* [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access
2021-01-24 19:49 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-24 19:49 ` Andrei Matei
2021-01-27 22:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/5] selftest/bpf: adjust expected verifier errors Andrei Matei
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-24 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast; +Cc: Andrei Matei
Before this patch, variable offset access to the stack was dissalowed
for regular instructions, but was allowed for "indirect" accesses (i.e.
helpers). This patch removes the restriction, allowing reading and
writing to the stack through stack pointers with variable offsets. This
makes stack-allocated buffers more usable in programs, and brings stack
pointers closer to other types of pointers.
The motivation is being able to use stack-allocated buffers for data
manipulation. When the stack size limit is sufficient, allocating
buffers on the stack is simpler than per-cpu arrays, or other
alternatives.
In unpriviledged programs, variable-offset reads and writes are
disallowed (they were already disallowed for the indirect access case)
because the speculative execution checking code doesn't support them.
Additionally, when writing through a variable-offset stack pointer, if
any pointers are in the accessible range, there's possilibities of later
leaking pointers because the write cannot be tracked precisely.
For reads, all the stack slots in the variable range needs to be
initialized, otherwise the read is rejected. All register spilled in
stack slots that might be read are marked as having been read, however
reads through such pointers don't do register filling; the target
register will always be either a scalar or a constant zero.
For writes, all the stack slots are in range are considered scalars
after the write; variable-offset register spills are not tracked.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 657 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 512 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index dfe6f85d97dd..9cb8472dfc8b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct bpf_func_state {
* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
*/
u32 frameno;
- /* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
+ /* subprog number == index within subprog_info
* zero == main subprog
*/
u32 subprogno;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d0eae51b31e4..9e49e1e4fa21 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2271,12 +2271,14 @@ static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL;
}
-/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
+/* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
* stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
*/
-static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */
- int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* stack frame we're writing to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ int off, int size, int value_regno,
+ int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
@@ -2402,9 +2404,167 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
-static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */,
- int off, int size, int value_regno)
+/* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
+ * known to contain a variable offset.
+ * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
+ * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
+ * dynamic range is potentially writtent to.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
+ * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
+ * the stack.
+ *
+ * If some stack slots in range are uninitialized (i.e. STACK_INVALID), the
+ * write is not automatically rejected. However, they are left as
+ * STACK_INVALID, which means that reads with the same variable offset will be
+ * rejected.
+ *
+ * No spilled pointers are marked as written because we don't know what's going
+ * to be actually written. This means that read propagation for future reads
+ * cannot be terminated by this write.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
+ int min_off, max_off;
+ int i, err;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
+ bool writing_zero = false;
+ /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
+ * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
+ */
+ bool zero_used = false;
+
+ cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+ ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
+ min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
+ if (value_regno >= 0)
+ value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
+ if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg))
+ writing_zero = true;
+
+ err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE),
+ state->acquired_refs, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+
+ /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+ u8 new_type, *stype;
+ int slot, spi;
+
+ slot = -i - 1;
+ spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+ stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks
+ && *stype != NOT_INIT
+ && *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) {
+ /* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in
+ * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status
+ * would be erased below (even though not all slots are
+ * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to
+ * leaks.
+ */
+ verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
+ insn_idx, i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Erase all spilled pointers. */
+ state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
+
+ /* Update the slot type. */
+ new_type = STACK_MISC;
+ if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
+ new_type = STACK_ZERO;
+ zero_used = true;
+ }
+ /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we leave it as such. We can't
+ * mark the slot as initialized, as the slot might not actually
+ * be written to (and so marking it as initialized opens the
+ * door to leaks of uninitialized stack memory.
+ */
+ if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
+ *stype = new_type;
+ }
+ if (zero_used) {
+ /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
+ err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* When register 'regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, max_off),
+ * we set the register's type according to the types of the respective stack
+ * slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then so is the
+ * destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be SCALAR. This
+ * function does not deal with register filling; the caller must ensure that
+ * all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as read.
+ */
+static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where src register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
+ int min_off, int max_off, int regno)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
+ int i, slot, spi;
+ u8 *stype;
+ int zeros = 0;
+
+ for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
+ slot = -i - 1;
+ spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+ stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
+ if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
+ break;
+ zeros++;
+ }
+ if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
+ /* any access_size read into register is zero extended,
+ * so the whole register == const_zero
+ */
+ __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[regno]);
+ /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
+ * so mark it precise here, so that later
+ * backtracking can stop here.
+ * Backtracking may not need this if this register
+ * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
+ * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
+ * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
+ * backtracking. Any register that contributed
+ * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
+ */
+ state->regs[regno].precise = true;
+ } else {
+ /* have read misc data from the stack */
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, regno);
+ }
+ state->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+}
+
+/* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
+ * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
+ * spilled reg.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
+ * register.
+ *
+ * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ /* func where src register points to */
+ struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
+ int off, int size, int dst_regno)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
@@ -2412,11 +2572,6 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
u8 *stype;
- if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) {
- verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n",
- off, size);
- return -EACCES;
- }
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
@@ -2427,9 +2582,9 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
- mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ if (dst_regno >= 0) {
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
return 0;
@@ -2441,16 +2596,16 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
+ if (dst_regno >= 0) {
/* restore register state from stack */
- state->regs[value_regno] = *reg;
+ state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
* has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
* which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
*/
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
- /* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
+ /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
* it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
* (e.g. for XADD).
* We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
@@ -2462,70 +2617,176 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
} else {
- int zeros = 0;
+ u8 type;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
+ type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+ if (type == STACK_MISC)
continue;
- if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) {
- zeros++;
+ if (type == STACK_ZERO)
continue;
- }
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
- if (value_regno >= 0) {
- if (zeros == size) {
- /* any size read into register is zero extended,
- * so the whole register == const_zero
- */
- __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]);
- /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet,
- * so mark it precise here, so that later
- * backtracking can stop here.
- * Backtracking may not need this if this register
- * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment.
- * Forward propagation of precise flag is not
- * necessary either. This mark is only to stop
- * backtracking. Any register that contributed
- * to const 0 was marked precise before spill.
- */
- state->regs[value_regno].precise = true;
- } else {
- /* have read misc data from the stack */
- mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
- }
- state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- }
+ if (dst_regno >= 0)
+ mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
}
return 0;
}
-static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
- int off, int size)
+enum stack_access_src {
+ ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */
+ ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */
+};
+
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno, int off, int access_size,
+ bool zero_size_allowed,
+ enum stack_access_src type,
+ struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
+
+static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
+{
+ return cur_regs(env) + regno;
+}
+
+/* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
+ * 'dst_regno'.
+ * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
+ * but not its variable offset.
+ * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
+ *
+ * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
+ * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
+ * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
+ * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
+ * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
+ * instead.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
{
- /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
- * can determine what type of data were returned. See
- * check_stack_read().
+ /* The state of the source register. */
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+ int min_off, max_off;
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "%s: fixed stack access illegal: reg=%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
+ __func__, ptr_regno, tn_buf, off, size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
*/
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+ false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
+ mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_read_var_off.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
+ * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
+ */
+static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int dst_regno)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+ /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
+ bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
+
+ /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
+ * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
+ * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
+ */
+ if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
+ verbose(env, "var-offset stack reads only permitted to register; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
+ /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
+ * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
+ * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ */
+ if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+ ptr_regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
- return 0;
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ off += reg->var_off.value;
+ err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+ dst_regno);
+ } else {
+ /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+ * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
+ * branch.
+ */
+ err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
+ dst_regno);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+/* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
+ * check_stack_write_var_off.
+ *
+ * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
+ * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
+ * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
+ * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
+ */
+static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
+ int value_regno, int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err;
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ off += reg->var_off.value;
+ err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
+ } else {
+ /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
+ * than fixed offset ones. Note that value_regno >= 0 on this
+ * branch.
+ */
+ err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
+ ptr_regno, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
+ }
+ return err;
}
static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
@@ -2858,11 +3119,6 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
return -EACCES;
}
-static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
- return cur_regs(env) + regno;
-}
-
static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
@@ -2981,8 +3237,8 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
- /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()
- * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being
+ /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
+ * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
* aligned.
*/
strict = true;
@@ -3400,6 +3656,91 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
+ * maximum valid offset is -1.
+ *
+ * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
+ * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
+ */
+static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
+ struct bpf_func_state *state,
+ enum bpf_access_type t)
+{
+ int min_valid_off;
+
+ if (t == BPF_WRITE)
+ min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
+ else
+ min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
+
+ if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
+ * bounds.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno, int off, int access_size,
+ enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int min_off, max_off;
+ int err;
+ char *err_extra;
+
+ if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
+ /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
+ err_extra = " indirect access to";
+ else if (type == BPF_READ)
+ err_extra = " read from";
+ else
+ err_extra = " write to";
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
+ if (access_size > 0)
+ max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
+ else
+ max_off = min_off;
+ } else {
+ if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+ reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ if (access_size > 0)
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
+ else
+ max_off = min_off;
+ }
+
+ err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
+ if (!err)
+ err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type);
+
+ if (err) {
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
+ } else {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
* if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
@@ -3515,8 +3856,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
- off += reg->var_off.value;
- err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size);
+ /* Basic bounds checks. */
+ err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3525,12 +3866,12 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
if (err)
return err;
- if (t == BPF_WRITE)
- err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
- value_regno, insn_idx);
- else
- err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
+ if (t == BPF_READ)
+ err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
value_regno);
+ else
+ err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
@@ -3693,49 +4034,53 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
return 0;
}
-static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
- int off, int access_size,
- bool zero_size_allowed)
+/* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
+ * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
+ * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized.
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
+ *
+ * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
+ * read offsets are marked as read.
+ */
+static int check_stack_range_initialized(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
+ int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
+ enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
+ int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
+ char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : "";
+ enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type;
+ /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
+ * read-only.
+ */
+ bool clobber = false;
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
- access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
- if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
- regno, off, access_size);
- } else {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
- regno, tn_buf, access_size);
- }
+ if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- return 0;
-}
-/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
- * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
- * and all elements of stack are initialized.
- * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
- * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
- */
-static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
- int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
- struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
-{
- struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
- struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
- int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
+ if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) {
+ /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for
+ * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra
+ * checks below.
+ */
+ bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE;
+ clobber = true;
+ } else {
+ bounds_check_type = BPF_READ;
+ }
+ err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size,
+ type, bounds_check_type);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
} else {
/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
* simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
@@ -3746,8 +4091,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
+ verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+ regno, err_extra, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
@@ -3759,28 +4104,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
meta = NULL;
- if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
- reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
- verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
- max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off;
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
- err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
+ min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
+ max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
}
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
@@ -3800,8 +4125,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
goto mark;
if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
- /* helper can write anything into the stack */
- *stype = STACK_MISC;
+ if (clobber) {
+ /* helper can write anything into the stack */
+ *stype = STACK_MISC;
+ }
goto mark;
}
@@ -3812,22 +4139,24 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
- __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
- for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
- state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+ if (clobber) {
+ __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
+ for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
+ state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC;
+ }
goto mark;
}
err:
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
} else {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
- tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+ verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+ err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
}
return -EACCES;
mark:
@@ -3876,8 +4205,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
"rdwr",
&env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access);
case PTR_TO_STACK:
- return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
- zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ return check_stack_range_initialized(
+ env,
+ regno, reg->off, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta);
default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
@@ -5541,6 +5872,41 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
+/* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
+ * have a variable offset.
+ *
+ * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
+ * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also
+ * retrieve_ptr_limit().
+ *
+ *
+ * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
+ */
+static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
+ struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int regno,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off)
+{
+ if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
+ regno, tn_buf, off);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -5784,10 +6150,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
return -EACCES;
} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
- check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
- dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
+ env, dst, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+ dst_reg->var_off.value)) {
return -EACCES;
}
}
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] " Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-27 22:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-01-30 22:55 ` Andrei Matei
2021-02-07 1:11 ` Andrei Matei
0 siblings, 2 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2021-01-27 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrei Matei; +Cc: bpf, ast
On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 02:49:05PM -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> + *
> + * If some stack slots in range are uninitialized (i.e. STACK_INVALID), the
> + * write is not automatically rejected. However, they are left as
> + * STACK_INVALID, which means that reads with the same variable offset will be
> + * rejected.
...
> + /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we leave it as such. We can't
> + * mark the slot as initialized, as the slot might not actually
> + * be written to (and so marking it as initialized opens the
> + * door to leaks of uninitialized stack memory.
> + */
> + if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
> + *stype = new_type;
'leaks of uninitialized stack memory'...
well that's true, but the way the user would have to deal with this
is to use __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16); for the whole buffer
before doing var_off write into it.
In the test in patch 5 would be good to add a read after this write:
buf[len] = buf[idx];
// need to do another read of buf[len] here.
Without memset() it would fail and the user would flame us:
"I just wrote into this stack slot!! Why cannot the verifier figure out
that the read from the same location is safe?... stupid verifier..."
I think for your use case where you read the whole thing into a stack and
then parse it all locations potentially touched by reads/writes would
be already written via helper, but imo this error is too unpleasant to
explain to users.
Especially since it happens later at a different instruction there is
no good verifier hint we can print.
It would just hit 'invalid read from stack'.
Currently we don't allow uninit read from stack even for root.
I think we have to sacrifice the perfection of the verification here.
