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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	<simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	<matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <gary.hook@amd.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
	<hpa@zytor.com>, <cl@linux.com>, <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	<aarcange@redhat.com>, <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	<andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <piotr.luc@intel.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<msalter@redhat.com>, <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
	<bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <arnd@arndb.de>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<devel@linuxdriverproject.org>,
	<bhe
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:08:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0c3ebb9-37b4-3f47-86df-eac110c07032@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307000349.GC5305@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>

On 3/6/2017 6:03 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 03:15:34PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 3/3/2017 2:42 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:10AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> The use of ioremap will force the setup data to be mapped decrypted even
>>>> though setup data is encrypted.  Switch to using memremap which will be
>>>> able to perform the proper mapping.
>>>
>>> How should callers decide whether to use ioremap() or memremap()?
>>>
>>> memremap() existed before SME and SEV, and this code is used even if
>>> SME and SEV aren't supported, so the rationale for this change should
>>> not need the decryption argument.
>>
>> When SME or SEV is active an ioremap() will remove the encryption bit
>> from the pagetable entry when it is mapped.  This allows MMIO, which
>> doesn't support SME/SEV, to be performed successfully.  So my take is
>> that ioremap() should be used for MMIO and memremap() for pages in RAM.
>
> OK, thanks.  The commit message should say something like "this is
> RAM, not MMIO, so we should map it with memremap(), not ioremap()".
> That's the part that determines whether the change is correct.
>
> You can mention the encryption part, too, but it's definitely
> secondary because the change has to make sense on its own, without
> SME/SEV.
>

Ok, that makes sense, will do.

> The following commits (from https://github.com/codomania/tip/branches)
> all do basically the same thing so the changelogs (and summaries)
> should all be basically the same:
>
>   cb0d0d1eb0a6 x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data
>   91acb68b8333 x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
>   4f687503e23f x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
>   e90246b8c229 x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted
>
> I would collect them all together and move them to the beginning of
> your series, since they don't depend on anything else.

I'll do that.

>
> Also, change "x86/pci: " to "x86/PCI" so it matches the previous
> convention.

Will do.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/pci/common.c |    4 ++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> index a4fdfa7..0b06670 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>>
>>>> 	pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>>> 	while (pa_data) {
>>>> -		data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
>>>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>
>>> I can't quite connect the dots here.  ioremap() on x86 would do
>>> ioremap_nocache().  memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) would do arch_memremap_wb(),
>>> which is ioremap_cache().  Is making a cacheable mapping the important
>>> difference?
>>
>> The memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) will actually check to see if it can perform
>> a __va(pa_data) in try_ram_remap() and then fallback to the
>> arch_memremap_wb().  So it's actually the __va() vs the ioremap_cache()
>> that is the difference.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>
>>>> 		if (!data)
>>>> 			return -ENOMEM;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>> 			}
>>>> 		}
>>>> 		pa_data = data->next;
>>>> -		iounmap(data);
>>>> +		memunmap(data);
>>>> 	}
>>>> 	set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
>>>> 	set_dev_domain_options(dev);
>>>>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	<simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	<matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <gary.hook@amd.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
	<hpa@zytor.com>, <cl@linux.com>, <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	<aarcange@redhat.com>, <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	<andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <piotr.luc@intel.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<msalter@redhat.com>, <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
	<bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <arnd@arndb.de>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<devel@linuxdriverproject.org>, <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mchehab@kernel.org>,
	<iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <alexandre.bounine@idt.com>,
	<kuleshovmail@gmail.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<mcgrof@kernel.org>, <mst@redhat.com>,
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <tj@kernel.org>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:08:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0c3ebb9-37b4-3f47-86df-eac110c07032@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307000349.GC5305@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>

On 3/6/2017 6:03 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 03:15:34PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 3/3/2017 2:42 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:10AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> The use of ioremap will force the setup data to be mapped decrypted even
>>>> though setup data is encrypted.  Switch to using memremap which will be
>>>> able to perform the proper mapping.
>>>
>>> How should callers decide whether to use ioremap() or memremap()?
>>>
>>> memremap() existed before SME and SEV, and this code is used even if
>>> SME and SEV aren't supported, so the rationale for this change should
>>> not need the decryption argument.
>>
>> When SME or SEV is active an ioremap() will remove the encryption bit
>> from the pagetable entry when it is mapped.  This allows MMIO, which
>> doesn't support SME/SEV, to be performed successfully.  So my take is
>> that ioremap() should be used for MMIO and memremap() for pages in RAM.
>
> OK, thanks.  The commit message should say something like "this is
> RAM, not MMIO, so we should map it with memremap(), not ioremap()".
> That's the part that determines whether the change is correct.
>
> You can mention the encryption part, too, but it's definitely
> secondary because the change has to make sense on its own, without
> SME/SEV.
>

Ok, that makes sense, will do.

