Re: [PATCH v2 07/39] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler

[Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>]

On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:04PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index d62b2cb85cea..b7dde8730236 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c

> @@ -229,16 +223,74 @@ enum cp_error_code {
>  	CP_ENCL	     = 1 << 15,
>  };
>  
> -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> +static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
> +	"unknown",
> +	"near-ret",
> +	"far-ret/iret",
> +	"endbranch",
> +	"rstorssp",
> +	"setssbsy",
> +};
> +
> +static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
> +			      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
> +
> +static void do_user_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
> +					     unsigned long error_code)
>  {
> -	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> -		pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
> -		BUG();
> +	struct task_struct *tsk;
> +	unsigned long ssp;
> +
> +	/* Read SSP before enabling interrupts. */
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +
> +	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "User-mode control protection fault with shadow support disabled\n");
> +
> +	tsk = current;
> +	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
> +	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
> +
> +	/* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
> +	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
> +	    __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
> +		unsigned int cpec;
> +
> +		cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
> +		if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err))
> +			cpec = 0;
> +
> +		pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
> +			 tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
> +			 regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
> +			 control_protection_err[cpec],
> +			 error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
> +		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
> +		pr_cont("\n");
>  	}
>  
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs) || (error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR))
> -		return;

Why are you removing the (error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR check from the
kernel handler?

> +	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
> +	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
> +}
> +#else
> +static void do_user_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
> +					     unsigned long error_code)
> +{
> +	WARN_ONCE(1, "User-mode control protection fault with shadow support disabled\n");
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
> +
> +static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
> +
> +extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
>  
> +static void do_kernel_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
>  	if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_ip)) {
>  		regs->ax = 0;
>  		return;
> @@ -283,9 +335,29 @@ static int __init ibt_setup(char *str)
>  }
>  
>  __setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
> -
> +#else
> +static void do_kernel_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	WARN_ONCE(1, "Kernel-mode control protection fault with IBT disabled\n");
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
> +	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
> +		BUG();
> +	}
> +
> +	if (user_mode(regs))
> +		do_user_control_protection_fault(regs, error_code);
> +	else
> +		do_kernel_control_protection_fault(regs);

These function names are weirdly long, surely they can do without the
_fault part at the very least. And as stated above, I would really like
the kernel thing to retain the error_code argument.

> +}
> +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) */