From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 10:23:41 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0701291017520.11801@d.namei> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1170075866.8720.15.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind
> of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make
> use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets of
> sysctls to particular processes. As is, I'd expect breakage of current
> systems running SELinux from this patch, because (confined) processes
> that formerly only required access to specific sysctl labels will
> suddenly run into denials on the generic fallback label.
Agreed, 100% NACK.
Please don't just simply remove long-researched & analyzed MAC security
which has been in the kernel for years, which is being used in the field
for high assurance systems, because you neglected to consider it during a
code cleanup.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2007 10:23:41 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0701291017520.11801@d.namei> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1170075866.8720.15.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Mon, 29 Jan 2007, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> NAK. Mapping all sysctls to a single security label prevents any kind
> of fine-grained security on sysctls, and current policies already make
> use of the current distinctions to limit access to particular sets of
> sysctls to particular processes. As is, I'd expect breakage of current
> systems running SELinux from this patch, because (confined) processes
> that formerly only required access to specific sysctl labels will
> suddenly run into denials on the generic fallback label.
Agreed, 100% NACK.
Please don't just simply remove long-researched & analyzed MAC security
which has been in the kernel for years, which is being used in the field
for high assurance systems, because you neglected to consider it during a
code cleanup.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-01-29 15:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-01-28 1:05 + clocksource-add-verification-watchdog-helper-fix-3.patch added to -mm tree akpm
[not found] ` <20070127172410.2b041952.akpm@osdl.org>
[not found] ` <1169972718.17469.164.camel@localhost.localdomain>
[not found] ` <20070128003549.2ca38dc8.akpm@osdl.org>
[not found] ` <20070128093358.GA2071@elte.hu>
[not found] ` <20070128095712.GA6485@elte.hu>
[not found] ` <20070128100627.GA8416@elte.hu>
[not found] ` <20070128104548.a835d859.akpm@osdl.org>
2007-01-28 19:21 ` [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-28 19:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 13:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 13:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 15:23 ` James Morris [this message]
2007-01-29 15:23 ` James Morris
2007-01-29 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 19:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 19:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 18:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 18:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 19:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-01-29 19:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-01-29 20:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-29 20:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-01-30 10:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2007-01-30 17:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-01-30 17:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-01-29 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-01-29 23:28 ` Russell Coker
2007-01-29 23:28 ` Russell Coker
2007-02-06 21:16 ` [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: Add a parent entry to ctl_table and set the parent entry Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-06 21:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-06 21:21 ` [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-06 21:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-07 18:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 18:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 21:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 21:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 21:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 21:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-07 22:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-07 22:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 15:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 15:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 17:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 17:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-08 22:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:51 ` [PATCH 0/5] sysctl cleanup selinux fixes Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:53 ` [PATCH 1/5] sysctl: Remove declaration of nonexistent sysctl_init() Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:54 ` [PATCH 2/5] sysctl: Set the parent field in the root sysctl table Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:55 ` [PATCH 3/5] sysctl: Fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 23:02 ` [PATCH 4/5] selinux: Enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 23:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 23:04 ` [PATCH 5/5] sysctl: Hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-08 23:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-09 12:26 ` [PATCH 4/5] selinux: Enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes Stephen Smalley
2007-02-09 12:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-09 12:24 ` [PATCH 3/5] sysctl: Fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid Stephen Smalley
2007-02-09 12:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-02-09 11:05 ` [PATCH 0/5] sysctl cleanup selinux fixes Andrew Morton
2007-02-09 18:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-02-09 18:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Pine.LNX.4.64.0701291017520.11801@d.namei \
--to=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=akpm@osdl.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@elte.hu \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.