> The following commits (from https://github.com/codomania/tip/branches)
> all do basically the same thing so the changelogs (and summaries)
> should all be basically the same:
>
>   cb0d0d1eb0a6 x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data
>   91acb68b8333 x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
>   4f687503e23f x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
>   e90246b8c229 x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted
>
> I would collect them all together and move them to the beginning of
> your series, since they don't depend on anything else.

I'll do that.

>
> Also, change "x86/pci: " to "x86/PCI" so it matches the previous
> convention.

Will do.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/pci/common.c |    4 ++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> index a4fdfa7..0b06670 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>>
>>>> 	pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>>> 	while (pa_data) {
>>>> -		data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
>>>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>
>>> I can't quite connect the dots here.  ioremap() on x86 would do
>>> ioremap_nocache().  memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) would do arch_memremap_wb(),
>>> which is ioremap_cache().  Is making a cacheable mapping the important
>>> difference?
>>
>> The memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) will actually check to see if it can perform
>> a __va(pa_data) in try_ram_remap() and then fallback to the
>> arch_memremap_wb().  So it's actually the __va() vs the ioremap_cache()
>> that is the difference.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>
>>>> 		if (!data)
>>>> 			return -ENOMEM;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>> 			}
>>>> 		}
>>>> 		pa_data = data->next;
>>>> -		iounmap(data);
>>>> +		memunmap(data);
>>>> 	}
>>>> 	set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
>>>> 	set_dev_domain_options(dev);
>>>>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com,
	luto@kernel.org, devel@linuxdriverproject.orgbhe
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:08:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0c3ebb9-37b4-3f47-86df-eac110c07032@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307000349.GC5305@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>

On 3/6/2017 6:03 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 03:15:34PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 3/3/2017 2:42 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:10AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> The use of ioremap will force the setup data to be mapped decrypted even
>>>> though setup data is encrypted.  Switch to using memremap which will be
>>>> able to perform the proper mapping.
>>>
>>> How should callers decide whether to use ioremap() or memremap()?
>>>
>>> memremap() existed before SME and SEV, and this code is used even if
>>> SME and SEV aren't supported, so the rationale for this change should
>>> not need the decryption argument.
>>
>> When SME or SEV is active an ioremap() will remove the encryption bit
>> from the pagetable entry when it is mapped.  This allows MMIO, which
>> doesn't support SME/SEV, to be performed successfully.  So my take is
>> that ioremap() should be used for MMIO and memremap() for pages in RAM.
>
> OK, thanks.  The commit message should say something like "this is
> RAM, not MMIO, so we should map it with memremap(), not ioremap()".
> That's the part that determines whether the change is correct.
>
> You can mention the encryption part, too, but it's definitely
> secondary because the change has to make sense on its own, without
> SME/SEV.
>

Ok, that makes sense, will do.

> The following commits (from https://github.com/codomania/tip/branches)
> all do basically the same thing so the changelogs (and summaries)
> should all be basically the same:
>
>   cb0d0d1eb0a6 x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data
>   91acb68b8333 x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
>   4f687503e23f x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
>   e90246b8c229 x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted
>
> I would collect them all together and move them to the beginning of
> your series, since they don't depend on anything else.

I'll do that.

>
> Also, change "x86/pci: " to "x86/PCI" so it matches the previous
> convention.