We can either allow reading uninit for _fixed and _var_off
or better yet do unconditional '*stype = new_type' here.
Yes it would mean that following _fixed or _var_off read could be
reading uninited stack. I think we have to do it for the sake
of user friendliness.
The completely buggy uninited reads from stack will still be disallowed.
Only the [min,max] of var_off range in stack will be considered
init, so imo it's a reasonable trade-off between user friendliness
and verifier's perfection.
Wdyt?
> + }
> + if (zero_used) {
> + /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
> + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* When register 'regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, max_off),
> + * we set the register's type according to the types of the respective stack
> + * slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then so is the
> + * destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be SCALAR. This
> + * function does not deal with register filling; the caller must ensure that
> + * all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as read.
> + */
> +static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + /* func where src register points to */
> + struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
> + int min_off, int max_off, int regno)
may be use 'dst_regno' here like you've renamed below?
> -static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> - const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
> - int off, int size)
> +enum stack_access_src {
> + ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */
> + ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */
> +};
> +
> +static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + int regno, int off, int access_size,
> + bool zero_size_allowed,
> + enum stack_access_src type,
> + struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
> +
> +static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
> +{
> + return cur_regs(env) + regno;
> +}
> +
> +/* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
> + * 'dst_regno'.
> + * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
> + * but not its variable offset.
> + * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
> + *
> + * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
> + * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
> + * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
> + * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
> + * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
> + * instead.
> + */
> +static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
> {
> - /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
> - * can determine what type of data were returned. See
> - * check_stack_read().
> + /* The state of the source register. */
> + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> + struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
> + int err;
> + int min_off, max_off;
> +
> + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> + char tn_buf[48];
> +
> + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> + verbose(env, "%s: fixed stack access illegal: reg=%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> + __func__, ptr_regno, tn_buf, off, size);
> + return -EINVAL;
The caller just checked that and this condition can never happen, right?
What is the point of checking it again?
> + }
> + /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
> */
> - if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> + err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
> + false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> + max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
> + mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
> + * check_stack_read_var_off.
> + *
> + * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
> + * bounds.
> + *
> + * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
> + * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
> + */
> +static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
> + int dst_regno)
> +{
> + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> + int err;
> + /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
> + bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
> +
> + /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
> + * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
> + * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
> + */
> + if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
> char tn_buf[48];
>
> tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> - verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> + verbose(env, "var-offset stack reads only permitted to register; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
The message is confusing. "read to register"? what is "read to not register" ?
Users won't be able to figure out that it means helpers access.
Also nowadays it means that atomic ops won't be able to use var_off into stack.
I think both limitations are ok for now. Only the message needs to be clear.
> tn_buf, off, size);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> + /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
> + * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
> + * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
> + */
> + if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
> + char tn_buf[48];
>
> - if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
> - verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
> + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> + verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
> + ptr_regno, tn_buf);
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> - return 0;
> + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
This is the same as 'bool var_off' variable above. Why not to use it here?
> + off += reg->var_off.value;
> + err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
> + dst_regno);
> + } else {
> + /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
> + * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
> + * branch.
> + */
> + err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
> + dst_regno);
> + }
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +
> +/* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
> + * check_stack_write_var_off.
> + *
> + * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
> + * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
> + * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
> + * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
> + *
> + * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
> + */
> +static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
> + int value_regno, int insn_idx)
> +{
> + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> + int err;
> +
> + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> + off += reg->var_off.value;
> + err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
> + value_regno, insn_idx);
> + } else {
> + /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
> + * than fixed offset ones. Note that value_regno >= 0 on this
> + * branch.
I don't understand what the last sentence above means.
The value_regno can still be == -1 here. It's not a bug.
It's not handled yet, but it probably should be eventually.
Please rephrase it.
> + */
> + err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
> + ptr_regno, off, size,
> + value_regno, insn_idx);
> + }
> + return err;
> }
>
> +/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
> + * maximum valid offset is -1.
> + *
> + * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
> + * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
> + */
> +static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
> + struct bpf_func_state *state,
> + enum bpf_access_type t)
> +{
> + int min_valid_off;
> +
> + if (t == BPF_WRITE)
> + min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
> + else
> + min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
> +
> + if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
> + return -EACCES;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
> + * bounds.
> + *
> + * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
> + */
> +static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
> + struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + int regno, int off, int access_size,
> + enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
> +{
> + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
> + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
> + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> + int min_off, max_off;
> + int err;
> + char *err_extra;
> +
> + if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
the ACCESS_HELPER|DIRECT enum should probably be moved right before this function.
It's not used earlier, I think, and it made the reviewing a bit harder than could have been.
> + /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
> + err_extra = " indirect access to";
> + else if (type == BPF_READ)
> + err_extra = " read from";
> + else
> + err_extra = " write to";
Thanks for improving verifier errors.
> +
> + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> + min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
> + if (access_size > 0)
> + max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
> + else
> + max_off = min_off;
> + } else {
> + if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
> + reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
hmm. are you sure about smax in both conditions? looks like typo?
> + verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
> + err_extra, regno);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> + min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> + if (access_size > 0)
> + max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
> + else
> + max_off = min_off;
> + }
The rest looks good.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access
2021-01-27 22:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2021-01-30 22:55 ` Andrei Matei
2021-02-02 0:22 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-02-07 1:11 ` Andrei Matei
1 sibling, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-30 22:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov; +Cc: bpf, ast
Thanks for reviewing this!
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 5:58 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 02:49:05PM -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> > + *
> > + * If some stack slots in range are uninitialized (i.e. STACK_INVALID), the
> > + * write is not automatically rejected. However, they are left as
> > + * STACK_INVALID, which means that reads with the same variable offset will be
> > + * rejected.
> ...
> > + /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we leave it as such. We can't
> > + * mark the slot as initialized, as the slot might not actually
> > + * be written to (and so marking it as initialized opens the
> > + * door to leaks of uninitialized stack memory.
> > + */
> > + if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
> > + *stype = new_type;
>
> 'leaks of uninitialized stack memory'...
> well that's true, but the way the user would have to deal with this
> is to use __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16); for the whole buffer
> before doing var_off write into it.
> In the test in patch 5 would be good to add a read after this write:
> buf[len] = buf[idx];
> // need to do another read of buf[len] here.
>
> Without memset() it would fail and the user would flame us:
> "I just wrote into this stack slot!! Why cannot the verifier figure out
> that the read from the same location is safe?... stupid verifier..."
>
> I think for your use case where you read the whole thing into a stack and
> then parse it all locations potentially touched by reads/writes would
> be already written via helper, but imo this error is too unpleasant to
> explain to users.
> Especially since it happens later at a different instruction there is
> no good verifier hint we can print.
> It would just hit 'invalid read from stack'.
