From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Smack modifications for: security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2023 09:41:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <91f05dc4-a4b7-b40a-ba1a-0ccc489c84b2@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <82ee6ddf66bb34470aa7b591df4d70783fdb2422.camel@huaweicloud.com>
On 4/13/2023 12:11 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-04-12 at 13:29 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/12/2023 12:22 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2023-04-11 at 10:54 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 4/11/2023 10:23 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Very very quick modification. Not tested.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> security/smack/smack.h | 2 +-
>>>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>>>>> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
>>>>> index e2239be7bd6..f00c8498c60 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
>>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
>>>>> @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct task_smack {
>>>>>
>>>>> #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
>>>>> #define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
>>>>> -#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
>>>>> +#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted (unused) */
>>>> See below ...
>>>>
>>>>> #define SMK_INODE_IMPURE 0x08 /* involved in an impure transaction */
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> index 8392983334b..b43820bdbd0 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>>> @@ -54,12 +54,12 @@
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
>>>>> - * SMACK64 - for access control, SMACK64EXEC - label for the program,
>>>>> - * SMACK64MMAP - controls library loading,
>>>>> + * SMACK64 - for access control,
>>>>> * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
>>>>> - * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT
>>>>> + * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT,
>>>>> + * Must be set explicitly - SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP
>>>>> */
>>>>> -#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 4
>>>>> +#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 2
>>>>>
>>>>> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
>>>>> static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
>>>>> @@ -957,11 +957,11 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> const struct qstr *qstr,
>>>>> struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
>>>>> {
>>>>> - struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
>>>>> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>>>>> struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
>>>>> struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
>>>>> struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
>>>>> + struct xattr *xattr2;
>>>> I'm going to channel Paul and suggest this be xattr_transmute instead of xattr2.
>>>> It also looks like it could move to be declared in the if clause.
>>>>
>>>>> int may;
>>>>>
>>>>> if (xattr) {
>>>>> @@ -979,7 +979,17 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>>>>> if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
>>>>> smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
>>>>> isp = dsp;
>>>>> - issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
>>>> I think you need to keep this. More below.
>>>>
>>>>> + xattr2 = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
>>>>> + if (xattr2) {
>>>>> + xattr2->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
>>>>> + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
>>>>> + GFP_NOFS);
>>>>> + if (xattr2->value == NULL)
>>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + xattr2->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
>>>>> + xattr2->name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
>>>>> @@ -3512,20 +3522,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
>>>>> * If there is a transmute attribute on the
>>>>> * directory mark the inode.
>>>>> */
>>>>> - if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
>>>>> - isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
>>>>> - rc = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dp, inode,
>>>>> - XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
>>>>> - TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
>>>>> - 0);
>>>>> - } else {
>>>>> - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
>>>>> - XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
>>>>> - TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
>>>>> - if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
>>>>> - TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
>>>>> - rc = -EINVAL;
>>>>> - }
>>>>> + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
>>>>> + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
>>>>> + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
>>>>> + if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
>>>>> + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
>>>>> + rc = -EINVAL;
>>>> Where is the SMACK64_TRANSMUTE attribute going to get set on the file?
>>>> It's not going to get set in smack_init_inode_security(). The inode will
>>> Isn't that the purpose of the inode_init_security hook?
>> No. It initializes the in-memory inode.
> I hope I'm not mistaken here...
>
> I make a small example. Filesystems call
> security_inode_init_security(). Ext4 does:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c?h=v6.3-rc6#n54
>
> security_inode_init_security() allocates new_xattrs. Each LSM fills
> new_xattrs. At the end of the loop, if there is at least one xattr
> filled, the initxattrs() callback passed by the caller of
> security_inode_init_security() is called.
>
> The ext4 initxattrs() callback is:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c?h=v6.3-rc6#n35
>
> which scans the xattr array and, for each xattr,
> calls ext4_xattr_set_handle().
>
> Maybe I'm overlooking it, but ext4_xattr_set_handle() is setting xattrs
> on the disk. Am I wrong?
Yes, you're wrong. I tried your change, and the SMACK64_TRANSMUTE isn't
set on the sub-directory when it's created. The __vfs_setxattr() call really
is necessary.
>
> Thanks
>
> Roberto
>
>>> After all LSMs provide one or multiple xattrs, xattrs are going to be
>>> written to the disk with the initxattr() callback of filesystems.
>>>
>>> There is a small mistake above (XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE instead
>>> of XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, as we are providing just the suffix).
>>>
>>> After fixing that, Smack tests succeed:
>> It's over a decade since I seriously looked at this code path,
>> but I'm pretty sure the __vfs_setxattr() call is necessary to get
>> the attribute written out. With your change the in-memory inode will
>> get the attribute, but if you reboot it won't be on the directory.
>>
>>> 95 Passed, 0 Failed, 100% Success rate
>>>
>>> There was a test failing in dir-transmute.sh, before I fixed the xattr
>>> name.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Roberto
>>>
>>>> know it's transmuting, but it won't get to disk without the __vfs_setxattr()
>>>> here in smack_d_instantiate(). Now, it's been a long time since that code
>>>> was written, so I could be wrong, but I'm pretty sure about that.
>>>>
>>>> I think that you should be fine with the changes in smack_init_inode_security(),
>>>> and leaving smack_d_instantiate() untouched.
>>>>
>>>>> if (rc >= 0)
>>>>> transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
>>>>> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-17 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-31 12:32 [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 1/4] reiserfs: Add security prefix to xattr name in reiserfs_security_write() Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:25 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 2/4] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:54 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 2:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05 9:43 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-05 19:59 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05 20:49 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 21:07 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06 9:14 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-06 16:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06 9:08 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 7:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 16:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-11 17:23 ` [PATCH] Smack modifications for: " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12 7:22 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-12 20:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-13 7:11 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-17 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-04-18 7:05 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-18 16:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 13:46 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-19 19:25 ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-04-20 8:48 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-08 12:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-09 23:44 ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-05-09 23:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 21:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-20 8:50 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-20 10:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-20 14:10 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:25 ` [PATCH v10 2/4] " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 3/4] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:56 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 7:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11 7:58 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 4/4] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 7:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-03 10:36 ` [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=91f05dc4-a4b7-b40a-ba1a-0ccc489c84b2@schaufler-ca.com \
--to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).