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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
	reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 2/4] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 11:14:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <841747d7-ab17-2904-ea1d-6adb3d35c711@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c3751b2b-aa4b-2105-c238-29816bc85607@schaufler-ca.com>

On 4/5/2023 11:07 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 4/5/2023 1:49 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 5, 2023 at 4:43 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>> On 4/5/2023 12:59 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Apr 5, 2023 at 5:44 AM Roberto Sassu
>>>> <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 4/5/2023 4:08 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/4/2023 11:54 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 31, 2023 at 8:33 AM Roberto Sassu
>>>>>>> <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>>>> ..
>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>>>>> index cfcbb748da2..8392983334b 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -52,6 +52,15 @@
>>>>>>>>    #define SMK_RECEIVING  1
>>>>>>>>    #define SMK_SENDING    2
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> +/*
>>>>>>>> + * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
>>>>>>>> + * SMACK64 - for access control, SMACK64EXEC - label for the program,
>>>>>>> I think it would be good to move SMACK64EXEC to its own line; it took
>>>>>>> me a minute to figure out why SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS was set to '4'
>>>>>>> when I only say three comment lines ... ;)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> + * SMACK64MMAP - controls library loading,
>>>>>>>> + * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
>>>>>>>> + * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> +#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 4
>>>>>>> If smack_inode_init_security() only ever populates a single xattr, and
>>>>>>> that is the only current user of SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, can we make
>>>>>>> this '1' and shrink the xattr allocation a bit?
>>>>>> If the parent directory is marked with SMACK64_TRANSMUTE, the access
>>>>>> rule allowing the access has the "t" mode, and the object being initialized
>>>>>> is a directory, the new inode should get the SMACK64_TRANSMUTE attribute.
>>>>>> The callers of security_inode_init_security() don't seem to care.
>>>>>> I can't say if the evm code is getting SMACK64_TRANSMUTE or, for that
>>>>>> matter, SMACK64_EXEC and SMACK64_MMAP, some other way. The older system
>>>>>> allowed for multiple Smack xattrs, but I'm not clear on exactly how.
>>>>> If you like to set an additional xattr, that would be possible now.
>>>>> Since we reserve multiple xattrs, we can call lsm_get_xattr_slot()
>>>>> another time and set SMACK64_TRANSMUTE.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think, if the kernel config has CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS set,
>>>>> EVM would protect SMACK64_TRANSMUTE too.
>>>> Ooookay, but can someone explain to me how either the current, or
>>>> patched, smack_inode_init_security() function can return multiple
>>>> xattrs via the security_inode_init_security() LSM hook?
>>> It can't.
>> I didn't think so.
>>
>> To be really specific, that's what we're talking about with this
>> patch: the number of xattrs that smack_inode_init_security() can
>> return to the LSM hook (and EVM, and the caller ...).  If it's only
>> ever going to be one, I think we can adjust the
>> 'SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS' down to '1' and save ourselves some
>> allocation space.
> 
> Does evm have an expectation that mumble_inode_init_security() is
> going to report all the relevant attributes? It has to be getting
> them somehow, which leads me to wonder if we might want to extend
> smack_inode_init_security() to do so. Even if we did, the maximum
> value would be '2', SMACK64 and SMACK64_TRANSMUTE. Now that would
> require a whole lot of work in the calling filesystems, as setting
> the transmute attribute would be moving out of smack_d_instantiate()
> and into the callers. Or something like that.

After changing the inode_init_security hook definition to pass the full 
xattr array, this is not going to be a problem. EVM sees all xattrs that 
are going to be set when an inode is created, and adds its own too.

If you have enough information to set security.SMACK_TRANSMUTE64 in 
smack_inode_init_security(), this patch sets already allows to set both 
xattrs at the same time. We would just need to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() 
another time, assuming that we reserve two xattrs.

Roberto


  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-06  9:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-31 12:32 [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 1/4] reiserfs: Add security prefix to xattr name in reiserfs_security_write() Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:25   ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 2/4] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:54   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05  2:08     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05  9:43       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-05 19:59         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 20:43           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05 20:49             ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 21:07               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06  9:14                 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-04-06 16:17                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06  9:08             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11  7:53     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 16:42       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-11 17:23         ` [PATCH] Smack modifications for: " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:54           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12  7:22             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-12 20:29               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-13  7:11                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-17 16:41                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18  7:05                     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-18 16:02                       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 13:46                         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-19 19:25                           ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-04-20  8:48                             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-08 12:29                               ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-09 23:44                                 ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-05-09 23:56                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 21:00                           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-20  8:50                             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-20 10:44                               ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-20 14:10                                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:25         ` [PATCH v10 2/4] " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:40           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 3/4] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:56   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11  7:58     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 4/4] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-03 10:36 ` [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Mimi Zohar

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