Will do.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/pci/common.c |    4 ++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> index a4fdfa7..0b06670 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>>
>>>> 	pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>>> 	while (pa_data) {
>>>> -		data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
>>>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>
>>> I can't quite connect the dots here.  ioremap() on x86 would do
>>> ioremap_nocache().  memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) would do arch_memremap_wb(),
>>> which is ioremap_cache().  Is making a cacheable mapping the important
>>> difference?
>>
>> The memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) will actually check to see if it can perform
>> a __va(pa_data) in try_ram_remap() and then fallback to the
>> arch_memremap_wb().  So it's actually the __va() vs the ioremap_cache()
>> that is the difference.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>
>>>> 		if (!data)
>>>> 			return -ENOMEM;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>> 			}
>>>> 		}
>>>> 		pa_data = data->next;
>>>> -		iounmap(data);
>>>> +		memunmap(data);
>>>> 	}
>>>> 	set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
>>>> 	set_dev_domain_options(dev);
>>>>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com,
	luto@kernel.org, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
	bhelgaas@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org,
	iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org,
	tony.luck@intel.com, alexandre.bounine@idt.com,
	kuleshovmail@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	tj@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 15:08:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0c3ebb9-37b4-3f47-86df-eac110c07032@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307000349.GC5305@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>

On 3/6/2017 6:03 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 03, 2017 at 03:15:34PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 3/3/2017 2:42 PM, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:10AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>>>
>>>> The use of ioremap will force the setup data to be mapped decrypted even
>>>> though setup data is encrypted.  Switch to using memremap which will be
>>>> able to perform the proper mapping.
>>>
>>> How should callers decide whether to use ioremap() or memremap()?
>>>
>>> memremap() existed before SME and SEV, and this code is used even if
>>> SME and SEV aren't supported, so the rationale for this change should
>>> not need the decryption argument.
>>
>> When SME or SEV is active an ioremap() will remove the encryption bit
>> from the pagetable entry when it is mapped.  This allows MMIO, which
>> doesn't support SME/SEV, to be performed successfully.  So my take is
>> that ioremap() should be used for MMIO and memremap() for pages in RAM.
>
> OK, thanks.  The commit message should say something like "this is
> RAM, not MMIO, so we should map it with memremap(), not ioremap()".
> That's the part that determines whether the change is correct.
>
> You can mention the encryption part, too, but it's definitely
> secondary because the change has to make sense on its own, without
> SME/SEV.
>

Ok, that makes sense, will do.

> The following commits (from https://github.com/codomania/tip/branches)
> all do basically the same thing so the changelogs (and summaries)
> should all be basically the same:
>
>   cb0d0d1eb0a6 x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data
>   91acb68b8333 x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data
>   4f687503e23f x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted
>   e90246b8c229 x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted
>
> I would collect them all together and move them to the beginning of
> your series, since they don't depend on anything else.

I'll do that.

>
> Also, change "x86/pci: " to "x86/PCI" so it matches the previous
> convention.

Will do.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/pci/common.c |    4 ++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> index a4fdfa7..0b06670 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
>>>> @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>>
>>>> 	pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>>>> 	while (pa_data) {
>>>> -		data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
>>>> +		data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>
>>> I can't quite connect the dots here.  ioremap() on x86 would do
>>> ioremap_nocache().  memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) would do arch_memremap_wb(),
>>> which is ioremap_cache().  Is making a cacheable mapping the important
>>> difference?
>>
>> The memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) will actually check to see if it can perform
>> a __va(pa_data) in try_ram_remap() and then fallback to the
>> arch_memremap_wb().  So it's actually the __va() vs the ioremap_cache()
>> that is the difference.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>
>>>> 		if (!data)
>>>> 			return -ENOMEM;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>>> 			}
>>>> 		}
>>>> 		pa_data = data->next;
>>>> -		iounmap(data);
>>>> +		memunmap(data);
>>>> 	}
>>>> 	set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
>>>> 	set_dev_domain_options(dev);
>>>>

--
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-13 20:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 423+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-04 10:11         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-04 10:11         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 20:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 20:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:19     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:19     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07  0:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07  0:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:42     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:42     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-07  0:03         ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-07  0:03         ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 14:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 14:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  8:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  8:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 14:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 14:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 15:09                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 15:09                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:29                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:29                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 19:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 19:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 11:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 11:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 13:15         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 18:28         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 18:28         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 22:25           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 22:25           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:17             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:17             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47             ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:47               ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:56                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:56                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:03                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:03                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 14:45                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 14:45                       ` Paolo Bonzini
     [not found]                       ` <b516a873-029a-b20a-3c43-d8bf4a200cb7-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-18 16:37                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-24 17:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-24 17:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:06     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:06     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-28 18:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-28 18:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:21       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:21       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:32         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:32         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 17:39     ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 19:11       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 19:11       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:03     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:03     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh

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