From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/18] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2020 09:02:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0e6b21ceae302f691fe9a66bc918c4c2b28d3049.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200908053459.GN68127@sol.localdomain>
On Mon, 2020-09-07 at 22:34 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 12:05:35PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > index 1b11e9af165e..88c672ccdcf8 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> > @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
> > #ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H
> > #define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H
> >
> > +#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
> >
> > #define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx"
> > @@ -16,6 +18,29 @@ int ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb);
> > int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
> > struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as);
> >
> > +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
> > +{
> > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
> > + return 0;
> > + return fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, fname);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
> > +{
> > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
> > + fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(fname);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline int ceph_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
> > +{
> > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
> > + return 0;
> > + return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode);
> > +}
> > +
> > +int ceph_fname_to_usr(struct inode *parent, char *name, u32 len,
> > + struct fscrypt_str *tname, struct fscrypt_str *oname);
> > +
> > #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */
> >
> > #define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(fsc) (0)
> > @@ -31,6 +56,28 @@ static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void ceph_fname_free_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline int ceph_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> This makes it so that readdir will succeed on encrypted directories when
> !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION. The other filesystems instead return an error code,
> which seems much better. Can you check what the other filesystems handle
> readdir?
>
Maybe. I'm not sure it's better.
It would be nice to be able to allow such clients to be able to clean
out an encrypted tree (given appropriate permissions, of course).
A network filesystem like this is a much different case than a local
one. We may have a swath of varying client kernel versions and
configurations that are operating on the same filesystem.
Where we draw that line is still being determined though.
> > +static bool fscrypt_key_status_change(struct dentry *dentry)
> > +{
> > + struct inode *dir;
> > + bool encrypted_name, have_key;
> > +
> > + lockdep_assert_held(&dentry->d_lock);
> > +
> > + dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
> > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir))
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + encrypted_name = dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME;
> > + have_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir);
> > +
> > + if (encrypted_name == have_key)
> > + ceph_dir_clear_complete(dir);
> > +
> > + dout("%s encrypted_name=%d have_key=%d\n", __func__, encrypted_name, have_key);
> > + return encrypted_name == have_key;
> > +}
> > +
>
> Only the no-key => key case needs to be handled, not key => no-key.
> Also, the caller already has 'dir', so there's no need to use ->d_parent.
>
> What's wrong with just:
>
> di = ceph_dentry(dentry);
> if (d_unhashed(dentry) ||
> d_really_is_negative(dentry) ||
> di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen ||
> + ((dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) &&
> + fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir))) {
> spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
> dput(dentry);
> err = -EAGAIN;
> goto out;
> }
Ok, I didn't realize that I didn't need to worry about key removal. Your
proposed scheme is simpler.
> > /*
> > * When possible, we try to satisfy a readdir by peeking at the
> > * dcache. We make this work by carefully ordering dentries on
> > @@ -238,11 +261,11 @@ static int __dcache_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > - spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
>
> Why delete this spin_lock()?
>
Yikes -- good catch! Fixed.
> > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) {
> > + spin_lock(&dn->d_lock);
> > + dn->d_flags |= DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME;
> > + spin_unlock(&dn->d_lock);
> > + }
>
> This is racy because fscrypt_has_encryption_key() could have been false when the
> dentry was created, then true here.
>
> Take a look at how __fscrypt_prepare_lookup() solves this problem.
Blech.
I guess I need to have ceph_fname_to_usr tell whether the name is a
nokey name, but that info is not currently returned
by fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr. I guess it will need to be...
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-09 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-04 16:05 [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/18] vfs: export new_inode_pseudo Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 3:38 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 11:27 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 22:31 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 10:47 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-09 16:12 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 16:51 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-09 18:49 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 19:24 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/18] fscrypt: drop unused inode argument from fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/18] fscrypt: export fscrypt_d_revalidate Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/18] fscrypt: add fscrypt_new_context_from_inode Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 3:48 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 11:29 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 12:29 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 22:34 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/18] fscrypt: don't balk when inode is already marked encrypted Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 3:52 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 12:54 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 23:08 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/18] fscrypt: move nokey_name conversion to separate function and export it Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 3:55 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 12:50 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 22:53 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 16:02 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/18] lib: lift fscrypt base64 conversion into lib/ Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 3:59 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 12:51 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/18] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/18] ceph: crypto context handling for ceph Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 4:29 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 16:14 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/18] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/18] ceph: add routine to create context prior to RPC Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 4:43 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/18] ceph: set S_ENCRYPTED bit if new inode has encryption.ctx xattr Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 4:57 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 12:20 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-09 15:53 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-09 16:33 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 17:19 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/18] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/18] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 5:06 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 12:24 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/18] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 5:12 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 12:26 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-09 16:18 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/18] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 5:34 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-09 13:02 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/18] ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/18] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets Jeff Layton
2020-09-04 16:11 ` Jeff Layton
2020-09-08 5:43 ` Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 5:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Eric Biggers
2020-09-08 12:09 ` Jeff Layton
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