_digests();
>         if (ret < 0)
>                 return ret;
> }

This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail
and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 09:30:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gc_KWedC12bTcX24KwjKiBCF=yvouRNzCbJKaLrgJdDg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com>

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 7:27 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> >> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> >> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> >> trusted-key operations.
> >>
> >> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> >> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> >> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> >> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> >
> > It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
> > the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
> > are kind of inconsistent.
>
> If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key
> instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems
> sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until
> module unloading, since we incremented the reference count.
>
> I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls
> to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted().
>
> trusted_instantiate() should look like:
> ---
> if (!chip) {
>         chip = tpm_default_chip();
>         if (!chip)
>                 return -ENODEV;
> }
>
> if (!digests) {
>         ret = init_digests();
>         if (ret < 0)
>                 return ret;
> }

This patch already achieves that because tpm_find_get_ops() will fail
and cause tpm_is_tpm2() to return NULL.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-21 16:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-18 23:45 [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Dan Williams
2019-03-18 23:45 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-18 23:45 ` Dan Williams
     [not found] ` <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-19  0:24   ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  0:24     ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  0:24     ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  0:30     ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19  0:30       ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19  0:30       ` Dan Williams
     [not found]       ` <CAA9_cmcOD2zPaaNbkYAaH5DRDRAebPkW+hwPA0zPKY4kU8R-rg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-19  0:56         ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  0:56           ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  0:56           ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19  1:34           ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19  1:34             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19  1:34             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20  1:55           ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20  1:55             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20  1:55             ` Dan Williams
     [not found]             ` <CAPcyv4hXKQcdLnKG6rPNOJr2wjq31uCCr+16S5Yu6S5A_5UGrA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-20  2:19               ` James Bottomley
2019-03-20  2:19                 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-20  2:19                 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 22:56         ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 22:56           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 22:56           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 23:01           ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 23:01             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 23:01             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:54   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:54   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 14:26   ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 14:26     ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 14:26     ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 16:30     ` Dan Williams [this message]
2019-03-21 16:30       ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 16:30       ` Dan Williams
     [not found]       ` <CAPcyv4gc_KWedC12bTcX24KwjKiBCF=yvouRNzCbJKaLrgJdDg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-21 17:45         ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 17:45           ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 17:45           ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-22 10:12           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 10:12             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 15:24             ` Dan Williams
2019-03-22 15:24               ` Dan Williams
2019-03-22 15:24               ` Dan Williams
2019-03-25 14:12               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:12                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:12                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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