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From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 3
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 17:32:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <=?utf-8?q?=3C44bd5915b7dd1466144496dd3e1adee15f07e6e2=2E158800?= =?utf-8?q?1639=2Egit=2Emgross=40linux=2Eintel=2Ecom=3E?=> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1588001639.git.mgross@linux.intel.com>

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 50db461961d2..5c1274beaf7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -912,9 +912,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -934,29 +934,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -974,7 +977,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -983,7 +986,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-27 15:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-27 15:33 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 0 mark gross
2018-01-01  1:52 ` [MODERATED] [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 1 Jia Zhang
2020-04-16 15:23 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 2 Mark Gross
2020-04-16 15:32 ` Mark Gross [this message]
2020-04-16 15:54 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 4 Mark Gross
2020-04-16 16:21 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 5/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 5 Mark Gross
2020-04-27 19:37 ` [PATCH 0/5] Slow Randomizing Boosts DoS v4.4.219 backport 0 Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-27 19:47   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-28 14:54     ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-28 15:35     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-28 21:27       ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-28 14:39   ` mark gross
2020-04-28 15:22     ` Greg KH
2020-04-28 21:38       ` mark gross
2020-04-28 22:25         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-29 15:04           ` [MODERATED] " mark gross

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