>
> Currently we don't allow uninit read from stack even for root.
> I think we have to sacrifice the perfection of the verification here.
> We can either allow reading uninit for _fixed and _var_off
> or better yet do unconditional '*stype = new_type' here.
> Yes it would mean that following _fixed or _var_off read could be
> reading uninited stack. I think we have to do it for the sake
> of user friendliness.
> The completely buggy uninited reads from stack will still be disallowed.
> Only the [min,max] of var_off range in stack will be considered
> init, so imo it's a reasonable trade-off between user friendliness
> and verifier's perfection.
> Wdyt?
I'm happy to do whatever you tell me. But, I dunno, the verifier
currently seems to be paranoid in ways I don't even understand (around
speculative execution). In comparison, preventing trivial leaks of
uninitialized memory seems relatively important. We're only talking
about root here (as you've noted), and other various checks are less
paranoid for root, so maybe it's no big deal. Where does the stack
memory come from? Can it be *any* previously used kernel memory?
A few possible alternatives (without necessarily knowing what I'm
talking about):
1) Perhaps it wouldn't be a big deal to zero-initialize all the stack
memory (up to 512 bytes) for a program. Is that out of the question?
In many cases it'd be less than 512 bytes; the verifier knows the max
stack needed. If the stack was always initialized, various verifier
checks could go away.
2) We could leave this patch as is, and work on improving the error
you get on rejected stack reads after var-offset stack writes. I think
the verifier could track what stack slots might have or might have not
been written to, and when a read to such an uncertain slot is
rejected, it could point to the previous var-off write (or one of the
possibly many such writes) and suggest a memset. Sounds potentially
complicated though.
3) Perhaps we could augment helper metadata with information about
whether each helper promises to overwrite every byte in the buffer
it's being passed in. This wouldn't solve the general usability
problem we're discussing, but it would make common cases just work.
Namely, bpf_probe_read_user() can make the required promise.
bpf_probe_read_user_str(), however, could not.
But, again, if you think relaxing the verification is OK, I'm very
happy to do that.
>
> > + }
> > + if (zero_used) {
> > + /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
> > + err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* When register 'regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, max_off),
> > + * we set the register's type according to the types of the respective stack
> > + * slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then so is the
> > + * destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be SCALAR. This
> > + * function does not deal with register filling; the caller must ensure that
> > + * all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as read.
> > + */
> > +static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + /* func where src register points to */
> > + struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
> > + int min_off, int max_off, int regno)
>
> may be use 'dst_regno' here like you've renamed below?
>
> > -static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > - const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
> > - int off, int size)
> > +enum stack_access_src {
> > + ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */
> > + ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int regno, int off, int access_size,
> > + bool zero_size_allowed,
> > + enum stack_access_src type,
> > + struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
> > +
> > +static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
> > +{
> > + return cur_regs(env) + regno;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
> > + * 'dst_regno'.
> > + * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
> > + * but not its variable offset.
> > + * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
> > + *
> > + * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
> > + * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
> > + * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
> > + * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
> > + * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
> > + * instead.
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
> > {
> > - /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
> > - * can determine what type of data were returned. See
> > - * check_stack_read().
> > + /* The state of the source register. */
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> > + struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
> > + int err;
> > + int min_off, max_off;
> > +
> > + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > + char tn_buf[48];
> > +
> > + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> > + verbose(env, "%s: fixed stack access illegal: reg=%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> > + __func__, ptr_regno, tn_buf, off, size);
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> The caller just checked that and this condition can never happen, right?
> What is the point of checking it again?
>
> > + }
> > + /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
> > */
> > - if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > + err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
> > + false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> > + max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
> > + mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
> > + * check_stack_read_var_off.
> > + *
> > + * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
> > + * bounds.
> > + *
> > + * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
> > + * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
> > + int dst_regno)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> > + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> > + int err;
> > + /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
> > + bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
> > +
> > + /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
> > + * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
> > + * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
> > + */
> > + if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
> > char tn_buf[48];
> >
> > tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> > - verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> > + verbose(env, "var-offset stack reads only permitted to register; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
>
> The message is confusing. "read to register"? what is "read to not register" ?
> Users won't be able to figure out that it means helpers access.
> Also nowadays it means that atomic ops won't be able to use var_off into stack.
> I think both limitations are ok for now. Only the message needs to be clear.
What message would you suggest? Would you plumb information about what
the read type is (helper vs atomic op)?
>
> > tn_buf, off, size);
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
> > + /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
> > + * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
> > + * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
> > + */
> > + if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) {
> > + char tn_buf[48];
> >
> > - if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
> > - verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
> > + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> > + verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
> > + ptr_regno, tn_buf);
> > return -EACCES;
> > }
> >
> > - return 0;
> > + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
>
> This is the same as 'bool var_off' variable above. Why not to use it here?
>
> > + off += reg->var_off.value;
> > + err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
> > + dst_regno);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
> > + * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
> > + * branch.
> > + */
> > + err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
> > + dst_regno);
> > + }
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
> > + * check_stack_write_var_off.
> > + *
> > + * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
> > + * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
> > + * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
> > + * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
> > + *
> > + * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
> > + int value_regno, int insn_idx)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
> > + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> > + int err;
> > +
> > + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > + off += reg->var_off.value;
> > + err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
> > + value_regno, insn_idx);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
> > + * than fixed offset ones. Note that value_regno >= 0 on this
> > + * branch.
>
> I don't understand what the last sentence above means.
> The value_regno can still be == -1 here. It's not a bug.
> It's not handled yet, but it probably should be eventually.
> Please rephrase it.
>
> > + */
> > + err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
> > + ptr_regno, off, size,
> > + value_regno, insn_idx);
> > + }
> > + return err;
> > }
> >
> > +/* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
> > + * maximum valid offset is -1.
> > + *
> > + * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
> > + * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off,
> > + struct bpf_func_state *state,
> > + enum bpf_access_type t)
> > +{
> > + int min_valid_off;
> > +
> > + if (t == BPF_WRITE)
> > + min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
> > + else
> > + min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
> > +
> > + if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
> > + * bounds.
> > + *
> > + * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
> > + struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int regno, int off, int access_size,
> > + enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
> > + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> > + int min_off, max_off;
> > + int err;
> > + char *err_extra;
> > +
> > + if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
>
> the ACCESS_HELPER|DIRECT enum should probably be moved right before this function.
> It's not used earlier, I think, and it made the reviewing a bit harder than could have been.
>
> > + /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
> > + err_extra = " indirect access to";
> > + else if (type == BPF_READ)
> > + err_extra = " read from";
> > + else
> > + err_extra = " write to";
>
> Thanks for improving verifier errors.
