From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org" <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:01:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4j+4WMFsEbT_TDQfNs2ZG6+ME6b07RaqmT9kfbTStWgJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1553036189.4899.136.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 3:56 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 17:30 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>
> Sorry for the late reply.
>
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 5:24 PM James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> > > > trusted-key operations.
> > >
> > > What actual problem is this fixing? To me it would seem like an
> > > enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no
> > > TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work.
> > > Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful
> > > insertion of trusted.ko?
> >
> > The module dependency chain relies on it. If that can be broken that
> > would also be an acceptable fix.
> >
> > I found this through the following dependency chain: libnvdimm.ko ->
> > encrypted_keys.ko -> trusted.ko.
> >
> > "key_type_trusted" is the symbol that encrypted_keys needs regardless
> > of whether the tpm is present.
>
> Commit 982e617a313b ("encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency")
> removed the dependency on trusted keys. masterkey_trusted.c should
> only be included if "CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS" is enabled. Is
> CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS enabled?
Yes, TRUSTED_KEYS is enabled, the module is built/available, and tries
to load when encrypted_keys.ko loads. The problem is that it fails to
load due an error returned from init_trusted(). The error is new for
v5.1. So, instead of requiring the module dependencies to resolve
successfully, and init_trusted() to return 0, the proposal is to just
lookup the key types by name.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list
Linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org" <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 23:01:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4j+4WMFsEbT_TDQfNs2ZG6+ME6b07RaqmT9kfbTStWgJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1553036189.4899.136.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 3:56 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 17:30 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>
> Sorry for the late reply.
>
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 5:24 PM James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> > > > trusted-key operations.
> > >
> > > What actual problem is this fixing? To me it would seem like an
> > > enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no
> > > TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work.
> > > Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful
> > > insertion of trusted.ko?
> >
> > The module dependency chain relies on it. If that can be broken that
> > would also be an acceptable fix.
> >
> > I found this through the following dependency chain: libnvdimm.ko ->
> > encrypted_keys.ko -> trusted.ko.
> >
> > "key_type_trusted" is the symbol that encrypted_keys needs regardless
> > of whether the tpm is present.
>
> Commit 982e617a313b ("encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency")
> removed the dependency on trusted keys. masterkey_trusted.c should
> only be included if "CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS" is enabled. Is
> CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS enabled?
Yes, TRUSTED_KEYS is enabled, the module is built/available, and tries
to load when encrypted_keys.ko loads. The problem is that it fails to
load due an error returned from init_trusted(). The error is new for
v5.1. So, instead of requiring the module dependencies to resolve
successfully, and init_trusted() to return 0, the proposal is to just
lookup the key types by name.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org" <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:01:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4j+4WMFsEbT_TDQfNs2ZG6+ME6b07RaqmT9kfbTStWgJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1553036189.4899.136.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 3:56 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 17:30 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>
> Sorry for the late reply.
>
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 5:24 PM James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > > Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> > > > the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> > > > trusted-key operations.
> > >
> > > What actual problem is this fixing? To me it would seem like an
> > > enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no
> > > TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work.
> > > Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful
> > > insertion of trusted.ko?
> >
> > The module dependency chain relies on it. If that can be broken that
> > would also be an acceptable fix.
> >
> > I found this through the following dependency chain: libnvdimm.ko ->
> > encrypted_keys.ko -> trusted.ko.
> >
> > "key_type_trusted" is the symbol that encrypted_keys needs regardless
> > of whether the tpm is present.
>
> Commit 982e617a313b ("encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency")
> removed the dependency on trusted keys. masterkey_trusted.c should
> only be included if "CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS" is enabled. Is
> CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS enabled?
Yes, TRUSTED_KEYS is enabled, the module is built/available, and tries
to load when encrypted_keys.ko loads. The problem is that it fails to
load due an error returned from init_trusted(). The error is new for
v5.1. So, instead of requiring the module dependencies to resolve
successfully, and init_trusted() to return 0, the proposal is to just
lookup the key types by name.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-19 23:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-18 23:45 [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Dan Williams
2019-03-18 23:45 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-18 23:45 ` Dan Williams
[not found] ` <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-19 0:24 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:24 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:24 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:30 ` Dan Williams
[not found] ` <CAA9_cmcOD2zPaaNbkYAaH5DRDRAebPkW+hwPA0zPKY4kU8R-rg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-19 0:56 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:56 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:56 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:55 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:55 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:55 ` Dan Williams
[not found] ` <CAPcyv4hXKQcdLnKG6rPNOJr2wjq31uCCr+16S5Yu6S5A_5UGrA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-20 2:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-20 2:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-20 2:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 23:01 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2019-03-19 23:01 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 23:01 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 14:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 14:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 14:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 16:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 16:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 16:30 ` Dan Williams
[not found] ` <CAPcyv4gc_KWedC12bTcX24KwjKiBCF=yvouRNzCbJKaLrgJdDg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-21 17:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 17:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 17:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-22 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 15:24 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-22 15:24 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-22 15:24 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-25 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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