All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
	arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 11:33:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3624c9f-af1f-740d-d359-3703024e83fd@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>



On 02/03/2017 16:17, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> ASID management:
>  - Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained through
>    CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any asid outside the SEV
>    asid range.

How is backwards compatibility handled?

>  - SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained through CPUID.
>  - SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush is required
>    if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.

[...]

> +
> +	/* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */
> +	bool last_cpuid;

Should be unsigned int.

> 
> +	/* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */
> +	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
> +
> +	/* Flush guest TLB:
> +	 * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the
> +	 *   same host CPU
> +	 *   or
> +	 * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs.
> +	 */
> +	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb ||

Why the cast?

> +		svm->last_cpuid != cpu)
> +		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;

If there is a match, you don't need to do anything else (neither reset
the asid, nor mark it as dirty, nor update the fields), so:

	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
	    svm->last_cpuid == cpu)
		return;

	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

(plus comments ;)).

Also, why not TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID if possible?

> +	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
> +	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb;
> +
> +	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

[...]

> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index fef7d83..9df37a2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1284,6 +1284,104 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
>  /* Memory Encryption Commands */
>  #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP	  _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, unsigned long)
>  
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
> +enum sev_cmd_id {

Please add documentation in Documentation/virtual/kvm/memory_encrypt.txt.

Paolo

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
	arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
	devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 11:33:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3624c9f-af1f-740d-d359-3703024e83fd@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>



On 02/03/2017 16:17, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> ASID management:
>  - Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained through
>    CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any asid outside the SEV
>    asid range.

How is backwards compatibility handled?

>  - SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained through CPUID.
>  - SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush is required
>    if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.

[...]

> +
> +	/* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */
> +	bool last_cpuid;

Should be unsigned int.

> 
> +	/* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */
> +	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
> +
> +	/* Flush guest TLB:
> +	 * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the
> +	 *   same host CPU
> +	 *   or
> +	 * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs.
> +	 */
> +	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb ||

Why the cast?

> +		svm->last_cpuid != cpu)
> +		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;

If there is a match, you don't need to do anything else (neither reset
the asid, nor mark it as dirty, nor update the fields), so:

	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
	    svm->last_cpuid == cpu)
		return;

	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

(plus comments ;)).

Also, why not TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID if possible?

> +	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
> +	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb;
> +
> +	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

[...]

> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index fef7d83..9df37a2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1284,6 +1284,104 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
>  /* Memory Encryption Commands */
>  #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP	  _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, unsigned long)
>  
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
> +enum sev_cmd_id {

Please add documentation in Documentation/virtual/kvm/memory_encrypt.txt.

Paolo

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
	ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
	arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
	devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 11:33:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3624c9f-af1f-740d-d359-3703024e83fd@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>



On 02/03/2017 16:17, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> ASID management:
>  - Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained through
>    CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any asid outside the SEV
>    asid range.

How is backwards compatibility handled?

>  - SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained through CPUID.
>  - SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush is required
>    if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.

[...]

> +
> +	/* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */
> +	bool last_cpuid;

Should be unsigned int.

> 
> +	/* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */
> +	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
> +
> +	/* Flush guest TLB:
> +	 * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the
> +	 *   same host CPU
> +	 *   or
> +	 * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs.
> +	 */
> +	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb ||

Why the cast?

> +		svm->last_cpuid != cpu)
> +		svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;

If there is a match, you don't need to do anything else (neither reset
the asid, nor mark it as dirty, nor update the fields), so:

	if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
	    svm->last_cpuid == cpu)
		return;

	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
	svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
	svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

(plus comments ;)).

Also, why not TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID if possible?

> +	svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
> +	sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb;
> +
> +	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);

[...]

> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index fef7d83..9df37a2 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1284,6 +1284,104 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
>  /* Memory Encryption Commands */
>  #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP	  _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, unsigned long)
>  
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
> +enum sev_cmd_id {

Please add documentation in Documentation/virtual/kvm/memory_encrypt.txt.

Paolo

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-16 10:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 423+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:01       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-04 10:11         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-04 10:11         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 18:11           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 20:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 20:54             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:19     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:19     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07  0:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07  0:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:12 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:42     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:42     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03 21:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-07  0:03         ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-07  0:03         ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-13 20:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 14:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 14:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 20:04       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  8:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  8:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 14:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 14:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 16:35           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 10:16             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 14:28               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 15:09                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 15:09                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:11                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:29                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:29                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 19:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 19:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 11:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 11:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 22:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 13:15         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 18:28         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 18:28         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 22:25           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 22:25           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:17             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:17             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47             ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:47               ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:56                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:56                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:03                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:03                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 14:45                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 14:45                       ` Paolo Bonzini
     [not found]                       ` <b516a873-029a-b20a-3c43-d8bf4a200cb7-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-18 16:37                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-18 16:37                           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 14:05               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 17:25                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 18:37                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 11:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 14:50                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 12:28     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-24 17:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-24 17:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-27 15:07       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:06     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:06     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-28 18:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-28 18:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:21       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:21       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:32         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:32         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 17:08       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 17:39     ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 19:11       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 19:11       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-03 13:55         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2017-03-16 10:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:41       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:09         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:03     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 11:03     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 10:38     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 18:17       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:33   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Brijesh Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=e3624c9f-af1f-740d-d359-3703024e83fd@redhat.com \
    --to=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=gary.hook@amd.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=msalter@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
    --cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xemul@parallels.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.