>
> > +
> > + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > + min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
> > + if (access_size > 0)
> > + max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
> > + else
> > + max_off = min_off;
> > + } else {
> > + if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
> > + reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
>
> hmm. are you sure about smax in both conditions? looks like typo?
>
> > + verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
> > + err_extra, regno);
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + }
> > + min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> > + if (access_size > 0)
> > + max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
> > + else
> > + max_off = min_off;
> > + }
>
> The rest looks good.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access
2021-01-30 22:55 ` Andrei Matei
@ 2021-02-02 0:22 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2021-02-02 0:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrei Matei; +Cc: bpf, ast
On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 05:55:36PM -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> Thanks for reviewing this!
>
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 5:58 PM Alexei Starovoitov
> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 02:49:05PM -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> > > + *
> > > + * If some stack slots in range are uninitialized (i.e. STACK_INVALID), the
> > > + * write is not automatically rejected. However, they are left as
> > > + * STACK_INVALID, which means that reads with the same variable offset will be
> > > + * rejected.
> > ...
> > > + /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we leave it as such. We can't
> > > + * mark the slot as initialized, as the slot might not actually
> > > + * be written to (and so marking it as initialized opens the
> > > + * door to leaks of uninitialized stack memory.
> > > + */
> > > + if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
> > > + *stype = new_type;
> >
> > 'leaks of uninitialized stack memory'...
> > well that's true, but the way the user would have to deal with this
> > is to use __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16); for the whole buffer
> > before doing var_off write into it.
> > In the test in patch 5 would be good to add a read after this write:
> > buf[len] = buf[idx];
> > // need to do another read of buf[len] here.
> >
> > Without memset() it would fail and the user would flame us:
> > "I just wrote into this stack slot!! Why cannot the verifier figure out
> > that the read from the same location is safe?... stupid verifier..."
> >
> > I think for your use case where you read the whole thing into a stack and
> > then parse it all locations potentially touched by reads/writes would
> > be already written via helper, but imo this error is too unpleasant to
> > explain to users.
> > Especially since it happens later at a different instruction there is
> > no good verifier hint we can print.
> > It would just hit 'invalid read from stack'.
> >
> > Currently we don't allow uninit read from stack even for root.
> > I think we have to sacrifice the perfection of the verification here.
> > We can either allow reading uninit for _fixed and _var_off
> > or better yet do unconditional '*stype = new_type' here.
> > Yes it would mean that following _fixed or _var_off read could be
> > reading uninited stack. I think we have to do it for the sake
> > of user friendliness.
> > The completely buggy uninited reads from stack will still be disallowed.
> > Only the [min,max] of var_off range in stack will be considered
> > init, so imo it's a reasonable trade-off between user friendliness
> > and verifier's perfection.
> > Wdyt?
>
> I'm happy to do whatever you tell me. But, I dunno, the verifier
> currently seems to be paranoid in ways I don't even understand (around
> speculative execution). In comparison, preventing trivial leaks of
> uninitialized memory seems relatively important. We're only talking
> about root here (as you've noted), and other various checks are less
> paranoid for root, so maybe it's no big deal. Where does the stack
> memory come from? Can it be *any* previously used kernel memory?
> A few possible alternatives (without necessarily knowing what I'm
> talking about):
> 1) Perhaps it wouldn't be a big deal to zero-initialize all the stack
> memory (up to 512 bytes) for a program. Is that out of the question?
> In many cases it'd be less than 512 bytes; the verifier knows the max
> stack needed. If the stack was always initialized, various verifier
> checks could go away.
Even if stack usage is small, like 64 byte, bzero of it has noticeable
perf penalty.
> 2) We could leave this patch as is, and work on improving the error
> you get on rejected stack reads after var-offset stack writes. I think
> the verifier could track what stack slots might have or might have not
> been written to, and when a read to such an uncertain slot is
> rejected, it could point to the previous var-off write (or one of the
> possibly many such writes) and suggest a memset. Sounds potentially
> complicated though.
too complicated imo.
> 3) Perhaps we could augment helper metadata with information about
> whether each helper promises to overwrite every byte in the buffer
> it's being passed in. This wouldn't solve the general usability
> problem we're discussing, but it would make common cases just work.
> Namely, bpf_probe_read_user() can make the required promise.
> bpf_probe_read_user_str(), however, could not.
eventually yes. That's orthogonal to this patch set.
>
> But, again, if you think relaxing the verification is OK, I'm very
> happy to do that.
The tracing progs can read stack with bpf_probe_read_kernel anyway, so
I would prefer to relax it to improve ease of use.
Unconditional *stype = new_type; here would do the trick.
Not for unpriv, of course.
Probably another 'bool' flag (instead of jumbo allow_ptr_leaks)
like 'allow_uninit_stack' that is set with perfmon_capable().
> > >
> > > tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
> > > - verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> > > + verbose(env, "var-offset stack reads only permitted to register; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
> >
> > The message is confusing. "read to register"? what is "read to not register" ?
> > Users won't be able to figure out that it means helpers access.
> > Also nowadays it means that atomic ops won't be able to use var_off into stack.
> > I think both limitations are ok for now. Only the message needs to be clear.
>
> What message would you suggest? Would you plumb information about what
> the read type is (helper vs atomic op)?
Something like: "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper functions" ?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access
2021-01-27 22:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2021-01-30 22:55 ` Andrei Matei
@ 2021-02-07 1:11 ` Andrei Matei
1 sibling, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-02-07 1:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov; +Cc: bpf, ast
> > +/* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
> > + * bounds.
> > + *
> > + * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
> > + */
> > +static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
> > + struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> > + int regno, int off, int access_size,
> > + enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
> > + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
> > + struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> > + int min_off, max_off;
> > + int err;
> > + char *err_extra;
> > +
> > + if (src == ACCESS_HELPER)
>
> the ACCESS_HELPER|DIRECT enum should probably be moved right before this function.
> It's not used earlier, I think, and it made the reviewing a bit harder than could have been.
It is, unfortunately. ACCESS_DIRECT is used close to where it is
defined, in check_stack_read_var_off().
>
> > + /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */
> > + err_extra = " indirect access to";
> > + else if (type == BPF_READ)
> > + err_extra = " read from";
> > + else
> > + err_extra = " write to";
>
> Thanks for improving verifier errors.
>
> > +
> > + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
> > + min_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
> > + if (access_size > 0)
> > + max_off = min_off + access_size - 1;
> > + else
> > + max_off = min_off;
> > + } else {
> > + if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
> > + reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
>
> hmm. are you sure about smax in both conditions? looks like typo?
This is how it used to be before this patch btw, but I think you're
right. It looks like the second one should have been smin_value.
Fixing here.
