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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper
Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 03:13:37 +1000 (AEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805190303100.26396@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y3ghhbws.fsf@xmission.com>

On Thu, 17 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> 
> Nack on this sharing nonsense.  These two interfaces do not share any
> code in their implementations other than the if statement to distinguish
> between the two cases.

Hmm, it's not even doing that.

There's already an if(!file && read_id == X) { } check and this is another 
one being added.

> If we want comprehensible and maintainable code in the security modules
> we need to split these two pieces of functionality apart.

All ima_read is doing in both the old and new case is checking if there's 
no file then if it's a certain operation, returning an error.

To echo Eric and Casey's suggestions, how about changing the name of the 
hook to security_kernel_read_data() ?

Then ima_read_file() can be changed to ima_read_data(), and then instead 
of two if (!file && read_id == X) checks, have:

	if (!file) {
		switch (read_id) {
		}
	}




-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: jmorris@namei.org (James Morris)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper
Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 03:13:37 +1000 (AEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805190303100.26396@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y3ghhbws.fsf@xmission.com>

On Thu, 17 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> 
> Nack on this sharing nonsense.  These two interfaces do not share any
> code in their implementations other than the if statement to distinguish
> between the two cases.

Hmm, it's not even doing that.

There's already an if(!file && read_id == X) { } check and this is another 
one being added.

> If we want comprehensible and maintainable code in the security modules
> we need to split these two pieces of functionality apart.

All ima_read is doing in both the old and new case is checking if there's 
no file then if it's a certain operation, returning an error.

To echo Eric and Casey's suggestions, how about changing the name of the 
hook to security_kernel_read_data() ?

Then ima_read_file() can be changed to ima_read_data(), and then instead 
of two if (!file && read_id == X) checks, have:

	if (!file) {
		switch (read_id) {
		}
	}




-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper
Date: Sat, 19 May 2018 03:13:37 +1000 (AEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805190303100.26396@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y3ghhbws.fsf@xmission.com>

On Thu, 17 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> 
> Nack on this sharing nonsense.  These two interfaces do not share any
> code in their implementations other than the if statement to distinguish
> between the two cases.

Hmm, it's not even doing that.

There's already an if(!file && read_id == X) { } check and this is another 
one being added.

> If we want comprehensible and maintainable code in the security modules
> we need to split these two pieces of functionality apart.

All ima_read is doing in both the old and new case is checking if there's 
no file then if it's a certain operation, returning an error.

To echo Eric and Casey's suggestions, how about changing the name of the 
hook to security_kernel_read_data() ?

Then ima_read_file() can be changed to ima_read_data(), and then instead 
of two if (!file && read_id == X) checks, have:

	if (!file) {
		switch (read_id) {
		}
	}




-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-18 17:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-17 14:48 [PATCH v2 0/9] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18  0:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18  0:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18  0:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18  3:37     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-18  3:37       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-18  3:37       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-18  3:37       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-18 11:30       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 11:30         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 11:30         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 11:30         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 14:58         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18 14:58           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18 14:58           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18 14:58           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-18 15:29           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 15:29             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 15:29             ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 17:13       ` James Morris [this message]
2018-05-18 17:13         ` James Morris
2018-05-18 17:13         ` James Morris
2018-05-18 17:55         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 17:55           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 17:55           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-18 17:55           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-17 14:48   ` Mimi Zohar

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