Existing code: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/1e0d27fce010b0a4a9e595506b6ede75934c31be/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L3721
>
> > + verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
> > + err_extra, regno);
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + }
> > + min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> > + if (access_size > 0)
> > + max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
> > + else
> > + max_off = min_off;
> > + }
>
> The rest looks good.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/5] selftest/bpf: adjust expected verifier errors
2021-01-24 19:49 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] " Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-24 19:49 ` Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/5] selftest/bpf: verifier tests for var-off access Andrei Matei
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-24 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast; +Cc: Andrei Matei
The verifier errors around stack accesses have changed slightly in the
previous commit (generally for the better).
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/verifier/basic_stack.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 4 ++--
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/const_or.c | 4 ++--
.../bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c | 12 +++++-----
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c | 6 ++---
.../selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c | 10 ++++-----
.../selftests/bpf/verifier/stack_ptr.c | 22 +++++++++++--------
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c | 16 +++++++-------
9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/basic_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/basic_stack.c
index b56f8117c09d..f995777dddb3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/basic_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/basic_stack.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, 8, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
index c4f5d909e58a..eb888c8479c3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 23 },
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
+ .errstr = "invalid read from stack R7 off=-16 size=8",
},
{
"calls: two calls that receive map_value via arg=ptr_stack_of_caller. test1",
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_48b = { 6 },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/const_or.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/const_or.c
index 6c214c58e8d4..0719b0ddec04 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/const_or.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/const_or.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-48 access_size=58",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R1 off=-48 size=58",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-48 access_size=58",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R1 off=-48 size=58",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c
index 87c4e7900083..0ab7f1dfc97a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -64+0 size 64",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R1 off=-64 size=65",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R1 off=-64 size=65",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R1 off=-64 size=65",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -64+0 size 64",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, -16),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -64+32 size 64",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+32 size 64",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c
index ca3b4729df66..070893fb2900 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
},
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL,
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+0 size 8",
},
{
"ARG_PTR_TO_LONG half-uninitialized",
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
},
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL,
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -16+4 size 8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+4 size 8",
},
{
"ARG_PTR_TO_LONG misaligned",
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
},
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL,
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R4 off=-4 access_size=8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R4 off=-4 size=8",
},
{
"ARG_PTR_TO_LONG initialized",
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c
index 193d9e87d5a9..cc8e8c3cdc03 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/raw_stack.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -8+0 size 8",
+ .errstr = "invalid read from stack R6 off=-8 size=8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R3",
+ .errstr = "invalid zero-sized read",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-513 access_size=8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R3 off=-513 size=8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-1 access_size=8",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect access to stack R3 off=-1 size=8",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack type R3 off=-512 access_size=0",
+ .errstr = "invalid zero-sized read",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
},
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/stack_ptr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/stack_ptr.c
index 8bfeb77c60bd..07eaa04412ae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/stack_ptr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/stack_ptr.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off=-79992 size=8",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack R1 off=-79992 size=8",
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
},
{
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off=0 size=8",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack R1 off=0 size=8",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK check high 1",
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
- .errstr = "invalid stack off=0 size=1",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack R1 off=0 size=1",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack R1",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK check high 6",
@@ -131,7 +132,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK check high 7",
@@ -183,7 +185,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
- .errstr = "invalid stack off=-513 size=1",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack R1 off=-513 size=1",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -208,7 +210,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK check low 6",
@@ -220,7 +223,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid stack off",
+ .errstr = "invalid write to stack",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
},
{
"PTR_TO_STACK check low 7",
@@ -292,7 +296,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "invalid stack off=0 size=1",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid write to stack R1 off=0 size=1",
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 42,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
index ee298627abae..b018ad71e0a8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
index 8504ac937809..49b78a1a261b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
{
- "variable-offset stack access",
+ "variable-offset stack read, priv vs unpriv",
.insns = {
/* Fill the top 8 bytes of the stack */
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "R4 unbounded indirect variable offset stack access",
+ .errstr = "invalid unbounded variable-offset indirect access to stack R4",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS,
},
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 },
- .errstr = "R2 max value is outside of stack bound",
+ .errstr = "invalid variable-offset indirect access to stack R2",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 },
- .errstr = "R2 min value is outside of stack bound",
+ .errstr = "invalid variable-offset indirect access to stack R2",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack var_off",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 var_off",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack var_off",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 var_off",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 6 },
- .errstr_unpriv = "R2 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for !root",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack var_off",
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 var_off",
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS,
},
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/5] selftest/bpf: verifier tests for var-off access
2021-01-24 19:49 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] " Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/5] selftest/bpf: adjust expected verifier errors Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-24 19:49 ` Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/5] selftest/bpf: move utility function to tests header Andrei Matei
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access Andrei Matei
4 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-24 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast; +Cc: Andrei Matei
Add tests for the new functionality - reading and writing to the stack
through a variable-offset pointer.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
index 49b78a1a261b..a03ad17d73fa 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
@@ -31,14 +31,102 @@
* we don't know which
*/
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- /* dereference it */
+ /* dereference it for a stack read */
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root",
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+},
+{
+ "variable-offset stack read, uninitialized",
+ .insns = {
+ /* Get an unknown value */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ /* add it to fp. We now have either fp-4 or fp-8, but
+ * we don't know which
+ */
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ /* dereference it for a stack read */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff8; 0x4)",
.result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "invalid variable-offset read from stack R2",
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
+{
+ "variable-offset stack write, priv vs unpriv",
+ .insns = {
+ /* Get an unknown value */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* Make it small and 8-byte aligned */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ /* add it to fp. We now have either fp-8 or fp-16, but
+ * we don't know which
+ */
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ /* dereference it for a stack write */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ /* Variable stack access is rejected.
+ */
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+ "variable-offset stack write clobbers spilled regs",
+ .insns = {
+ /* Dummy instruction; needed because we need to patch the next one
+ * and we can't patch the first instruction.
+ */
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 0),
+ /* Make R0 a map ptr */
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ /* Get an unknown value */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ /* Make it small and 8-byte aligned */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-8 or fp-16, but
+ * we don't know which.
+ */
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ /* Spill R0(map ptr) into stack */
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ /* Dereference the unknown value for a stack write */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ /* Fill the register back into R2 */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -8),
+ /* Try to dereference R2 for a memory load */
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 1 },
+ /* The unpriviledged case is not too interesting; variable
+ * stack access is rejected.
+ */
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* In the priviledged case, dereferencing a spilled-and-then-filled
+ * register is rejected because the previous variable offset stack
+ * write might have overwritten the spilled pointer (i.e. we lose track
+ * of the spilled register when we analyze the write).
+ */
+ .errstr = "R2 invalid mem access 'inv'",
+ .result = REJECT,
+},
{
"indirect variable-offset stack access, unbounded",
.insns = {
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/5] selftest/bpf: move utility function to tests header
2021-01-24 19:49 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access Andrei Matei
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/5] selftest/bpf: verifier tests for var-off access Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-24 19:49 ` Andrei Matei
2021-01-26 2:33 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access Andrei Matei
4 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-24 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast; +Cc: Andrei Matei
get_base_addr is generally useful for tests attaching uprobes. This
patch moves it from one particular test to test_progs.{h,c}. The
function will be used by a second test in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c | 21 ----------------
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
index a0ee87c8e1ea..3bda8acbbafb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
@@ -2,27 +2,6 @@
#include <test_progs.h>
#include "test_attach_probe.skel.h"
-ssize_t get_base_addr() {
- size_t start, offset;
- char buf[256];
- FILE *f;
-
- f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
- if (!f)
- return -errno;
-
- while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%*x %s %zx %*[^\n]\n",
- &start, buf, &offset) == 3) {
- if (strcmp(buf, "r-xp") == 0) {
- fclose(f);
- return start - offset;
- }
- }
-
- fclose(f);
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
void test_attach_probe(void)
{
int duration = 0;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
index 213628ee721c..6d3354ae4034 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
@@ -423,6 +423,31 @@ static int load_bpf_testmod(void)
return 0;
}
+/* find the address at which the executable section of the current program has
+ * been loaded.
+ */
+ssize_t get_base_addr(void)
+{
+ size_t start, offset;
+ char buf[256];
+ FILE *f;
+
+ f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return -errno;
+
+ while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%*x %s %zx %*[^\n]\n",
+ &start, buf, &offset) == 3) {
+ if (strcmp(buf, "r-xp") == 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ return start - offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fclose(f);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/* extern declarations for test funcs */
#define DEFINE_TEST(name) extern void test_##name(void);
#include <prog_tests/tests.h>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
index f7c2fd89d01a..7a1eafd7ae77 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ int compare_map_keys(int map1_fd, int map2_fd);
int compare_stack_ips(int smap_fd, int amap_fd, int stack_trace_len);
int extract_build_id(char *build_id, size_t size);
int kern_sync_rcu(void);
+ssize_t get_base_addr(void);
#ifdef __x86_64__
#define SYS_NANOSLEEP_KPROBE_NAME "__x64_sys_nanosleep"
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/5] selftest/bpf: move utility function to tests header
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/5] selftest/bpf: move utility function to tests header Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-26 2:33 ` Andrii Nakryiko
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2021-01-26 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrei Matei; +Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov
On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 11:54 AM Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> get_base_addr is generally useful for tests attaching uprobes. This
> patch moves it from one particular test to test_progs.{h,c}. The
> function will be used by a second test in the next patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
> ---
trace_helpers.{c,h} seem more appropriate as a destination
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c | 21 ----------------
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
> index a0ee87c8e1ea..3bda8acbbafb 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c
> @@ -2,27 +2,6 @@
> #include <test_progs.h>
> #include "test_attach_probe.skel.h"
>
[...]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access
2021-01-24 19:49 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/5] bpf: allow variable-offset stack access Andrei Matei
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/5] selftest/bpf: move utility function to tests header Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-24 19:49 ` Andrei Matei
2021-01-26 2:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
4 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-01-24 19:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast; +Cc: Andrei Matei
Add a higher-level test (C BPF program) for the new functionality -
variable access stack reads and writes.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c | 43 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c4c47fb0f0af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "test_stack_var_off.skel.h"
+
+int dummy;
+
+noinline void uprobed_function(char *s, int len)
+{
+ /* Do something to keep the compiler from removing the function.
+ */
+ dummy++;
+}
+
+void test_stack_var_off(void)
+{
+ int duration = 0;
+ struct bpf_link *uprobe_link;
+ struct test_stack_var_off *skel;
+ size_t uprobe_offset;
+ ssize_t base_addr;
+ char s[100];
+
+ base_addr = get_base_addr();
+ if (CHECK(base_addr < 0, "get_base_addr",
+ "failed to find base addr: %zd", base_addr))
+ return;
+ uprobe_offset = (size_t)&uprobed_function - base_addr;
+
+ skel = test_stack_var_off__open_and_load();
+ if (CHECK(!skel, "skel_open", "failed to open skeleton\n"))
+ return;
+ if (CHECK(!skel->bss, "check_bss", ".bss wasn't mmap()-ed\n"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ uprobe_link = bpf_program__attach_uprobe(skel->progs.uprobe,
+ false /* retprobe */,
+ 0 /* self pid */,
+ "/proc/self/exe",
+ uprobe_offset);
+ if (CHECK(IS_ERR(uprobe_link), "attach_uprobe",
+ "err %ld\n", PTR_ERR(uprobe_link)))
+ goto cleanup;
+ skel->links.uprobe = uprobe_link;
+
+ /* trigger uprobe */
+ s[0] = 1;
+ s[1] = 10;
+ uprobed_function(&s[0], 2);
+
+ if (CHECK(skel->bss->uprobe_res != 10, "check_uprobe_res",
+ "wrong uprobe res: %d\n", skel->bss->uprobe_res))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ test_stack_var_off__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..44f982684541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2017 Facebook
+
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+int uprobe_res;
+
+SEC("uprobe/func")
+int BPF_KPROBE(uprobe, char *s, int len)
+{
+ /* This BPF program performs variable-offset reads and writes on a
+ * stack-allocated buffer.
+ */
+ char buf[16];
+ unsigned long idx;
+ char out;
+
+ /* Zero-out the buffer so we can read anywhere inside it. */
+ __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16);
+ /* Copy the contents of s from user-space. */
+ len &= 0xf;
+ if (bpf_probe_read_user(&buf, len, s)) {
+ bpf_printk("error reading user mem\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Index into the buffer at an unknown offset that comes from the
+ * buffer itself. This is a variable-offset stack read.
+ */
+ idx = buf[0];
+ idx &= 0xf;
+ out = buf[idx];
+ /* Append something to the buffer. The position where we append it
+ * is unknown. This is a variable-offset stack write.
+ */
+ buf[len] = buf[idx];
+ uprobe_res = out;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.27.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access
2021-01-24 19:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access Andrei Matei
@ 2021-01-26 2:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2021-02-07 1:11 ` Andrei Matei
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2021-01-26 2:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrei Matei; +Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov
On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 11:54 AM Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Add a higher-level test (C BPF program) for the new functionality -
> variable access stack reads and writes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
> ---
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
> .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c | 43 ++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c4c47fb0f0af
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#include <test_progs.h>
> +#include "test_stack_var_off.skel.h"
> +
> +int dummy;
> +
> +noinline void uprobed_function(char *s, int len)
> +{
> + /* Do something to keep the compiler from removing the function.
> + */
> + dummy++;
> +}
> +
> +void test_stack_var_off(void)
> +{
> + int duration = 0;
> + struct bpf_link *uprobe_link;
> + struct test_stack_var_off *skel;
> + size_t uprobe_offset;
> + ssize_t base_addr;
> + char s[100];
> +
> + base_addr = get_base_addr();
> + if (CHECK(base_addr < 0, "get_base_addr",
> + "failed to find base addr: %zd", base_addr))
> + return;
> + uprobe_offset = (size_t)&uprobed_function - base_addr;
> +
> + skel = test_stack_var_off__open_and_load();
> + if (CHECK(!skel, "skel_open", "failed to open skeleton\n"))
> + return;
> + if (CHECK(!skel->bss, "check_bss", ".bss wasn't mmap()-ed\n"))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> + uprobe_link = bpf_program__attach_uprobe(skel->progs.uprobe,
> + false /* retprobe */,
> + 0 /* self pid */,
> + "/proc/self/exe",
> + uprobe_offset);
> + if (CHECK(IS_ERR(uprobe_link), "attach_uprobe",
> + "err %ld\n", PTR_ERR(uprobe_link)))
> + goto cleanup;
> + skel->links.uprobe = uprobe_link;
> +
> + /* trigger uprobe */
> + s[0] = 1;
> + s[1] = 10;
> + uprobed_function(&s[0], 2);
I don't think uprobe() is essential to this test and just obscured
what is being tested. I'd just use a global variable to pass whatever
input data you need and use usleep(1), just like lots of other tests.
> +
> + if (CHECK(skel->bss->uprobe_res != 10, "check_uprobe_res",
> + "wrong uprobe res: %d\n", skel->bss->uprobe_res))
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> +cleanup:
> + test_stack_var_off__destroy(skel);
> +}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..44f982684541
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +// Copyright (c) 2017 Facebook
> +
> +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
> +
> +int uprobe_res;
> +
> +SEC("uprobe/func")
> +int BPF_KPROBE(uprobe, char *s, int len)
> +{
> + /* This BPF program performs variable-offset reads and writes on a
> + * stack-allocated buffer.
> + */
> + char buf[16];
> + unsigned long idx;
> + char out;
> +
> + /* Zero-out the buffer so we can read anywhere inside it. */
> + __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16);
> + /* Copy the contents of s from user-space. */
> + len &= 0xf;
> + if (bpf_probe_read_user(&buf, len, s)) {
> + bpf_printk("error reading user mem\n");
> + return 1;
> + }
> + /* Index into the buffer at an unknown offset that comes from the
> + * buffer itself. This is a variable-offset stack read.
> + */
> + idx = buf[0];
> + idx &= 0xf;
> + out = buf[idx];
> + /* Append something to the buffer. The position where we append it
> + * is unknown. This is a variable-offset stack write.
> + */
> + buf[len] = buf[idx];
> + uprobe_res = out;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> --
> 2.27.0
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/5] selftest/bpf: add test for var-offset stack access
2021-01-26 2:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
@ 2021-02-07 1:11 ` Andrei Matei
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Matei @ 2021-02-07 1:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrii Nakryiko; +Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov
done in v3. Thanks!
On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:37 PM Andrii Nakryiko
<andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2021 at 11:54 AM Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Add a higher-level test (C BPF program) for the new functionality -
> > variable access stack reads and writes.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
> > .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c | 43 ++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..c4c47fb0f0af
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_var_off.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#include <test_progs.h>
> > +#include "test_stack_var_off.skel.h"
> > +
> > +int dummy;
> > +
> > +noinline void uprobed_function(char *s, int len)
> > +{
> > + /* Do something to keep the compiler from removing the function.
> > + */
> > + dummy++;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void test_stack_var_off(void)
> > +{
> > + int duration = 0;
> > + struct bpf_link *uprobe_link;
> > + struct test_stack_var_off *skel;
> > + size_t uprobe_offset;
> > + ssize_t base_addr;
> > + char s[100];
> > +
> > + base_addr = get_base_addr();
> > + if (CHECK(base_addr < 0, "get_base_addr",
> > + "failed to find base addr: %zd", base_addr))
> > + return;
> > + uprobe_offset = (size_t)&uprobed_function - base_addr;
> > +
> > + skel = test_stack_var_off__open_and_load();
> > + if (CHECK(!skel, "skel_open", "failed to open skeleton\n"))
> > + return;
> > + if (CHECK(!skel->bss, "check_bss", ".bss wasn't mmap()-ed\n"))
> > + goto cleanup;
> > +
> > + uprobe_link = bpf_program__attach_uprobe(skel->progs.uprobe,
> > + false /* retprobe */,
> > + 0 /* self pid */,
> > + "/proc/self/exe",
> > + uprobe_offset);
> > + if (CHECK(IS_ERR(uprobe_link), "attach_uprobe",
> > + "err %ld\n", PTR_ERR(uprobe_link)))
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + skel->links.uprobe = uprobe_link;
> > +
> > + /* trigger uprobe */
> > + s[0] = 1;
> > + s[1] = 10;
> > + uprobed_function(&s[0], 2);
>
> I don't think uprobe() is essential to this test and just obscured
> what is being tested. I'd just use a global variable to pass whatever
> input data you need and use usleep(1), just like lots of other tests.
>
> > +
> > + if (CHECK(skel->bss->uprobe_res != 10, "check_uprobe_res",
> > + "wrong uprobe res: %d\n", skel->bss->uprobe_res))
> > + goto cleanup;
> > +
> > +cleanup:
> > + test_stack_var_off__destroy(skel);
> > +}
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..44f982684541
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_stack_var_off.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +// Copyright (c) 2017 Facebook
> > +
> > +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
> > +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> > +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> > +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
> > +
> > +int uprobe_res;
> > +
> > +SEC("uprobe/func")
> > +int BPF_KPROBE(uprobe, char *s, int len)
> > +{
> > + /* This BPF program performs variable-offset reads and writes on a
> > + * stack-allocated buffer.
> > + */
> > + char buf[16];
> > + unsigned long idx;
> > + char out;
> > +
> > + /* Zero-out the buffer so we can read anywhere inside it. */
> > + __builtin_memset(&buf, 0, 16);
> > + /* Copy the contents of s from user-space. */
> > + len &= 0xf;
> > + if (bpf_probe_read_user(&buf, len, s)) {
> > + bpf_printk("error reading user mem\n");
> > + return 1;
> > + }
> > + /* Index into the buffer at an unknown offset that comes from the
> > + * buffer itself. This is a variable-offset stack read.
> > + */
> > + idx = buf[0];
> > + idx &= 0xf;
> > + out = buf[idx];
> > + /* Append something to the buffer. The position where we append it
> > + * is unknown. This is a variable-offset stack write.
> > + */
> > + buf[len] = buf[idx];
> > + uprobe_res = out;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> > --
> > 2.27.0
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread